Forgotten in the diaspora: the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, 1948-2011 by Yassin, Lubna
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
6-1-2013 
Forgotten in the diaspora: the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, 
1948-2011 
Lubna Yassin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Yassin, L. (2013).Forgotten in the diaspora: the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, 1948-2011 [Master’s thesis, 
the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1034 
MLA Citation 
Yassin, Lubna. Forgotten in the diaspora: the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, 1948-2011. 2013. American 
University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1034 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Forgotten in the Diaspora: 
           The Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, 1948-2011 
 
      Lubna Ahmady Abdel Aziz Yassin 
     Middle East Studies Center (MEST) 
Spring, 2013 
  Thesis Advisor: Dr. Sherene Seikaly 
   Thesis First Reader: Dr. Pascale Ghazaleh 
  Thesis Second Reader: Dr. Hani Sayed 
 
  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
I. CHAPTER ONE: PART ONE: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………...…….4 
A. PART TWO: THE RISE OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE 
PROBLEM…………………………………………………………………………………..……………..13 
B. AL-NAKBA BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY…………………………………………………14 
C. EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PALESTINE CAUSE DURING THE 
MONARCHAL ERA………………………………………………………………………………………25  
D. PALESTINE IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS DURING THE INTERWAR 
PERIOD………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….38 
E. THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN EGYPT, 1948-1952………………………….……….41 
 
II. CHAPTER TWO: THE NASSER ERA, 1954-1970 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………….…45 
B. THE EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS, 1954-1970……………..………………..49 
C. PALESTINIANS AND THE NASEERIST PRESS………………………………………………..71 
D. PALESTINIAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS………………………………………………..…..77 
E. LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN EGYPT………………………….…...81 
 
III. CHAPTER THREE: THE SADAT ERA, 1970-1981 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND……………………………………………………………………….95 
B. EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS DURING THE SADAT ERA…………………102 
C. THE PRESS DURING THE SADAT ERA…………………………………………….……………108 
D. PALESTINE IN THE EGYPTIAN PRESS DURING THE SADAT ERA……………….…122 
E. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES DURING THE SADAT 
ERA……………………………………………………………………………………………………….…129 
 
IV. CHAPTER FOUR: THE MUBARAK ERA, 1981-2011 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND………………………………………………………………….…145 
B. EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS, 1981-2011…………………………………….152 
  
3 
 
C. THE PRESS DURING THE MUBARAK ERA……………………………………………….…175 
D. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES…………………………….…….…188 
E. CANADA CAMP………………………………………………………………………………………..199 
 
V. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………………208 
VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………...216 
 
 
  
4 
 
 
Chapter One 
Part One: Introduction 
 
Aim of the project: 
The present thesis examines the question of how political tensions affect refugees’ 
rights through analyzing the course of Egyptian-Palestinian relations spanning the 
different Egyptian regimes. Political tensions here refer to instances when Palestinian 
factions either grew directly at odds with the Egyptian regime, or entangled within the 
web of regional struggle for power. This thesis examines how shifting political discourses 
and interests affected the civil rights of stateless refugees in a host country. The project 
addresses the securitization of the Palestinians with special emphasis on refugee status 
and regime stability. By researching official political narratives, this research interrogates 
the deployment of “national security” discourse and its impact on refugees’ basic civil 
rights, or denial thereof. This project explores if and how the Camp David Accords of 
1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 changed the official Egyptian attitude 
towards the Palestinian refugees in Egypt. Other questions will include; how has Egypt’s 
status as a signatory to international and regional treaties related to the protection of the 
refugees affected the state’s policies regarding the Palestinian community? In this respect 
it is worth noting that Egypt ratified without reservations the Casablanca Accords of 1965 
which stipulated that the Palestinian refugees in signatory Arab host countries should be 
treated as equals to nationals.
1
 Additionally, despite some reservations Egypt and Tunisia 
were the only Arab countries to ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
                                                          
1. http://www.unchr.org/refworld/docid/460a2b252.html [accessed on 16 September 2011] 
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Refugees issued by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on 
22 May 1981.
2
 Egypt formulated reservations to articles 12 (paragraph 1), 20 and 22 
(paragraph 1), and articles 23 and 24. Egypt expressed a reservation to article 12 
(paragraph 1) because it contradicts the Egyptian internal laws. The original article 
provided that the personal status of a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country 
of his domicile or, failing this, of his residence. This formula, however, contradicts with 
article 25 of the Egyptian civil code which stipulates that: “in the case of persons without 
nationality or with more than one nationality at the same time. In the case of persons 
where there is a proof, in accordance with Egypt, of Egyptian nationality, and at the same 
time in accordance with one or more foreign country, of nationality of that country, the 
Egyptian law must be applied.”3 Concerning articles 20, 22 (paragraph 1), 23 and 24, 
Egypt expressed reservations because those articles considered refugees as equal to 
nationals in terms of accessing primary education and welfare services. The Egyptian 
authorities argued that it is more convenient to the competent authorities to approach the 
topic of the refugees on a case-by-case basis.
4
 It is also of importance to take into account 
that Egypt’s Palestinians fall under the terms of article 1D (paragraph 2) of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees issued by UNHCR.
5
  
This convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from 
organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations Higher 
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.  When such protection or 
assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being 
definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the 
                                                          
2. United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, 137  
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4add77d42.pdf  
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General Assembly of the United Nations, the persons shall ipso facto be entitled 
to the benefits of this Convention.
6
  
This case applies to the Palestinian refugees in Egypt, who unlike their 
counterparts in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, do not fall 
under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 
established in 1949 to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians displaced in 1948. 
However, the fact that the 1951 Convention failed to define dispersed Palestinians as 
refugees rendered them vulnerable vis-à-vis the host countries. The rationale behind this 
exclusion was based on the fact that Palestinian refugees were already receiving 
assistance from another UN organ; UNRWA in this case. But UNRWA offers only 
humanitarian assistance and not legal protection for refugees and it does not operate in all 
Arab countries hosting Palestinian refugees. Further, during the drafting of the 
Convention, Arab states opposed including Palestinians under the mandate of UNHCR, 
arguing that such inclusion will weaken the prospect of their right of return. By excluding 
Palestinian refugees from its wide definition, the Convention left the refugees in limbo 
with no concrete international legal protection enforcing the implementation of its articles 
by signatory states.
7
       
The project will also address the role of the press in shaping public opinion and 
narratives on issues such as national security. The project will also explore the role of the 
press in pushing certain topics to the forefront while pulling others to the background. It 
will also address the question of how the Egyptian press constructs the image of the 
Palestinians with special emphasis on moments of political tensions between Egypt and 
                                                          
6. Ibid. 
7. Lex Takkenberg, The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, (Oxford University Press, 
1998), 65-67 
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the Palestinian factions (i.e. singing the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty, 
tensions rising between Egypt and Hamas across the Gaza Strip boarders). 
The research addresses the political shifts in Egypt for over six decades. It begins 
with an analysis of Nasser’s pan-Arabism. It then moves to Sadat’s nationalist oriented 
(Egypt First) discourse and his close ties with the West generally and the United States 
specifically. The thesis will then explore the Mubarak era, which is largely a continuation 
of Sadat’s legacy. This project contributes to the existing scholarship investigating 
protection gaps in refugees’ studies, since it examines how shifting political discourses or 
conflicting interests would affect enacting refugees’ civil rights in host countries. The 
research investigates the extent of the integration and implementation of the terms of 
regional and international treaties within the Egyptian domestic legal apparatus. It is 
worth mentioning that whenever Egypt signs a treaty whether regional or international it 
automatically becomes integrated into the Egyptian legal system the day following its 
publication in the official gazette. Thus, it is important to examine whether or not such 
treaties are effectively enacted and what are the obstacles hindering their implementation.  
In other words, the project examines the gap between refugees’ realities and theoretical 
protection mechanisms. 
Literature Review: 
           There are limited sources that directly address the status of the Palestinian 
refugees in Egypt. The lack of official records or statistics revealing their exact number, 
locations, and activities further complicates this project. However, the fieldwork 
conducted between years 2003 and 2005 by Oroub El-Abed provides useful insights 
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regarding the livelihood of the Palestinians in Egypt since 1948.
8
 Additionally, studies by 
Abbas Shiblak, Maher Bitar, and Laurie A. Brand, provide a useful theoretical framework 
on the legal status of the stateless Palestinians in Arab host countries.
9
 These sources also 
pay special attention to the ways in which internal Arab politics and fluctuations in the 
relations between the Arab regimes and the Palestinian factions define and affect the 
status of the Palestinian refugees. 
         Further works essential to the project will include studies in international refugee 
law, providing a theoretical legal framework situating the Palestinian refugees in Egypt in 
a wider global socio-legal context.  In this respect the seminal study by Lex Takkenberg 
provides an in-depth analysis aiming at defining Palestinian refugee status within the 
paradigms of international protection laws along with addressing their status in the Arab 
world from a legal perspective.
10
 Furthermore, a set of independent reports provides a 
comprehensive approach to examine the status of Egypt as a host country including those 
of Sherifa Shafie, Asem Khalil, and Katarzyna Grabska.
11
 Such studies analyze the status 
of Egypt as a refugee receiving country over different decades; those reports also address 
the different types of refugees residing in Egypt and their respective socio-economic and 
legal status. 
                                                          
8. Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 2009 
9. “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1996), 36-45 
 “Unprotected Among Bothers: Palestinians in the Arab World,” University of Oxford, Refugee Studies 
Center, Working Paper Series, Jan. 2008, RSC Working Paper No. 44 
Palestinians in the Arab World.  Columbia University Press, 1988 
10. The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law, 1998 
11. “Palestinian Refugees in Arab States: A Rights – Based Approach,” CARIM Research Reports 2009/08 
“Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt,” Forced Migration and 
Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, Egypt, July 2006 
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           For examining the press’ role in shaping public opinion, Ghada Hashem Talhami’s 
comparative study on the process of constructing the image of the Palestinians through 
the lens of both the official and independent Egyptian press across the past six decades is 
very useful.
12
 Additional sources include studies by Mustapha K. El-Sayed and Karem 
Yehia; both examine how the Egyptian press portrayed Palestinians during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s a crucial era when Egyptian-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly 
following the signing of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace 
Treaty of 1979.
13
         
          Furthermore, examining the various shifts within the official Egyptian political 
discourse and the ways in which such shifts affect and define the Palestinians in Egypt is 
an integral component to this project. To this end such studies by Ghada Hashem 
Talhami, Maha Ahmed Dajani, and Muhammad Sa’id Hamdan examine the ways in 
which Egypt both defined and situated its political and regional identity through the lens 
of the Palestine question.
14
 Additionally, the present thesis aims at exploring the 
historical background addressing both the historical ties between Egypt and Palestine and 
the rise of the Palestinian refugee problem. In this respect Ilana Feldman’s study provides 
a comprehensive historical analysis examining the historical socio-political relations 
between Egypt and Palestine through the lens of Gaza which holds a special status as the 
                                                          
12. Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 2007 
13. “Egyptian Popular Attitudes toward the Palestinians since 1977,”  Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 4 (Summer, 1989), 37-51 
“The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-1985,”  Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 
1987), 45-63 
14. Palestine and Egyptian National Identity, 1992 
The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, 1986 
Siyasat Misr Tijah Al-Qadiyah Al-Filastiniyah 1946-1956 [ Egyptian Politics toward the Palestinian Cause 
1946-1956], 2006 
10 
 
eastern gate to Egypt.
15
 As for analyzing the history of the Palestinian refugee problem, 
Benny Morris’s study although relying heavily on Israeli archives, remains the most 
detailed account exploring the question of the Palestinian refugees.
16
 Moreover, the case 
of the Palestinian refugees cannot be properly addressed without examining the causes 
leading to the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948 in what is referred to as the nakba. The 
Palestine war led to the expulsion of more than 750,000 Palestinians from their homeland 
representing the first official wave of Palestinian refugees.  In this respect studies by Avi 
Shlaim and Eugene L. Rogan utilize the various recently declassified Israeli and British 
archives to shed new light on the events leading to the creation of the state of Israel on 15 
May 1948, the subsequent intervention of the Arab armies and their ultimate defeat.
17
 
This new reading into the history of the 1948 war aims to deconstruct long established 
facts regarding the creation of Israel and the outcome of the war. Israeli scholars like Avi, 
Shlaim, Benny Morris, and Ilan Pappe, attempt to utilize the available archives in order to 
reexamine the unchallenged Zionist version historicizing the 1948 war.
18
 
Methodologies: 
 This project will use a combination of both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources will include analyzing presidential speeches and interviews, and 
reviewing press editorials published the Egyptian newspaper both official and 
independent depending on availability. Other primary sources will include various 
Egyptian laws, which were issued during the decades under study and had a direct impact 
                                                          
15. Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1947, 2008 
16. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2004 
17. “The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug. 1995), 
287-304 
The War for Palestine, Second Edition, 2007 
18. Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” 288 
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on the Palestinian refugees in Egypt as well as international treaties to which Egypt is a 
signatory.  
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One 
         This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the aim of the 
project, brief literature review, and methodologies. The second part traces the origins of 
the Palestinian refugee problem and early Egyptian-Palestinian relations. This part also 
examines the Egyptian government reaction toward the early waves of Palestinian 
refugees on the eve of the nakba.  
Chapter Two 
         This chapter focuses on the Nasser era, 1954-1970. It examines the place of the 
Palestine cause within Nasser’s pan-Arabism. It will also investigate the ways in which 
Palestinian nationalism was utilized to promote Nasser’s vision of pan-Arabism. The 
chapter also attempts to analyze the era’s press and laws relating to Palestinians with 
special emphasis on moments of political crisis.  
Chapter Three 
This chapter examines Sadat’s era, 1970-1981. This era represented a significant 
breach with Nasserism especially during the second half of the 1970s which witnessed 
the shift from pan-Arabism to Egyptian nationalism. The assassination of Egyptian 
Minister of Culture Youssef al-Sibai in February, 1978, the signing of the Camp David 
Accords of 1978, and the Peace Treaty of 1979 led to a rapid deterioration in Egyptian-
12 
 
Palestinian relations. The chapter in this sense attempts to examine how political conflicts 
affect refugees’ social and legal rights as Egypt’s Palestinian refugees were the direct 
victims of the Egyptian-Palestinian clash. 
Chapter Four 
This chapter examines the Mubarak years, 1981-2011. This era is mainly 
characterized by being a continuation of Sadat’s political and economic discourse. 
Mubarak maintained a close dependency on the United States and posed as a peace 
mediator between the Arabs and Israel. Palestinian refugees’ status did not witness 
significant improvements as all Sadat’s regulations remained intact. The only noteworthy 
improvement occurred with the issuing of Law 154 0f 2004. This law gave Egyptian 
women married to foreigners the right to pass their citizenship to their children. 
Palestinian children however, remained excluded from the application of this law until 
May, 2011. Egyptian-Palestinian relations remained stable throughout the Mubarak era 
until the Fatah-Hamas split in 2007. The Egyptian regime sided with Fatah and attempted 
to isolate Hamas by sealing the Rafah cross border, thus, intensifying the Israeli blockade 
suffocating the Gaza Strip. The Mubarak era ended with his resignation on 11 February 
2011 following an eighteen-day mass revolution against his regime.    
Conclusion  
This part briefly examines the Egyptian political arena following the 25 January 
2011 revolution, and the extent to which the post-Mubarak era affected the course of 
Egyptian-Palestinian relations and the status of Egypt’s Palestinian refugees. 
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Part Two: The Rise of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
 
 What led to the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem? And what are the 
historiographical debates on the 1948 war? I will address these questions and examine the 
evolution of Egypt’s official response to the developments in Palestine during the 1920s 
and until the 1948 war. This section ends with assessing the Egyptian government official 
response to the early waves of Palestinians seeking refuge in Egypt.   
The Palestinian refugee problem resulted from the defeat of the Arab armies in 
the 1948 war, which became known in Palestinian historiography and narratives as al-
nakba (catastrophe). The Arab states rejected the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) Partition Plan approved on 29 November 1947.
19
 Accordingly, the Arab League 
(AL) decided to send Arab armies (from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq) into Palestine 
despite lacking adequate military preparation and unified strategies. During the war, 
Palestinians suffered from brutal attacks carried by the Haganah (a Jewish paramilitary 
group). The attacks followed the pattern outlined in Plan Dalet (Plan D), which aimed at 
expelling as many Palestinians as possible to include their villages into the proposed 
Jewish state.
20
 In the wake of the defeat and the signing of the armistice between the 
Arabs and Israel on Rhodes Island between January and July 1949 more than 750,000 
Palestinians became stateless refugees. During the war Israeli forces pushed hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians toward the neighboring Arab states. On the eve of the war the 
                                                          
19. Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, (Boston New 
York: Bedford / ST. Martin’s Seventh Edition, 2010), 212-214, Document No. 4.2 “UNSCOP’s Plan of 
Partition with Economic Union.” The plan proposed the partition of Palestine into seven sections: three 
parts controlled by the Arabs, the other three by the Jews, while keeping Jerusalem and Bethlehem under 
the administration of the UN. 
20. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Dalet, Plan D is argued to be at the core of the Zionist project and 
served as a guide to the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians during the 1948 war. 
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coastal Palestinian cities, later called Israel, held an Arab population of about 860,000. 
By the end of the war, the population decreased dramatically to reach 133,000. This 
means that over 700,000 Palestinians became refugees dispersed in camps in Jordan, 
Lebanon, the Gaza Strip (under Egyptian rule), Syria, and lesser numbers in Iraq.
21
 
The outcome of the defeat was tremendous. Thousands of forcibly dispossessed 
Palestinians lost their homeland, their relatives, and their means of livelihood “in one of 
the biggest ethnic cleansing operations in modern times.”22 The psychological trauma 
resulting from the horrors of the war and the sense of dispossession was immeasurable. 
The unfolding of the nakba narrates not only Arab political failure, but challenges the 
myths surrounding the creation of the state of Israel.       
Al-nakba between Myth and Reality 
             The state of Israel was officially created on 15 May 1948.
23
 Israeli historians 
portrayed its creation in biblical terminology as a miracle where a small Jewish 
population (small Jewish David) managed against all odds to score a decisive victory 
over a coalition of Arab armies (Goliath) aiming at destroying the newly-born state.
24
 The 
narrative also claimed that the Palestinian refugee problem is not an Israeli creation. 
Instead the problem came into existence because the Arab states called on the 
Palestinians to leave their cities until the expulsion of Israeli settlers. This portrayal, 
however, ignored the fragmented Arab front, the role of the British mandate (1922-1948) 
                                                          
21. Ibid. 203 also see Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, (New York: Vintage Books), 1992, 14-
15 
22. Mahmoud Issa, “The Nakba, Oral History and the Palestinian Peasantry: The Case of Lubya,” in Nur 
Masalha, ed. Catastrophe Remembered: Palestine, Israel and the Internal Refugees, (London New York: 
Zed Books, 2005), 181 
23. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. Document No. 4.5, 
“Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948,” 218-220 
24. Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 
(Aug. 1995), 287-304, 294 
15 
 
in facilitating the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and more importantly the 
settler colonial nature of the Zionist project. In this sense, Israeli version of history was 
utilized to build a specific national consciousness. It is a form of official nationalism as 
Benedict Anderson puts it: “a conscious, self-protective policy, intimately linked to the 
preservation of imperial-dynastic interests…The one persistent feature of this style of 
nationalism was, and is, that it is official – i.e. something emanating from the state, and 
serving the interests of the state first and foremost.”25 
From its premise, the Zionist project adopted Israel Zangwill’s slogan: a land 
without people, for a people without land.
26
 The language used in the Balfour Declaration 
of November 1917 carried a resemblance to this theme through explicitly ignoring the 
actual presence of an indigenous population entitled to the right of self-determination. 
The Declaration states:   
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews 
in any other country.
27
 
By referring to the Palestinians as non-Jewish communities, the Balfour Declaration 
aimed at denying Palestinians their political and national rights by virtually denying their 
existence as nationals entitled to the right of self-determination. This explains the policies 
adopted by the British mandate, which focused on hindering any attempts to create any 
semi-official Palestinian governing body with a minimum level of authority. By denying 
the establishment of a quasi-official Palestinian authority the British aimed at controlling 
                                                          
25. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London New York: Verso, 2006), 159 
26. Said, The Question of Palestine, 9 
27. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Document No. 2.2, 96-97 
16 
 
all the Palestinian affairs in a manner that would not empower Palestinian Arabs with any 
level of self-rule otherwise prevailing in the other Arab states during that time period.
28
  
            Edward Said argues that the structure of the Declaration shows the extent to 
which Zionism is yet another manifestation of imperialism. Said explains that the 
Declaration was in fact made by a foreign power (Great Britain) regarding a foreign 
territory with the promise of establishing a national homeland for a foreign community 
regardless of the presence and wishes of the existing indigenous population.
29
 
Accordingly, like most colonial projects, Zionism was rationalized as a higher mission to 
fulfill God’s promise to the Jewish people and to end anti-Semitism in Europe. Similar to 
the discourse of colonialism, European Zionists argued that their project is the by-product 
of Western culture that would bring civilization to the backward land of the inferior 
orient.
30
 This argument assumed that the land of Palestine is the rightful Jewish homeland 
regardless of the presence of an indigenous population, which was Arab (Muslims and 
Christians). In fact the British Census of Palestine conducted in 1922 shows that Palestine 
held a population of 689,272 persons of whom only 60,000 were Jews. The demographic 
statistics thus reveal that seventy-eight of the population was Muslim, about ten percent 
                                                          
28. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” in Eugene L. Rogan 
and Avi Shlaim, eds. The War for Palestine, (New York: Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 
2007), 19 
29. Said, The Question of Palestine, 15-16 
30. Ibid. 23-25, in his book Orientalism, Said also argues that by denying the nakba, Israeli historians 
perceive the land of Palestine and its Arab-Islamic heritage as a vintage site to evoke a sense of authenticity 
albeit devoid of its indigenous population. Said refers to this form of narrative as “Israeli Orientalism,” in 
which Israeli historians like Western orientalists construct an imaginary version of the timeless authentic 
“Orient” regardless of the present realities of the place and its inhabitants. In Edward W. Said, Orientalism, 
(New York: Penguin Book), 2003, 79-85    
17 
 
Christians (mostly Arabs and few foreigners), and eleven percent were Jews (the majority 
of whom were not Palestinian but European immigrants).
31
    
Further, Israeli historians argue that during the war Israel faced a monolithic 
coalition of Arab armies sharing common goals and strategies. They also argue that 
Israeli forces practiced self-restraint and did not adopt systematic expulsion tactics.
32
 
However, recent declassified Israeli and British documents related to the 1948 war 
provide a counter-argument to traditional Israeli historiography. Israeli historians (known 
as revisionists) like Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, and Ilan Pape embarked on a process of 
deconstructing the Israeli narrative chronicling the events of the 1948 war and the 
creation of the state of Israel.
33
 Despite gaining a wider recognition within Western 
scholarship, the Israeli revisionists’ discourse is not entirely a pioneering one. Oral 
Palestinian historiography documenting the events of the war and the demolition of 
Palestinian villages provide a body of first-hand testimonies. Several Palestinian 
intellectuals like Arif al-Arif, Walid Khalidi, and Edward Said voiced similar narratives 
albeit receiving less scholarly circulation.
34
 Joel Beinin argues that the historical account 
presented by Israeli revisionists is not in fact entirely new. He explains that in addition to 
oral Palestinian historiographies, the circumstances leading to the nakba were known to 
Zionist political and military elites, soldiers, and kibbutz members who “actively 
                                                          
31. Ibid. 17, for a detailed account of all Palestinian villages and their demographic details prior to 1948 see 
Walid Khalidi, All that Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, 
(Washington D.C. : Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992) 
32. Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” 288 
33. Ibid. 287-288 
34. Joel Beinin, “Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits of the New Israeli History,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (Winter 2005), 6-23, 8 
18 
 
expelled Palestinians, expropriated their lands, and destroyed their homes—knew very 
well what happened to the Palestinian Arabs in 1948.”35 
Traditional Israeli accounts of the 1948 war claim that Israel faced a unified Arab 
front sharing common strategies. However, analyzing the Arab political scene on the eve 
of the war opposes the Israeli narrative. On one hand, Rashid Khalidi attempts to study 
the reasons behind the defeat in the 1948 war from a Palestinian perspective. He argues 
that Palestine represented a unique case in the sense that unlike other Arab states during 
the inter-war period Palestine did not have a clear unified political context representing 
its national cause on the international level. In other words, Palestine under the British 
mandate, 1922-1948 did not enjoy any form of a para-state or a minimum of political and 
legislative autonomy like the cases of other Arab states including the likes of Egypt, Iraq, 
Syria, and Transjordan. Although the former states did not enjoy complete independence, 
yet several indigenous figures maintained some form of rule over several national 
affairs.
36
 
 In glaring contrast to their policies toward the Palestinians the British aimed at 
empowering the Jewish agencies in Palestine with enough independence to create a semi-
official apparatus in Palestine. The British in this respect facilitated the Jewish 
community’s attainment of international recognition as a future state. The British 
mandate purposefully overlooked the growing number of Jewish migration into Palestine; 
the British also provided great assistance into the establishment of the Jewish Agency. 
The mandate empowered the Agency with enough support and elevated it to an official 
                                                          
35. Ibid. 9 
36. Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” 18 
19 
 
status while at the same time denying the Palestinians any chance at creating any form of 
self-governing structures.
37
  
           Khalidi also argues that the lack of a unified Palestinian national leadership led to 
the fragmentation of the Palestinian society. This consequently undermined their struggle 
for statehood as they lacked a unified political front representing the Palestine question 
on the international level. This political fragmentation was largely the byproduct of the 
failure of what Albert Hourani referred to as the politics of notables in Palestine.
38
 For 
several decades the elites dominated the Palestinian political scene as the representatives 
of the Palestinian people. However, the notables failed because of their apparent inability 
to overcome their personal and ideological differences. The intense clash between Hajj 
Amin al-Husayni the grand mufti of Jerusalem and Raghib al-Nashashibi the former 
mayor of Jerusalem is a prime example of a bitter conflict that polarized the Palestinians 
and divided them into rival factions.
39
 Such bitter rivalries weakened the Palestinian 
national struggle, thus, depriving it from having a unified leadership and a clear national 
strategy.    
Khalidi adds that the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 provides another 
manifestation of the failed politics of the notables. Instead of seizing the opportunity of 
the revolt to create a unified national front, these elites created more divisions and 
polarization into an already fragmented social fabric. This also explains the fact that the 
base of the revolt consisted of the frustrated subaltern classes who saw in the martyrdom 
of Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam in 1935 a catalyst to galvanize national sentiments. 
                                                          
37. Ibid. 19-20 
38. Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of the Notables,” in W. Polk and R. Chambers, eds. 
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century (Chicago, IL: 1968), 41-68 
39. Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: the Underlying Causes of Failure,” 22-23 
20 
 
Shaykh al-Qassam a preacher based in Haifa succeeded in reaching out to the 
population’s sentiments more than any of the competing notables. His death in 
confrontation with the British forces in 1935 became glorified as a demonstration of 
martyrdom for the national cause thus, sowing in the Palestinian national consciousness 
the seeds for the Great Arab Revolt.
40
 However, the revolt’s base failed to compose a 
coherent strategy. The revolutionaries suffered from internal divisions among themselves 
between urbanite, subaltern, and the peasantry classes. They also lacked a common 
leadership. Elites’ rivalries intensified during the course of the revolt and created more 
divisions than cohesion.
41
 In this respect Khalidi argues that the outcome of the 1948 war 
could be seen as being predictable given the fact that the Palestinian front never 
recovered from the defeat of the 1936-1939 revolt and the growing fragmentation of the 
Palestinian social fabric.  
the Palestinians in 1947-49 seem to have been even less organized and even less 
centralized, and to have had even less of a national focus…Given the course of 
Palestinian history until 1948, the underlying causes of what happened in 
Palestine in that year should be perfectly comprehensible, and the final outcome 
should not have been unexpected, shocked and surprised though many 
Palestinians clearly were by it.
42   
On the other hand, contrary to the Israeli account, Zionists during 1948 did not 
face a unified Arab front. In fact, although the Arab states declared a state of war with the 
intension of restoring Palestine to its inhabitants, they lacked common strategies and 
secretly aspired to secure hidden regional interests. Eugene L. Rogan argues that the case 
of Jordan is integral to understand the mechanisms directing the politics of the Arab 
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states on the eve of the war.
43
 Relations between King Abdullah and the Zionists date 
back to the early years of his reign where he aimed at securing financial support for his 
kingdom, which suffered from limited resources.  Rogan explains at the outset of the war 
Abdullah signed a deal with the Jewish Agency; the mutual agreement between the two 
parties proposed to divide the land of Palestine between the Jewish Agency and 
Transjordan. Based on the Partition Plan of 1947, Abdullah hoped to expand the 
territories of Trans-Jordan through occupying that part of Palestinian land adjacent to his 
frontier. Abdullah envisioned that the proposed plan would provide him with necessary 
territorial expansion and abort the creation of a Palestinian state headed by his rival the 
mufti of Jerusalem, Hajji Amin al-Husayni.
44
 Therefore, it could be argued that 
Abdullah’s decision to enter the Palestine war served as a pretext to facilitate his plan for 
territorial expansion into Palestine. In other words, in the case of Jordan narrow national 
interests and regional competition gained priority over Arab and Palestinian 
nationalism.
45
 
For Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, participating in the war was the only 
convenient pretext to preserve a regional balance of power and contain Abdullah’s 
ambitions.
46
 In the case of Egypt, King Farouk came under massive public pressures 
demanding the dispatching of the Egyptian army into Palestine. In a futile attempt to 
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deflate the opposition, curtail freedoms, enact emergency laws, and regain the support of 
the masses Farouk decided to dispatch the army into Palestine. On the regional level, he 
envisioned building an Arab leadership for himself as the liberator of Palestine. He also 
like the rest of the Arab leaders, decided to enter the war to block Abdullah from 
establishing his envisioned kingdom of Greater Syria.
47
 Farouk, however, ignored the fact 
that for a long time the army’s role became confined to maintaining internal security. 
British policies in Egypt aimed at limiting the Egyptian army’s capabilities to justify the 
presence of its troops in Suez under the pretext of defending the Canal Zone. 
Consequently, the army lacked essential training, equipment, and preparation combined 
with the presence of unqualified chiefs in leading positions.
48
  
           The previous analysis aimed at disputing the Israeli claim that during the 1948 war 
Israel faced the formidable Arab Goliath. The British archives reveal that the Arab states 
were unprepared and waged a miscalculated war where mistrust combined with narrow 
political and territorial ambitions surpassed the ostensible aim of liberating Palestine.
49
   
 The Palestinian Refugees and the Myth of self-defense  
One of the most recurrent themes in Israeli historiography is the claim that the 
Israeli army always reacts in self-defense and does not intentionally target unarmed 
civilians. Israeli historians also claim that the Zionists did not intend to expel the 
Palestinians adding that the Arab states were the ones who called upon the Palestinians to 
flee their lands to make way to the Arab armies. However, contrary to the prevailing 
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Israeli version of history Morris asserts that “Regarding April-May and the start of the 
main stage of the exodus, I have found no evidence to show that the AHC or the Arab 
leaders outside Palestine issued blanket instructions, by radio or otherwise, to the 
inhabitants to flee.”50 
Morris’s thesis is the most detailed account utilizing both Israeli and British 
archives to dispel the myth claiming that the Zionists never called on the Palestinians to 
flee and that they left because the Arab leaders told them to do so through radio 
broadcasts. However, despite its importance, his argument addressing the rise of the 
Palestinian refugee problem raises several critical observations. For instance, the book 
relies heavily on Israeli sources; he treats them uncritically although he admits that much 
of such documents were subjected to political censorship and partial distortion.
51
 Morris 
based his entire argument on the assumption that the Palestinian refugee problem was 
born of war not by design.
52
 In other words, the refugee problem resulted mainly from the 
growing hostilities before and throughout the 1948 war. Thus, he concludes that expelling 
the Palestinian population was a military byproduct and not a pre-calculated systematical 
political strategy. Morris stressed that prior to the war Zionist leaders “did not enter the 
war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war ‘transfer’ thinking ever 
translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion.”53 He 
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also explains that during the war’s early months there were no reports regarding mass 
expulsion or leveling of villages.  
This however contradicts his conclusion that the exodus resulted from both the 
brutal Haganah attacks such as the massacres of Deir Yassin and Lydda, along with the 
use of psychological warfare mechanisms that instilled fear which led to mass flight. 
Morris also argues that in the months preceding the war the Haganah and the Israeli army 
acted on the grounds of self-defense and retaliation against Arab attacks and not 
according to systematic expulsion policies. This argument however fails short from 
explaining that in many cases the fine line between self-defense and violence grew 
increasingly blurry as with cases of collective punishment for entire villages or mass 
executions. Additionally, Morris places an emphasis on denying the presence of a 
predetermined expulsion policy, although he explains that Plan Dalet (Plan D) proved 
useful in providing a pretext for mass evacuations. He argues that Israeli military 
commanders utilized the provisions of Plan D to justify expelling hundreds of 
Palestinians allegedly for protecting the wellbeing of the Yishuv.
54
  
             Contrary to Morris’s argument regarding Plan D, Ilan Pappe argues that the 
ultimate goal of Zionism focused on the creation of a purely Jewish state in Palestine 
with a Jewish majority. In this respect Pappe asserts that Plan D “was a master plan for 
the ethnic cleansing of Palestine” where “the main objective was clear from the 
beginning – the de-Arabisation of Palestine.”55 He adds that despite the use of the 
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defensive pretexts to justify armed attacks the integral goal of acquiring as much 
territories as possible remained in the forefront.
56
  
             To conclude, this section presented the historical background explaining the 
emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem which resulted from the defeat of the Arab 
armies in the 1948 war. It traced the political and military reasons behind the defeat, 
along with attempting to dispute several widespread myths surrounding the birth of the 
state of Israel. This part aimed at utilizing the new scholarship analyzing the reasons 
behind the nakba in order to further problematize the defeat as the result of both political 
and military failure and disintegration. Additionally, the arguments presented here 
deconstruct some of the prevailing historical accounts addressing the 1948 war. They also 
serve as a general historical prelude situating the problem of the Palestinian refugees in a 
wider historical framework. The next part will examine the evolution of Egyptian official 
response to the Palestine problem beginning in the 1920s through the 1940s. 
Egyptian Official Response to the Palestine Cause during the Monarchal Era  
           Egyptian official response to the Palestine cause developed gradually between the 
1920s and 1940s. During the 1920s, Egyptian nationalism shaped itself in new ways. 
Also, Egypt officially gained its independence with the end of the unilateral ending of the 
British protectorate on 28 February 1922.
57
 In 1923 Egypt held its first free parliamentary 
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elections with the Wafd Party winning the majority of the seats. During the 1920s and 
1930s, Egyptian politicians focused their efforts on domestic political issues, the struggle 
to end all British presence in Egypt, as well as promoting a sense of nationalism largely 
confined in Egyptian cultural and historical heritage.
58
 
During the 1920s, Egyptian intellectuals utilized themes and motifs evoking 
Egypt’s “Pharaonic” heritage. Egyptian writers and artists stressed the importance of 
creating artistic and literary works based entirely on ancient Egyptian motifs to evoke a 
sense of continuation between modern Egypt and its ancient history.
59
 It was a process of 
creating “territorial Egyptian nationness…[t]he crux of this discourse’s impact is what 
might be called the “Misrification” [tamsir in Arabic] of space and subject.”60 Therefore, 
Egypt during that era developed an essentially inward sense of nationalism that was 
largely detached from Arab affiliation.
61
 Nonetheless, Egypt during the 1920s was the 
region’s intellectual capital with the recognition and expansion of Cairo University, as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
administration of the Sudan. In Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the 
Middle East, New Revised Edition, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 249-250   
58. James Jankowski, “Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Aug. 1980), 1-38, 2-4 
59. An example of this pharaonic trend is illustrated in Mahmoud Mokhtar’s huge statue “The Revival of 
Egypt” [Nahdat Misr]. The statue which stands at the entrance of Cairo University depicts a huge sphinx-
like figure sitting next to a woman dressed in peasant attire. The writings of Taha Husayn also glorified 
Egypt’s pharaonic heritage at the expense of its Arab-Islamic one. In one of his weekly articles, 
Mohammad Zaki Abdel Kader called for creating a distinctive national Egyptian literature based entirely 
on Egyptian historic, cultural and geographic heritage. An article published in al-Siyasa al-Usbu‘iyya 
[Politics Weekly], 12 July 1930 [Arabic Source]. Additionally, Tawfik al-Hakim called for reviving all 
things Egyptian. He asserted the essential difference between Egypt and the Arab world. In his book Under 
the Sun of Thought [Tahet Shams al-Fikr]; al-Hakim explained that Egypt and the Arabs stood for two 
opposing sides. In his novel The Return of the Soul [Awdet al-Rouh] published in 1928, al-Hakim 
explained that Egypt’s uniqueness stemmed from it being a complete self-sufficient unit with its distinctive 
historical and cultural values. He also stressed that the Egyptians of the Twentieth century are in fact 
completing the thousand-years old cycle of ancient Egyptians. Those themes are further explained in Anis 
Sayegh, The Arab Idea in Egypt [al-Fikra al-Arabiya fi Misr], (Beirut: 1959) [Arabic Source]            
60. Gabriel Piterberg, “The Tropes of Stagnation and Awakening in Nationalist Historical Consciousness,” 
in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds.  Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 42-61, (53) 
61. Jankowski, “Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period,” 2 
27 
 
well as a remarkable surge in the numbers of newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, 
radio stations, film and recording industry.
62
     
 Egyptian politicians showed very little attention to developments occurring in 
neighboring Palestine. During the 1920s, several Palestinian delegations visited with the 
aim of promoting the Palestine cause. Also, Palestinians residing in Egypt sponsored 
committees to spread awareness on events in Palestine and appeal to Egyptian official 
support. However, such activities generated very little official response, which did not go 
beyond sponsoring some fundraisings to restore al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The state, 
for its part, “did not involve itself in the Palestine problem in an official way in the 
1920s.”63  
 This attitude however, gradually changed in the wake of the Wailing Wall 
disturbances of 1929. The disturbances occurred in August 1929 over a dispute between 
Arabs and Jews concerning the rights of access and worship in the Wailing Wall – Dome 
of the Rock area. The situation escalated and turned into violent confrontations between 
the Muslim and Jewish communities.
64
 The rising violence in Jerusalem generated the 
first significant Egyptian response toward developments in Palestine during the interwar 
period. However, it is important to differentiate between Egyptian official and nonofficial 
responses. Several independent associations issued statements defending the rights of 
Palestinian Arabs while criticizing both Jewish and British policies in Palestine. Further 
activities included raising funds and sending medical aid. Most of the organizations 
involved in such activities fell under two categories: first, Islamic associations like the 
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Young Men’s Muslim Association (YMMA), the Society of the Islamic Banner, and the 
Islamic Guidance Society. The second category consisted of Syrian and Palestinian 
groups like for instance, the Syro-Palestinian Conference in Egypt and gatherings of 
Palestinians living in Egypt.
65
 By contrast, the Egyptian government along with the 
secular political parties seemed “to have done nothing in relation to the Wailing Wall 
disturbances; no protests, no meetings, no appeals for assistance.”66 Islamic organizations 
in this respect perceived the violence from a religious rather than a political perspective. 
During that era the political dimension of Zionism had not been fully materialized. 
Islamic circles argued that the whole dispute stemmed from Jewish rather than Zionist 
encroachments. They argued that the issue could be resolved if the British government 
interfered and officially recognized that as a majority, the Muslims had religious 
privileges in the disputed area. Liberal politicians like Prime Ministers Adli Yakan, 
Muhammad Mahmoud, and Moustafa al-Nahhas did not issue any statements regarding 
the violence in Jerusalem. There were not any mass protests, and King Fu‘ad declared 
that the entire incident was a matter of the British government.
67
              
           The 1930s witnessed a gradual growth in Egyptian concerns with the Palestine 
problem. This shift stemmed from both domestic and regional factors. Regionally, the 
rising numbers of Jewish immigrants to Palestine raised fears that the British government 
was moving forward with its plan to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
Indeed, the first half of the 1930s witnessed an influx in European Jewish immigrants 
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escaping anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany.
68
 Driven by depression and high rates of 
unemployment, European states and the United States put several restrictions on 
immigration. This left Palestine an easy destination for European Jews escaping Hitler’s 
repression. Records show that numbers of Jewish immigrants showed steady increase 
from 30,327 persons in 1933 to 42,359 in 1934, while peaked at 61,854 persons in 
1935.
69
 By mid-1930s the Jewish population in Palestine reached a total of 400,000 
people.
70
 Palestinian-Jewish tensions escalated culminating with the eruption of the Great 
Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The revolt started as a general strike protesting British 
policies in Palestine and the influx of Jewish immigrants. It soon transformed into a 
large-scale rebellion considered to be “the longest anticolonial rebellion in the east during 
the interwar period.”71 The rapid developments in Palestine gradually gained visibility in 
Egyptian official and public opinions.           
During the 1930s Egypt witnessed an intellectual shift from a liberal-westernized 
approach to the emergence of a pan-Arab pan-Islamic attitude. This shift from an 
Egyptian-centric orientation to a larger Arab-Islamic framework resulted from several 
domestic factors. Egyptian society during the 1930s opted for embracing Islamic trends 
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in response to the rising activities of the YMMA and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as 
the failure of the liberal experiment in fulfilling national aspirations. The liberal 
parliamentary experiment fell short from achieving full Egyptian independence from 
British dominance. It also failed in bridging social and economic gaps as “[a] few 
landowning families held vast amounts of land, while the mass of the population eked out 
a living on small estates or as landless laborers. The largest landholders by far were 
members of the royal family, reputed to own no fewer than 180,000 acres.”72 The 
parliament largely dominated by wealthy classes voted against social and land reform 
laws to preserve the existing status-quo and protect their economic interests. Against such 
failures and glaring inequalities, Hassan al-Banna, the leader of the Brotherhood, called 
for a return to authentic Islamic practices and traditions as a solution to current social and 
political problems. Al-Banna further argued that “parliamentary governance was a sham 
imposed by the wealthy and powerful on the poor to keep them in their place.”73 Al-
Banna’s argument combined with persisting political and economic grievances appealed 
to the masses and nurtured their religious sentiments. Aside from the westernized elites 
and members of the royal family, Islam remained an integral component of ordinary 
Egyptians’ everyday lives. King Farouk would also encourage nourishing religious 
rhetoric in an attempt to bridge the cultural gap between the ruling elites and the masses, 
he stressed that Qur’an “is the key of happiness; it is the key of life.”74 The 1930s 
                                                          
72. Robert L. Tignor, Egypt: A Short History, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 
255  
73. Ibid. 252, for a detailed analysis of this trend see Charles D. Smith, “The 'Crisis of Orientation': The 
Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 
1930's,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Oct., 1973), 382-410 
74. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 55 
31 
 
witnessed a significant rise in religious writings discussing the life of Prophet 
Muhammad and early Islamic history and civilization.
75
     
This era also witnessed the emergence of pan-Arab ideas in Egyptian political 
thought as a means of identifying Egypt with a larger entity.
76
 In fact cultivating the seeds 
of Arab nationalism within Egyptian identity had more popular appeal than integral 
Egyptian nationalism of the 1920s. It formulated a supra-Egyptian nationalism through a 
unique mixture of “elements of both Islamicism and integralism as well as of earlier 
territorial nationalism, but reshaped to fit its particularly Arab perspective.”77 The rise of 
Islamic sentiments during the 1930s introduced the Egyptian public to the many 
“cultural, religious, and political ties that bound Egypt to the other Arab states, thus 
“increas[ing] awareness of the Arab and Islamic components of Egyptian national 
identity.”78 The revival of Arab and Islamic orientation brought into the public’s 
conscious a new perception of the Palestine question. The public got to know that fellow 
Arab and Muslim Palestinians struggle against alien occupation. The Great Revolt of 
1936 increased the public’s awareness and interest in the Palestine problem. The public 
identified with the revolt politically and religiously, since Palestinians were fellow Arabs 
and Muslims fighting against colonial oppression.
79
 
The rise of pan-Arab sentiments during the 1930s gained the encouragement of 
both King Farouk and Egyptian politicians as political vehicles to score popularity among 
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the masses. Both the king and his rival the Wafdist leader Mustafa al-Nahhas used pan-
Arabism and the Palestine issue “as useful propaganda tools…to enhance their own 
reputations.”80 After signing the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Egypt hoped to engage 
in the diplomatic efforts regarding the Palestine question.
81
 However, the Egyptian 
official interest in the Palestine question did not stem solely from sentiments, but largely 
from national and political considerations. Egyptian politicians hoped that adopting the 
Palestine problem would enhance Egypt’s political prestige as an Arab leader, score 
political leverage against Britain, and deflate the opposition to the 1936 treaty.
82
 During 
the 1936 revolt Egyptian diplomacy offered very little other than rhetoric. In deed 
journalist Abdel Qadir al-Mazini criticized the government’s stance where “ministers 
“talk” about Palestine, yet the government of Egypt is not participating in any other way 
[than talk] to stop the bloodshed and to achieve justice.”83          
The release of the Peel Commission’s report of 1937 recommending the partition 
of Palestine between Arabs and Jews raised much attention and concern in Egypt. 
Various Egyptian organizations such as the YMMA, the Muslim Brotherhood, Young 
Egypt, and the Egyptian Women’s Union as well as youth and university students’ groups 
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protested the report.
84
 They released reports denouncing the partition plan, arguing that 
Palestine is an Arab land and belongs to the Arabs. Religious arguments voiced through 
al-Azhar argued that the partition of Palestine meant the loss of the Holy Places and that 
it is the duty of every Muslim to defend Palestine.
85
 Secular arguments stressed that the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would lead to Arab Jewish hostilities which would 
eventually facilitate European intervention under the pretext of preserving regional peace. 
Further arguments explained that the proposed Jewish state would act as a barrier 
destroying Egypt’s hopes of leading the Arab world, since Egypt would be culturally and 
economically isolated from the Arab east. The proposed Jewish state would thus become 
the region’s financial center and transform the region into its “economic colony.”86 
Politicians warned that the creation of a Jewish state would end all hopes for the unity of 
the Arab east. They also warned that such state would have an expansionist goal, which 
would soon go beyond Palestine and lay claims to other neighboring Arab lands.
87
     
Wafdist Prime Minister Moustafa al-Nahhas represented Egypt’s official response 
to the Peel report. During a parliamentary hearing on 20 July 1937, he stressed that the 
Egyptian government was keen on defending Palestinians’ national rights. Nahhas voiced 
his rejection of the partition plan to the British ambassador to Egypt Sir Miles Lampson. 
He protested the fact that Palestinians were being “plucked up by the roots to make way 
for strangers in their native land,” he further added “what was to prevent the Jews from 
eventually maintaining a right to Sinai in the future? Or provoke trouble with [the] Jewish 
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community in Egypt itself?”88 Nonetheless, Nahhas did not encourage Egyptian-Arab 
collaboration regarding the Palestine issue. He declined to send official representatives to 
the inter-Arab conference on Palestine, which was held in Syria in September 1937. The 
Egyptian delegation to the conference participated on a non-official basis and had very 
little to offer other than clichéd rhetoric.
89
       
The year 1937 saw a limited Egyptian involvement in the Palestine question. 
There were two cases where the Egyptian government expressed solidarity and concern 
toward Palestine. The first occurred on 18 September 1937 when the Egyptian Foreign 
Minister addressed the League of Nations and stressed Egypt’s rejection to the partition 
option and its firm belief that “Palestine remain for the Palestinians.”90 The second 
occasion came in the form of a petition to the British embassy drafted by members of the 
Egyptian parliament. They stressed the historical and religious ties binding Egyptians and 
Palestinians, and denounced the partition plan and British repressive policies in 
Palestine.
91
 The limited Egyptian diplomatic involvement in the Palestine issue in 1937 
resulted mainly from Egypt’s internal political crisis. The Wafd party had to deal with 
several domestic challenges. On the one hand, the rivalry between King Farouk and al-
Nahhas crippled the political scene. On the other hand, the Wafd party, long known for 
its mass popularity, faced a rising challenge from a new generation of educated youth 
who questioned the credibility of the existing political order.
92
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In 1938 and 1939, Prime Minister Mohammad Mahmoud adopted a more active 
policy toward the Palestine issue. It is however important to note that the rising public 
support of Palestine highly influenced the premier’s stance. He delivered several public 
speeches on Palestine before the World Parliamentary Congress in October 1938 and 
before the joint meeting of representatives of Arab governments held in Cairo in January 
1939. Mahmoud also sent an official Egyptian delegation to the St. James Conference on 
Palestine in February-March 1939.
93
 When such meetings failed to resolve Arab-Jewish 
disputes, Mahmoud proposed negotiating with both the British and the World Zionist 
Organization. In April 1939 the governments of Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia formally 
rejected the resolutions of the White Paper of 17 May 1939. Following several 
unsuccessful negotiations with Palestinian representatives, Mahmoud delivered a public 
statement explaining that the proposed plan failed to serve as a base to solve the Palestine 
question.
94
 
The 1940s witnessed an increasing Egyptian involvement in the Palestine issue 
coinciding with the establishment of the Arab League (AL) in Cairo on 22 March 1945.
95
 
The AL Secretary General Abdel-Rahman Azzam stressed Egypt’s commitment to 
Palestine, and explained that Zionism was an imperialistic project in Arab land supported 
and financed by both Britain and the United States. He also warned that Egypt would 
resist any attempt to enforce the partition of Palestine.
96
 Egypt based its official stance on 
Palestine during the 1940s on three foundations explained in the Palestine Conference 
held in London in 1946: first, Egypt’s firm rejection to both partition and the 
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establishment of a Jewish state in the Arab region. Second, Egypt would not remain 
passive in face of the mounting Zionist threat. Third, stressing Egypt’s rejection to the 
proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry of 1946.
97
   
However, the diplomatic efforts remained confined to repetitive rhetoric. In the 
year 1947, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formed the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which released its report recommending the 
partition of Palestine into two states.
98
 On 29 November 1947 the UNGA adopted this 
recommendation and issued its partition resolution.
99
 Passing the partition resolution 
agitated the Egyptian public. Mass protests erupted demanding immediate military 
intervention on behalf of Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt were at 
the forefront of such protests stressing that defending Palestine is a religious duty on 
every Muslim. As of late 1947 and early 1948, the Brotherhood started training and 
sending independent fighters into Palestine to fight the Zionists.
100
   
By the late 1940s, the Egyptian government suffered from mounting domestic 
turmoil. Negotiations with the British government dragged, the economic situation 
worsened, along with an influx in social disturbances and mass protests. Against this 
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troubled backdrop, King Farouk decided to send the Egyptian army into Palestine. Prime 
Minister Mahmoud Fahmy al-Nuqrashi had previously advised against formal military 
intervention in Palestine. He argued that the Egyptian army lacked essential training and 
necessary armament. He also added that he cannot declare a state of war while the British 
army is stationed on the banks of the Suez Canal right behind the lines of the Egyptian 
army. He proposed that instead of sending the formal army the government could support 
the Palestinians through supplying financial aid, arms, and volunteers.
101
 However, 
without informing either the Prime Minister or parliament King Farouk decided to 
dispatch the Egyptian army into Palestine on 15 May 1948. He decided to enter the 
Palestine war as a means to achieve narrow national interests. He hoped the move would 
restore his shattered popularity; delegitimize the rising wave of nationalist opposition, 
that is, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood; and to divert the public’s attention away from 
deteriorating national conditions. The war could also be used as a pretext to curtail 
freedoms and enact emergency laws. On the regional level, King Farouk envisioned 
building an Arab leadership for himself as the liberator of Palestine. More importantly his 
decision to enter the war like the rest of the Arab leaders came as a means to block 
Abdullah of Jordan from establishing his envisioned kingdom of Greater Syria.
102
                 
The war ended with a disastrous defeat for the Arab armies, since their 
miscalculated intervention lacked strategic co-ordination and underestimated the 
Zionists’ strength. More importantly the war for the Arab leaders became by and large a 
competition for territorial and regional power. On 24 February 1949 Egypt signed the 
Rhodes Armistice with Israel to pull out its besieged army in al-Falujah pocket; it also 
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granted Egypt the administration of Gaza.
103
 The Egyptian rule over Gaza lasted from 
1949 until 1967 when it fell to Israeli occupation as a result of the war. Until then, the 
Egyptian governor-general in Gaza retained all the powers exercised by the former 
British High Commissioner in Palestine. Also, the name of the area changed to the Gaza 
Strip with the issuing of Law 255 of 1955, which legalized the general-governor’s 
powers.
104
 On 23 April 1950 the Egyptian government replaced the Palestine currency 
with the Egyptian one. The Strip from 1949 until 1962 was under emergency law and 
military rule. The situation changed in 1962 when President Nasser issued an official 
proclamation ending the military status of the area.
105
 The Egyptian government stressed 
at this time that had no intention of annexing Gaza. Its temporary rule, the official 
narrative insisted, was a means of preserving a part of Arab Palestine in preparation for 
the liberation of the whole of Palestine.
106
  
The previous section examined the evolution of the Egyptian official response to 
the Palestine problem beginning with the 1920s till the war of Palestine in 1948. This 
response shifted gradually from an Egypt-centric nationalism in the 1920s to a more Arab 
and Islamic orientation throughout the 1930s and the 1940s. The following section will 
examine samples from the Egyptian press during the interwar period and how the image 
of Palestine evolved during that era.  
Palestine in the Egyptian Press during the Interwar Period 
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During the 1920s the Egyptian press focused largely on domestic issues and 
mainly the struggle for independence from the British occupation. Covering 
developments in Palestine occurred on occasional intervals and Palestine “was accorded 
no more attention than that given to other foreign areas of the world.”107 During the 
1920s many articles showed sympathy toward the Jewish national home project arguing 
that it will benefit Palestinians.
108
 The press however, provided daily coverage on the 
Wailing Wall disturbances of August 1929. Nonetheless, the press coverage seemed 
largely detached. For instance, both al-Muqattam and al-Siyasa al-Usbu‘iyya questioned 
the credibility of the Palestinian account on the disturbances and criticizing the 
Palestinian Arab leadership for resorting to violence.
109
 Another trend of coverage used 
the disturbances to warn against religious strife and sectarianism. Papers like al-
Muqattam, al-Ahram, and the Wafdist paper al-Balagh “used events in Palestine to 
caution [their] readers about the dangers of “religious controversy” in “Eastern” nations, 
advising that sectarian discord could only serve to weaken national causes.”110 Unlike the 
reaction of the Islamic circles, which sided with Palestinians against Jewish 
transgressions, the liberal and secular press used the events in Palestine as a negative 
example to warn against the ramifications of religious intolerance.
111
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            The 1930s and 1940s witnessed a shift toward Arab and Islamic concepts which 
in return lead to more interest in the Palestine issue. The eruption of the Great Revolt of 
1936 captured the Egyptian public and revealed the depth of the Arab-Zionist conflict in 
Palestine. Through the revolt, ordinary Egyptians felt more related to their fellow 
Palestinians who fought both a national and religious battle against British and Zionist 
colonialism. Several writers praised the Palestinians’ heroism and determination, 
explaining that their courage had inspired every Arab and Muslim.
112
 Writers reacted 
more vigorously to the Peel Report of 1937, which recommended the partition of 
Palestine. Several editorials by the likes of Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, Hafez Mahmoud, and 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal warned that the partition would erase Arab Palestine from 
the map, push Arab Palestinians outside their home land, and end any prospects of ever 
achieving Arab unity.
113
  
The second half of the 1940s witnessed a surge in Palestine coverage coinciding 
with the impending UN-General Assembly partition resolution of 1947. Al-Masri (the 
Egyptian) newspaper reported extensively on Palestine during the year 1947. The paper 
attacked the passivity of the Egyptian government and stressed the necessity of preparing 
the Egyptian army to defend Palestine.
114
 Misr al-Fatah (Young Egypt) ran many 
editorials criticizing the passivity of both the Egyptian government and the Arab League. 
The paper praised the voluntary brigades and called on the masses to donate money and 
arms, and enroll with informal fighters, since the Arab governments and the Arab League 
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had failed to provide any meaningful support to defend Palestine.
115
 Leftist papers like al-
Fagr (the Dawn) and al-Dameer (the Conscience), the mouthpieces of the Workers and 
Peasants Organization provided wide coverage on developments in Palestine. The papers 
ran several editorials explaining the Zionist project’s hidden goals. The papers again 
strongly attacked the Arab League and accused it of collaborating with Western 
imperialism against Palestine.
116
      
The previous part examined samples of Egyptian newspapers and their stance on 
Palestine during the interwar period. Press coverage on the Palestine issue shifted 
gradually from a limited stance during the 1920s to an increasing interest in the 1930s, 
culminating with extensive coverage during the 1940s till the eruption of the 1948 war. 
The next section will examine the Egyptian government’s response to the early waves of 
Palestinian refugees. 
The Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, 1948-1952 
Before the outbreak of the 1948 war many upper and middle class families 
especially from the coastal cities like Jaffa and Haifa fled to Egypt between the end of 
1947 and early 1948.
117
 Numbers of refugees increased as more people fled the 
Haganah’s systematic assaults. The first wave of refugees (around 1250) arrived at Port 
Said between 25 and 29 April 1948. Before 15 May 1948 Egypt received between 5000-
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6000 Palestinian refugees.
118
 When the war broke out the number of the refugees fleeing 
into Egypt increased, therefore, the government founded the “High Committee for 
Palestinian Refugee Affairs’ to organize the arrival of the early waves of Palestinian 
refugees to Egypt.”119 Later on the government established another camp in al-Qantarah 
Sharq (on the Sinai side of the Suez Canal) to accommodate the growing number of 
refugees.
120
 The Egyptian government also did not seek assistance from the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).
121
 This policy resulted from the 
government’s assumption that the situation with the refugees was temporary.122 The 
government stance on the refugees seemed detached and unwilling to engage actively 
with their plight. The Egyptian government understood the refugees as an external 
problem outside the state’s mandate. Such a perception still dominates the government’s 
policies toward refugee communities until the present day.    
             Al-Nuqrashi’s government argued that Egypt cannot accommodate the refugees 
on a long-term basis. Officials used such domestic problems like inflation, over-
population, and high rates of unemployment as pretexts to reject sustaining the refugees 
on a permanent basis.
123
 In September 1948 the government moved the refugees housed 
in al-Abbasiayyah camp to the one in al-Qantarah; the total number of the Palestinian 
refugees was 11,000.
124
 The government also established a committee to review the status 
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of the refugees on a case-by-case basis. The Ministry of Interior issued temporary 
residence permits for those who had enough funds and were familiar with an Egyptian 
national who would act as a guarantor, but the Egyptian government denied issuing work 
permits to the refugees who lacked financial resources. Also, the validity of the residency 
permits varied according to each case and the process itself took much time.
125
  
Nuqrashi advised against settling refugees on long-term basis. He perceived the 
refugees, especially those associated with the communists or the Muslim Brotherhood, as 
a potential national security threat.
126
 In this respect, the Egyptian government 
maintained a clear line separating Egyptian territories and the Gaza Strip. This is 
illustrated in adopting the policy of concentrating most of the refugees in Gaza mainly in 
the Maghazi camp which received 7,000 residents from the Qantarah camp during 
September 1949. The government also encouraged those who had relatives in other 
countries to leave Egypt as well as transferring those who lack financial resources to 
Gaza.
127
 By 1950 only a few thousand Palestinians remained where “[b]eginning June 5, 
1950, Egypt Air, in a series of flights, transported 516 Palestinians to Jerusalem. And in 
August 1950 another group was sent to Gaza.”128 The government’s treatment of early 
Palestinian refugees showed a clear sense of detachment and uneasiness. Al-Nuqrashi 
adopted the “national security threat” rhetoric as a pretext to justify policies that would 
otherwise raise public criticism. 
Conclusion  
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The first part of this chapter introduced the aim of the project. The second part 
examined the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, as well as providing a 
deconstructive analysis to the historiography of the 1948 war. This section also examined 
the evolution of the official Egyptian response to the Palestine problem during the 
interwar period until the 1948 war. This response shifted gradually from a detached 
stance during the 1920s to a more active role during the 1930s and 1940s. It also 
analyzed how the Egyptian press reacted to developments in Palestine during the period 
under investigation. The last section investigated the Egyptian government’s response to 
the early waves of Palestinian refugees. During that era, the government adopted a 
detached policy; treated the refugees as a temporary problem, and showed unwillingness 
to engage actively in settling them in Egypt.      
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Chapter Two 
 The Nasser Era 1954-1970 
This chapter focuses on the Nasserist era and the course of the Egyptian-
Palestinian relations during that period. The chapter in this respect attempts to analyze 
Nasser’s political project and how the Palestine question fitted within its parameters. It 
will also attempt to examine the social and legal status of Egypt’s Palestinian refugees 
during the era under investigation and the extent to which political tensions affected their 
rights.      
Historical background 
 On 23 July 1952 the Free Officers Movement declared a military coup d’état which 
dethroned King Farouk and declared the establishment of the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC).  The movement under the leadership of General Mohammed Naguib and 
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser delivered its first statement stating that the decision to 
dethrone the king resulted from “the persistence of the British occupation since 1882, the 
corruption and inefficiency of the political order leading to the defeat in the Palestine war 
of 1948, and the glaring social inequalities.”129 However, the question is: to what extent 
did the defeat in the Palestine war contribute to triggering the coup? To answer this 
question, it is useful to briefly examine the socio-political scene prevailing in Egypt on 
the eve of the 1948 war. Prior to the Palestine war political and social frustrations 
surfaced against the ailing monarchy. King Farouk lost his initial popularity among the 
population due to his inability to end the British occupation that had persisted since 1882 
along with the spread of poverty and rural landlessness. In fact one of Farouk’s 
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motivations behind participating in the war resulted from his desire to regain his lost 
popularity among the population and score a victory against the rising national 
opposition. He took this decision while ignoring the fact that the army lacked essential 
training and preparation combined with the presence of unqualified chiefs in the 
leadership.
130
 Additionally, the political parties including the liberal Wafd failed to 
provide substantial alternatives to break the deadlock and achieve complete 
independence. In fact the first Wafdist government under the leadership of Saad Pasha 
Zaghlul hoped “to make a deal with the British government to reconcile Egyptian 
nationalist and British imperialist interests.”131 In the year 1936 the Wafd government 
under the leadership of Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 
1936. The treaty would have lasted for twenty years and it stipulated the withdrawal of 
the British troops from Egypt except for a number of 10,000 soldiers to protect the Suez 
Canal. The treaty also gave the British the exclusive right to train and supply arms to the 
Egyptian army and to step in for defense in cases of war.
132
 However, given the fact that 
the Egyptian army at that time lacked sufficient ammunition, vital equipment, training, 
and experienced military leaders, the British secured a prolonged military presence in the 
Canal Zone along with bases in Cairo and Alexandria.
133
 By early 1952 al-Nahhas Pasha 
unilaterally renounced the 1936 treaty sparking violent clashes between the British troops 
and the Egyptian policemen in the Canal Zone resulting in the death of more than fifty 
Egyptian policemen on 25 January 1952 (known as Police Day). Following news about 
the massacres in Suez, violence erupted culminating with the burning of Cairo where 
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thousands of demonstrators set fires in hundreds of foreign banks and hotels across the 
city on 26 January 1952.
134
 The political scene would remain in turmoil until the Free 
Officers announced their coup and seized power on 23 July 1952. 
The social and economic scene did not fare better. The majority of the population 
suffered from poverty, illiteracy and the wide spread of fatal diseases. The social gaps 
grew wider between the wealthy landlords and the majority of the poor landless 
population.
135
 Also the fact that the capitalists and Pashas dominated the parliament 
hindered any attempts at social reform and improving the living standards for the 
masses.
136
 Frustrated and disillusioned by the liberal-democratic experience, intellectuals 
started looking elsewhere for solutions to Egypt’s social, economic, and political 
dilemmas. Some groups followed the Marxist communist doctrine. Others expressed a 
deep interest in the Italian and German experiences under the leadership of Mussolini and 
Hitler. However, the Muslim Brotherhood appealed more to the majority of the 
population arguing that restoring authentic Islamic institutions and abandoning “Western 
innovations” was the only way to solve Egypt’s problems.137 The Brotherhood argued 
that westernization did not benefit the average Egyptians who kept suffering while a tiny 
minority associated with the palace and the Europeans accumulated most of the country’s 
wealth.
138
 In this respect it is important to note that King Farouk’s miscalculated decision 
to enter the Palestine war stemmed from a futile attempt to regain the support of the 
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masses, divert the attention from the crumbling domestic affairs, and deflate the 
opposition especially the growing brotherhood.
139
  
Against this turbulent landscape, the defeat in 1948 was the final factor that 
discredited the ailing monarchy and, shattered the government’s credibility as well as the 
Wafd’s liberal experiment. The defeat put much pressure on a severely frustrated and 
humiliated army. The defeat was not the sole trigger for the Free Officers’ coup, but it 
constituted a decisive turning point. 
In The Philosophy of the Revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser reflects on his 
experience in 1948 also known as the nakba which he saw as a mirror foreshadowing the 
fate of Egypt.
140
 Nasser explained that the seeds of the coup existed long before the 
eruption of the Palestine war and the debacle of the defective weapons. The Free Officers 
had begun circulating pamphlets advocating for the liberation of Egypt beginning in the 
early 1940s. Nasser narrates that while theses group of soldiers fought in the trenches in 
Palestine and were latter under siege in the Faluja pocket, Egypt continued to be their 
preoccupation. Their “dreams were in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy…but 
our hearts were hovering round our distant Mother Country, which was then a prey to the 
wolves that ravaged it.”141 Nasser and his military colleagues felt that the greater battle is 
in Egypt, whom a greater Faluja awaits if she remains besieged by the British and the 
King.        
There is our Mother Country, a far, far bigger Falouja. What is happening in 
Palestine is but a miniature picture of what is happening to Egypt. Our Mother 
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Country has been likewise besieged by difficulties as well as ravaged by an 
enemy. She was cheated and pushed to fight unprepared. Greed, intrigue and 
passion have toyed with her and left her under fire unarmed.
142
 
The defeat added a surge to the mounting socio-political frustrations prevailing in 
Egypt in the decades prior to the war. In this respect the defeat combined with the 
Palestinians’ trauma of dispossession proved that the time has come to overthrow the 
ailing political order. Nasser stressed that ousting Farouk became a national duty to 
liberate Egypt from corruption, tyranny, British domination, and above all to protect 
Egypt from the fate of Palestine.
143
 The Palestine question would later become a crucial 
component in Nasser’s quest to define Egypt’s political identity and build domestic and 
regional support for his pan-Arab project. To this end the following section addresses the 
relation between Nasserism and the Palestine question.    
The Egyptian-Palestinian Political Relations 1954-1970 
Nasser’s political ideology did not crystalize until his presidency commenced in 
1954 after ousting General Naguib. The year 1955 would have a considerable impact on 
shaping the course of Nasser’s policies until the first half of the 1960s. Initially, Nasser 
focused on improving Egypt’s social and economic conditions, while simultaneously 
negotiating the withdrawal of the remaining British troops. Nasser hoped to maintain 
open relations with the West and the United States in order to secure funds to revive the 
economic and industrial sectors. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nasser called for 
abiding by the United Nations (UN) resolutions and following the path of political 
negotiations. He stressed maintaining order across the borders with Gaza in order to 
maintain the cease-fire with and deprive Israel of a premise to wage counter-attacks. This 
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required imposing heavy surveillance on Palestinian activists in the Gaza Strip especially 
the militant groups in an effort to ensure Egypt’s national security. Additionally, prior to 
1955 Nasser expressed openness towards several proposals that aimed to resettle 
Palestinian refugees in the host countries. For instance, the Egyptian government 
discussed the prospects of the Northern Sinai project proposing the transfer of the Nile 
water to Sinai enabling poor Gazan families to cultivate some small plots. Aware that 
such plans would dissolve their national rights; Gazans strongly opposed any resettlement 
plans and insisted on their right of return. In February 1955 Gazans demonstrated against 
this proposal and forced the Egyptian government to drop the project altogether.
144
 
However, an aggressive Israeli raid on Gaza on 28 February 1955, which killed 
thirty-nine Egyptian soldiers and injured many, signaled for Nasser a political rather than 
a military message.
145
 The raid occurred at a time when there were no major clashes 
across the borders. More than anything it was a moment of Israel’s performance of its 
military power. The raid highlighted the increasing vulnerability and ill equipped 
condition of Egypt’s eastern borders. Nasser turned first to the United States but their 
insistence on defense supervision including dispatching their own inspectors to oversee 
arm’s handling and use pushed Nasser to reject the deal.146 He would attain his aims 
through a Soviet proposal to supply different arms including modern planes and tanks in 
return for Egyptian cotton and rice. On 27 September 1955 Nasser announced the 
finalization of the deal, which would be known as the “Czechs Deal.” It marked Nasser’s 
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alliance with the Eastern bloc in a glaring challenge to the United States and the Western 
bloc in the midst of an increasingly embittered Cold War.
147
 Thus the raid and Nasser’s 
reactions to it fostered his status as a regional leader. He appeared to refuse to surrender 
to Western conditions and adopted a hardline stance towards Israel including supporting 
Palestinian armed attacks across the borders. Nasser explained that Israel’s reliance on 
aggression deems peace unattainable. He added that after the Gaza raid and the 
inefficiency of the Security Council to stop Israeli aggression, Egypt had no choice but to 
defend itself and would use all its military capabilities to safeguard its national 
security.
148
 Nasser would later recall that the Gaza raid proved that the Israeli threat is 
bigger than the occupied territories, in the sense that, since territorial expansionism lies at 
the heart of the Zionist project, then it would eventually expand to include more Arab 
lands. He added that Israel in reality is the tool of Western imperialism and the focal 
point for global Zionism.
149
   
At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser went on to announce Egypt’s 
neutralism and support of anti-Western movements across the Arab world and Asia.  He 
further defied the West by refusing any arm deals that mandated joining anticommunist 
alliances. Nasser solidified his relations with the Soviet bloc and condemned any Arab 
alliance with the West.
150
 This is illustrated in the case of the Baghdad Pact of the 1955. 
A British sponsored union with the aim of protecting the region, the pact included in its 
membership Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain. The pact in fact aimed at 
containing Soviet influence and to maintain enough power to protect Western interests in 
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the region. Nasser called Iraq’s membership “a betrayal of Arab nationalist interests.”151 
Nasser argued that Western powers are not really interested in protecting the Middle East 
from any threat, but rather focused on defending the region against the Soviet Union. For 
him, pro-Western alliances were imperialistic tools in disguise; they aimed to destroy 
Arab nationalism and subordinate the region.
152
 Nasser insisted that defending the region 
should come from within the Arab nation through a unified defense system independent 
of external forces. He explained that by adopting an anti-Soviet stance, the pact was a 
distraction from the imminent Israeli threat and an attempt to dissolve the Palestine 
question. Citing the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s declaration that the pact 
strengthened the West’s influence in the Middle East, Nasser explained that acting 
against it to protect Arab nationalism and its borders was a necessity.
153
 Nasser’s most 
rebellious move came on 26 July 1956 when he nationalized the Suez Canal Company as 
an Egyptian Limited Company.
154
 The move came as an act of retaliation when both 
Britain and the United States intentionally withdrew from financing the high dam project 
in Aswan in an attempt to humiliate him. Nasser claimed Egyptian sovereignty over the   
Canal and insisted that he would not surrender to imperialist schemes aimed at interfering 
in Egyptian internal affairs and dictating the course of its policies.
155
 This bold direction 
triggered the Tripartite Aggression of Britain, France and Israel on 5 November 1956.
156
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The Anglo-French troops withdrew on 23 December 1956 after a veto by the United 
States against the aggression. Israel would withdraw by March 1957 after agreeing to 
install the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) to oversee the borders with Gaza 
and prevent the infiltrations of Palestinian armed groups.
157
 The Suez crisis greatly 
enhanced Nasser’s image as an Arab hero who defied the West, it proved “Nasser’s 
contention that non-alignment and rejection of Western arms agreements were the best 
means to retain Arab freedom…and weakened those who argued for continued reliance 
on Western pacts.”158 
  Following the Suez war, Nasser turned his focus to define Egypt’s political identity 
and its regional position. As early as 1954 Nasser envisioned a central regional leadership 
for Egypt stressing its Arab roots through invoking shared geographical boundaries and 
historical heritage. Nasser referred to Egypt as “Arab Egypt.”159 In The Philosophy of the 
Revolution, Nasser asserted that “[t]he era of isolation is now gone” adding “[n]either can 
we ignore that there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part 
of us as we are a part of it, that our history has been mixed with it and that its interests are 
linked with ours.”160      
          The Palestine question provided Nasser with a unique foundation for his pan-Arab 
project. From a strategic perspective, resolving the Palestine question became essential to 
safeguarding Egypt’s borders. Nasser also realized that adopting the Palestine question 
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would be a cornerstone to unify the Arab world behind his pan-Arab project. Nasser 
envisioned a central role for Egypt within the realm of regional politics, adopting pan-
Arabism secured this goal and provided a context to legitimize his policies.   
I do not know why I always imagine that in this region in which we live there is a 
role wandering aimlessly about seeking an actor to play it. I do not know why this 
role, tired of roaming about in this vast region which extends to every place 
around us, should at last settle down, weary and worn out, on our frontiers 
beckoning us to move, to dress up for it and to perform it since there is nobody 
else who can do so.
161
 
The Palestine question provided a unique venue to unify the Arab states behind one 
common goal which is to liberate Palestine and defeat imperialism. Pan-Arabism and 
Palestine became Nasser’s pillars in establishing a regional role for Egypt. Nasser 
stressed that Palestine is the first cause of all the Arabs who share that same fate asserting 
that “fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory…It was a duty imposed by 
self-defense.”162 Such stances provided him with sweeping support among the Arab 
masses generally and Palestinians particularly. Nasser stressed that Israel was the by-
product of the British mandate in Palestine. He added that the idea of establishing a 
Jewish state in Palestine would have remained unfeasible without the unlimited political 
and financial support it received from the British Empire.
163
 From a strategic point of 
view Nasser realized that adopting the Palestine cause would rally the Arabs behind 
Egypt and his pan-Arab project, thus, securing a regional dominance for Egypt. Palestine 
and the defeat of imperialism were recurrent themes in Nasser’s speeches during the 
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1950s and the 1960s. In Gaza, Nasser stated “conspiracies against Arab nationalism in 
Palestine are in fact targeting Arab nationalism in Egypt as well.”164   
Further, on the occasion of declaring the new Egyptian constitution in 1956, 
Nasser stressed that Egypt is part and parcel of Arab nationalism and would support all 
Arabs in their quest for independence and freedom. He also blamed the loss of Palestine 
on imperialism and its agencies which isolated Egypt from its Arab roots.
165
  
In this respect, it is important to explain that despite Nasser’s pro-Palestine stance, 
this position cannot be explained in isolation from the calculations of political strategies 
and national priorities. Egypt’s welfare and stability were at the core of Nasser’s political 
project.
166 Adopting the Palestine question was a strategic component of Nasser’s project 
to define Egypt’s political identity and role in the region. Also, from a military and 
national security perspective, solving the Palestine question was integral to protect 
Egypt’s eastern borders. Promoting Palestinian nationalism rested on conforming to 
Nasser’s vision of pan-Arabism. While projecting the image of Palestine’s liberator, 
Nasser kept the Palestinian factions under close check and wanted to avoid any 
miscalculated confrontation with Israel. Nasser repeatedly declared that he would not be 
dragged into an unprepared confrontation just to appease popular sentiments. He 
maintained a preference for a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on 
implementing the UN-resolutions. Despite his strong anti-Zionist speeches, Nasser was 
aware of the international balance of power and the influence of the Israeli lobby in the 
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United States and Europe.
167
 Nasser’s long time confident Mohammad Hassanain Heikal 
recalls the leader’s position that a military option was unreasonable if diplomacy was 
possible. Nasser insisted in several public and private meetings that he would declare a 
state of war only when it was unavoidable must and in accordance with the political and 
strategic considerations of the region, he would never go to war for the sake of war 
only.
168
 Nasser never attempted to wage a miscalculated sentimental war.  Subjected to 
defeat resulting mainly from poor military strategies, Nasser stressed the importance of 
“choosing the right time and the right place to confront Israel’s military might.”169 He 
emphasized that “exhausting all paths of diplomacy would provide enough time to 
strengthen the internal front and encourage the international community to support us in 
case diplomacy failed and we opted to the military option.”170  
Incorporating the Palestinian resistance movements in the Nasserist project was 
also a strategy to prevent opponents and competing alliances from absorbing them. For 
instance as in the case of the Baghdad Pact, 1955-1979, Nasser opposed any military 
pacts with Western countries labeling them as another manifestation of imperialism 
aiming at destroying Arab nationalism and dissolving the Palestine question. He stressed 
that military co-operation should be done within the frame of the Arab League (AL) only 
without any foreign interference.
171
 After the demise of the United Arab Republic (UAR), 
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1958-1961, the Baathists in Syria would become another challenge to Nasser. The list 
would also include the Marxists and the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza. Following the 
Gaza raid Nasser supported the fedayeen’s operations against Israel to prevent the 
Brotherhood from advocating jihad (holy war) against Israel. However, this support had 
strings attached where Nasser made it clear that such operations should be carried out 
according to Egypt’s guidance and approval, those who failed to conform to this 
condition would face detention and imprisonment.
172
 The idea behind keeping the 
fedayeen under surveillance stems on the one hand, from Nasser’s intolerance against 
miscalculated operations which could trigger Israeli counter-attacks. On the other hand, 
supporting fedayeen fits Nasser’s rhetoric supporting Palestinians and liberation 
movements. This support relayed a political message to the United States and the 
Western powers invoking the presence of a regional military leverage that could counter 
Israel’s military might. Finally, containing the fedayeen was a preemptive strategy to 
deprive anti-Nasserism from taking the upper hand especially the Brotherhood, which 
had been active in the Strip since 1948. In this respect, Nasser aimed at supporting albeit 
containing Palestinian nationalism in accordance with his pan-Arab vision.    
           During the Egyptian rule over Gaza 1949-1967 and especially following the 1955 
raid, the Egyptian administration focused monitoring the Strip. Aside from sustaining the 
everyday needs, extending free university education and providing jobs for all university 
graduates, the administration had to maintain enough power to control any political 
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activities that might be perceived as a security threat.
173
 In other words, the 
administration opted to adopt what Ilana Feldman refers to as “tactical government”, a 
term referring to the containment of potential social unrest through providing essential 
services including education, housing projects, and employment.
174
 The logic behind this 
approach aimed to enhance the legitimacy of the administration and to shape the Strip in 
accordance with the Nasserist political project. The administration in this respect focused 
on monitoring the religious and educational institutions so as to control their output. The 
Egyptian administration promoted a religious education, which “sought to promote a kind 
of civic morality that would not threaten government power and could participate in its 
project of promoting a well-ordered public life.”175 Through controlling both religious 
institutions and education the administration intended to eliminate the threat of political 
activism on religious basis a model promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood the main 
opponents to Nasser’s regime. Following a failed attempt by the brotherhood on Nasser’s 
life in 1954, the government heavily monitored any Palestinian activists linked to the 
Brotherhood; many would face detention and arrest based on mere suspicion of being 
collaborating with them.
176
 This historical experience proves the extent to which refugees 
are vulnerable to domestic and regional political tensions. The administration sought to 
maintain an active but contained Palestinian nationalism. Egyptian education promoted 
non-political activism were “[t]he duties of the nationalist as described in schools were 
not immediately political ones, but cultural and moral ones, including care for others, 
                                                          
173. Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967, 102 & 153 
174. Ibid. 153-154 
175. Ibid. 203 
176. Rouleau, “Abd al-Nasser and the Palestinian National Movement: Chronicle of a Stormy Affair,” 175-
196 
59 
 
cooperation, and respect.”177 Furthermore, the attempt to direct Palestinian nationalism 
was not limited to the historical period of Egyptian rule in Gaza; it ultimately affected the 
course of Egyptian political relations with Palestinian movements. This is evident in the 
formation of Fatah in 1959 and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 as 
well as the ebbs and flows of Egyptian-Palestinian relations under Nasser.  
Formed in Kuwait in 1959, the Palestine National Liberation Movement “Fatah” 
became the most prominent national organization. The leaders of Fatah descended from 
the middle classes and the 1948 refugees who took refuge in the Gaza Strip.
178
 The key 
leaders of Fatah were Yasser Arafat and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad). Arafat settled in 
Kuwait as of 1957 after being frustrated by Nasser’s repressive policies against 
Palestinian armed struggle. Arafat an Egyptian by birth, and education (he had a degree 
in engineering from Cairo University in 1956) became the president of the Palestinian 
Student Union (PSU) in 1952, and served with the Egyptian army during the Suez war in 
1956. He fully supported the Free Officers’ coup and subscribed to their discourse which 
blamed the loss of Palestine on the corruption of the Arab monarchies and the imperial 
conspiracies against Arab nationalism.
179
 However, his enthusiasm gradually faded due to 
Nasser’s strict surveillance on Palestinian activists. Arafat along with other Palestinians 
came to the conclusion that “the new regime had turned out to be scarcely better than the 
other Arab regimes, all seen as unfriendly and deeply untrusted.”180 Fatah did not 
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subscribe to any specific political ideology, rather, their motive and goal focused on 
liberating Palestine as a whole. Unlike, pan-Arabism which preached Arab unity as the 
means to liberate Palestine, Fatah leaders argued that liberating Palestine would lead to 
Arab unity.
181
 Additionally, they believed that military action should precede political 
initiatives.
182
 This approach drew its inspiration from the success of the Algerian war of 
independence. For instance, Abu Iyad credited the writings of Frantz Fanon as the main 
source of his philosophy.
183
 Fatah’s founders insisted on the autonomy of their decisions 
and claimed that they would not interfere in Arab regimes’ internal affairs nor take sides 
in regional conflicts. However, one of their undeclared goals focused on slowly preparing 
the region for a military confrontation with Israel.  
[T]hey pledged to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab states 
and from taking sides in inter-Arab conflicts.  Fatah’s undeclared agenda was to 
be the spearhead of the liberation of Palestine by organizing an armed struggle 
that would lead to a conflict between Israel and its neighbors – a conflict that they 
fully believed would end in an Arab victory.
184
 
By October 1959 Fatah started publishing a monthly journal entitled Filastinuna 
(Our Palestine) which would last until the year 1964.
185
  Published in Beirut and 
distributed in some Arab countries it started publishing anonymous articles explaining the 
organization’s ideologies. The journal’s articles reaffirmed the movement’s political 
neutrality toward Arab regimes while stressing the necessity of armed struggle to liberate 
Palestine.
186
 Fatah’s project did not gain immediate popularity; its establishment came at 
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a time when Nasserism had reached its zenith. On 1 February 1958 Egypt and Syria 
united forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) “thought to be the nucleus of a wider 
Arab union that, in the words of Abu Iyad, ‘would submerge the State of Israel.”187 
Further, the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq a major British ally strengthened Nasser’s 
position against the United States and Britain. From this vantage, it appeared that the 
achievement of Arab unity was merely a matter of time. A turn of events in 1961 pushed 
Fatah again to the forefront. On 28 September 1961 the UAR collapsed with Syria’s 
withdrawal due to mounting dissatisfaction with the Egyptian rule especially political and 
military hegemony and Nasser’s attempt to nationalize the economy.188 Disillusioned by 
the UAR’s collapse many Palestinians expressed their frustration with traditional political 
parties and opted to join the ranks of Fatah. Further, various Arab states including Iraq, 
Algeria, Syria and Saudi Arabia aspiring to rival Nasser or contain his growing 
hegemony provided various forms of financial and logistical aid to Fatah.
189
 As of 1964 
Syria would openly sponsor Fatah with the aim of reviving its role as a key regional 
power and to discredit Nasser’s role. In this sense, Syria’s pro-Fatah stance stemmed 
from strategic national considerations camouflaged under the rubric of supporting armed 
struggle against Zionism. To this end Syria would supply Fatah with logistical support 
facilitating its commando operations in Israel albeit from non-Syrian territories.
190
    
Sensing the threat of a surge in uncontrolled military attacks that would lead to 
war, Nasser decided to establish a Palestinian organization that would unify the various 
Palestinian factions. This came in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
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(PLO), established in May 1964 under the patronage of the Arab League and the 
leadership of Ahmed Shuqayri. This also led to the establishment of the organization’s 
military wing known as the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) “with units to be stationed 
in Arab host countries and under their command.”191 Undeterred by this move and under 
Syria’s patronage, Fatah secret military wing al-Asifa (the Storm) would carry several 
attacks on Israel. In retaliation Fatah members in Gaza faced detention and torture. 
Nasser also “called on all the countries bordering Israel to crack down on the perpetrators 
of the raids. He had already asked various Arab states to ban the distribution of 
Filastinuna, by then identified as Fatah’s mouthpiece.”192 In the meantime Syria initiated 
a propaganda war accusing Nasser of relinquishing the Palestine cause and dismissing 
Shuqayri as a Nasserist agent. Nasser responded that Arab regimes are using the Palestine 
cause as a strategy card to score narrow national interests. He added that the problem 
with Syria is less about military competition and more about political distrust, explaining 
that conferences and the war of words are not the means to liberate Palestine. He also 
defended the creation of the PLO while dismissing claims labeling the organization as 
powerless. Nasser stressed that the PLO served as a unifying Palestinian entity resisting 
Israeli attempts to dissolve the Palestine question. Nasser would repeat that declaring war 
was a difficult decision, not a sentimental one.
193
 Prior to the 1967 war, Nasser feared 
that the race for regional power and the unconditional support of Palestinian militants 
would create the pretext Israel needed to wage a preemptive war.  
                                                          
191. Ibid. 184 
192. Ibid. 185 
193. Nasser’s speech at the Palestinian National Congress, Cairo University on 31 May 1965, 
http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=1123&lang=ar [Arabic Source]  
63 
 
It was thus that fedayeen action, encouraged by Syria for its own ends, set in 
motion the chain of events that ultimately proved Nasser’s worst fears about the 
consequences of ill-advised armed struggle.  The debacle of the June 1967 war 
radically changed the balance of power in the region, including that between the 
Palestinian resistance and Nasser’s Egypt.194 
The Six Day War of 5-10 June 1967 changed the dynamics of the region 
dramatically in favor of Israel, which emerged as a rising military power. The 1967 
debacle and its consequences became the second massive defeat to befall the Arabs since 
1948. The defeat in 1967 led to the loss of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza, Jerusalem, the West 
Bank, and the Golan Heights.  Further, it is estimated that more than 350,000 Palestinians 
became refugees who faced forced evictions from their villages, thus, intensifying the 
Palestinian refugee problem already persisting since 1948.
195
 The scale of mass evictions 
and the permanent destruction of villages endangered the prospect of a return to the Arab 
Palestinians and discredited Israeli prewar claims “that it would not expand its 
borders.”196 In this respect it is important to briefly explain the political circumstances 
leading to the 1967 war. Norman G. Finkelstein argues that the 1967 war could have been 
avoided adding that Nasser never wanted to start a miscalculated war.
197
 Finkelstein 
argues that Israel’s reasons to wage a preemptive strike could be summarized as follows: 
First, the Israeli leaders argued that Syrian fighters constantly attack the Israeli northern 
settlements.  Second, Israel also argued that Nasser’s Egypt is preparing a massive strike 
against Israel citing the large concentrations of the Egyptian army in Sinai. Third, the 
closure of the Tiran Straits was presented as an act of declaring war and a violation of 
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international law.
198
 Finkelstein argues that to counter anti-Nasser propaganda launched 
by Syria and Jordan, Nasser decided to replace the United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) with the Egyptian army across the borders in Sinai and Gaza. The UNEF 
functioned as a peace-keeping force stationed across the Egyptian-Israeli borders to 
maintain the cease-fire implemented since the Suez war 1956. Nasser’ decision resulted 
from the mounting criticisms coming from Damascus and Amman accusing him of 
hiding behind the UNEF and using them “as a pretext for not confronting Israel.”199 
Finkelstein adds that Nasser only wanted to readjust the positions of the UNEF not their 
entire withdrawal, however “[c]onfronted with an all – or – nothing ultimatum from UN 
Secretary – General U Thant that left him with no ‘face – saving device’, Nasser opted 
for a complete withdrawal.”200 In other words, Nasser’s decision to deploy the Egyptian 
troops into Sinai on 14 May 1967 stemmed from his desire to preserve his image and 
credibility in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.
201
 Further, Finkelstein argues that on 
the Syrian front the shelling from the Golan Heights “aimed to deter the Israeli 
encroachments.”202 When the 1948 war ended the Syrian – Israeli armistice agreement 
stipulated the creation of Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) on the borders between the Golan 
Heights and Israeli northern settlements. However, according to UN – reports Israel 
repeatedly violated those DMZs and gradually took control of large portions of those 
areas and forcibly evicted the Arab villagers residing there. Major – General Carl Von 
Horn, who served as chief of staff of the UN forces admitted that Israel used whatever 
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means available to acquire most of the land. Illegal encroachments triggered resentment 
among the Syrians whose attacks on Israeli targets came as a means of defending their 
properties.
203
   
Nasser’s motivations behind the closure of the Straits of Tiran remain unclear, but 
Finkelstein argues that the entire case is debatable from an international legal perspective. 
Until the Suez war Israeli ships heading to Eilat were not allowed to pass through the 
Straits, Nasser defended his decision to impose this blockade as a response to Israel’s 
insistence on disregarding the UN – resolutions calling for the return of the Palestinian 
refugees.
204
 However, Finkelstein argues that Israel had not used the port of Eilat in the 
last two and half years prior to the war, adding that “a mere 5 per cent of Israel’s trade 
passed through Eilat.”205 Furthermore, the implementation of the blockade on the 
Egyptian side became less strict where “the Egyptian navy had searched a couple of ships 
after the establishment of the blockade and thereafter relaxed its implementation.”206 
Indeed the US envoy Charles Yost observed that the blockade “did not of itself constitute 
an armed attack, and self – defense did not cover general hostilities against the UAR.”207 
Nasser also expressed his willingness to go to the International Court of Justice to handle 
the case where legal experts themselves admitted that the case had not been settled 
legally.
208
  
Further territories were lost to Israel along with an influx in the numbers of 
Palestinian refugees. The relations between Nasser’s Egypt and Fatah also shifted in the 
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post 1967 era. Following the defeat Nasser faced a series of moral and political dilemmas 
both nationally and regionally. The defeat sent shock waves throughout the Arab world 
and Nasser’s status as an Arab hero faced a tough challenge, this became apparent during 
the Khartoum Arab Summit held during August and September 1967. During the summit 
the Arab delegations outvoted both Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan rejecting his 
proposal to be granted a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the states which lost territories 
to Israel. The summit released its famous resolution of the “three nos” which rejected 
negotiation, reconciliation, and the recognition of Israel. Nonetheless, Nasser gave 
Hussein his approval to pursue direct negotiations with Israel and the United States.
209
      
           By opting for diplomacy, Nasser sought to buy enough time to rebuild his military 
capabilities and restore his shattered credibility in front of a frustrated and angry 
Egyptian society. Despite loud Palestinian criticisms, Nasser accepted UN Security 
Council Resolution 242 issued on 22 November 1967 which called for Israel’s 
withdrawal from all territories occupied on 5 June 1967. Palestinian criticisms stemmed 
from the fact that the resolution implied “recognition of Israel in exchange for Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories occupied during the war.”210 Further, unlike previous UN 
– Resolutions the text only called for a just settlement to the refugee problem without 
referring to their right of return.
211
 From a strategic perspective Nasser needed something 
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concrete to negotiate with as a sign of good intentions. Additionally, he explained that 
although Resolution 242 is a feasible way to remove the ramifications of the offence, yet 
it is not enough to fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people. Adding that if the UAR had 
the right to accept the resolution it is understandable that the Palestinian resistance had 
the right to reject it.
212
 On a parallel path, Nasser decided upon an advice from Heikal to 
receive the leaders of Fatah. Heikal convinced him that Fatah has no relations with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and had nothing to do with the failed assassination attempt back in 
1954. Nevertheless, this change of heart resulted by and large “from a strategic 
standpoint, Nasser needed Fatah as a card he could play in case Israel would not agree to 
a settlement based on the return of the Occupied Territories.”213           
           Nasser’s decision to meet with Arafat among other Fatah members was a result of 
the power shift in the wake of the 1967 defeat. Fatah operations against Israel gained 
wide support among the Arab masses and many Egyptians started joining their ranks. The 
heroism and resilience shown by the Palestinian fedayeen in battles like Karameh in 
March 1968 gave hope and pride to the reeling Arab world following the humiliation of 
1967 where; “enthusiasm for the fedayeen swelled to unprecedented heights.”214 Further, 
Nasser hoped that Arafat known for his sympathy to Egyptian nationalism would be a 
reliable ally. Nasser envisioned that an alignment with Fatah would act as a pressure card 
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in case Israel refused negotiations and the UN resolution 242’s condition of Israeli 
withdrawal from the areas occupied on 5 June 1967.
215
 To further cement his alignment 
and patronage, Nasser paved the way for Fatah to take over the PLO. Shuqayri resigned 
in December 1967. Nasser had secured his departure. Fatah won a majority of the seats in 
the executive committee and Arafat becoming the organization’s president in March 
1969.
216
 Additionally, under Nasser’s patronage the PLO established a permanent 
presence in southern Lebanon through the Cairo Accords, signed in November 1969.
217
 
With this move, Nasser hoped that opening a second front against Israel would benefit 
the progression of the war of attrition along the Suez Canal.
218
 Nonetheless, Nasser and 
Fatah were at odds in July 1970 when Nasser accepted the Second Rogers Plan. The plan 
introduced on 19 July 1970, which Egypt accepted on 23 July 1970, proposed peace in 
exchange of an Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian and Jordanian territories while 
observing a cease-fire across the borders.
219
 Nasser anticipated that the Palestinians 
would criticize the move but Egyptian national interests were his priority. However, he 
did not expect Fatah’s harsh personal attacks. For instance, the central committee of the 
PLO condemned the plan and attacking its signatories. The committee’s organ, Fatah 
published several articles that violently attacked Nasser and accusing him of being an 
agent of imperialism and Zionism. Other headlines announced that leaders no longer able 
to resist, should leave office. At the same time, the Baath Party in Iraq aimed to seize the 
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opportunity to outbid Nasser and his regional leadership.
220
 Fatah’s Sawt al-Asifa (The 
Voice of the Storm) and the PLO’s Sawt Filastin (The Voice of Palestine) both stationed 
in Cairo mediated the criticisms. Initially, Nasser refused to shut them down saying that 
they should be given the chance to reconsider their position. He feared that closing the 
stations would send the message to the Jordanian government that Egypt no longer 
supported the resistance movement, and that it was vulnerable to Jordan’s whims. Nasser 
also believed that it is part of Egypt’s role to bare criticisms launching from within its 
territories against its official policies. Even after sending several envoys to Fatah 
leadership in Amman the criticisms intensified. The Palestinian party line refused any 
negotiations and insisted that the Palestinian resistance would continue the fight on their 
own. Eventually, this escalation led to the decision to close the two stations on 28 July 
1970.
221
 Nasser expressed his sadness about this decision and issued a statement 
reaffirming the UAR’s support to the Palestinian resistance movement and its noble role, 
hoping that all the organizations would reach a healthy relationship in order to carry-on 
its role in liberating Arab land.
222
 It remains unclear whether the decision to close the 
stations stemmed from Nasser’s fear that such criticism would lead to domestic agitation 
against his policies. A breakthrough would later occur when Nasser agreed to meet 
Arafat. During the meeting Nasser explained that he did not expect Israel to commit to a 
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withdrawal from the West Bank. He added that accepting the Rogers Plan was a delaying 
strategy to rebuild the armed forces.
223
     
This back and forth came to a halt with the impending signs of a full-fledged 
confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian army culminating with the events of 
Black September 1970. The roots for those bloody confrontations go back to the 1967 
defeat. Palestinian activists “decided to adopt guerrilla warfare tactics as the most 
effective method of attacking and defeating Israel.”224 One of the popular organizations 
endorsing this strategy was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led 
by George Habash. He believed that their operations should carry a strong message to 
draw the world’s attention to the Palestinian cause. Accordingly, his group adopted the 
strategy of hijacking passengers’ airplanes beginning with El Al jet in 1968 and 
culminating with hijacking four European planes in September 1970.
225
 The guerrilla 
attacks intensified across the Jordanian borders triggering major Israeli retaliatory 
attacks. The situation escalated between King Hussein and the fedayeen over the control 
of the country. Fearing that the fedayeen were creating a state-within-a state and posing a 
challenge to his rule, the government launched a large-scale assault targeting Palestinian 
civilians and fedayeen alike. The massive operations led to the destruction of the refugee 
camps, whole sections of Amman, and the death and detention of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees.
226
 Nasser swiftly intervened, sending a military envoy with a 
message to King Hussein urging him to stop the fighting and to protect the Palestinian 
resistance. He warned him that this tragic assault would benefit the enemy and cripple the 
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region with an internal Arab civil war. Nasser explicitly said that he would not allow for 
the destruction of the Palestinian resistance movement, which he believed to be the 
noblest byproduct of the 1967 defeat.
227
 He called for an Arab summit in Cairo on 21 
September 1970 and under his patronage Arafat and Hussein signed a cease-fire 
agreement on 27 September 1970.
228
 The agreement acknowledged the right of the 
Palestinian organizations to operate, but stipulated that the fedayeen should leave the 
cities and remain along the frontlines. However, after Nasser’s sudden death on 28 
September 1970, the clashes resumed and culminated with the expulsion of the PLO from 
Jordan by mid-1971.
229
     
The previous sections focused on analyzing the Egyptian-Palestinian political 
relations in the light of the Nasserist project, an analysis which attempted to put such 
relations in their wider historical and political perspectives. The following section will 
analyze the image of the Palestinians in the Egyptian press during the Nasser era. 
Palestinians and the Nasserist Press 
The Egyptian press underwent significant transformations during the Nasserist 
era. Nasser believed in the vital role of the press in presenting and legitimizing certain 
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policies. Nasser utilized the press in his propaganda against the Western-backed Arab 
states through the writings of Heikal and other Palestinian journalists like Nasser al-Din 
al-Nashashibi.
230
 However, the establishment of a socialist one-party regime in this case, 
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) limited press freedom and marginalized the opposition. 
The state consolidated its power over the press through nationalization, the firing of 
prominent journalists, and their substitution with those regime loyalists: “all heads of 
administration and chief editors of the nationalized press were expected to belong to the 
ASU. This mandatory membership was made a prerequisite for belonging to the Press 
Syndicate.”231 Nasser asserted more control over the Press Syndicate by placing his close 
associate Salah Salem as its chairman. This move rendered the organization weak and 
incapable of securing media and journalists’ rights.232 Therefore, despite the eloquence 
and analytical approach evident in the writings of figures like Heikal and Ahmad Bahaa 
al-Din among others, the press as a whole lacked diversity. It was essentially a regime-
directed and government-controlled.
233
       
The representations of the Palestine question in Egyptian press during the 
Nasserist era can be divided into two phases. The first starts with the crystallization of 
Nasser’s political project in 1954 and stretches till 1967. During this period the press 
adopted Nasser’s vision of the Arab-Israeli conflict which could be summarized in the 
following points: First, Israel was an alien body implanted by the imperial powers to 
weaken the Arab nation. Thus, the struggle to liberate Palestine was an integral part of 
the Arab nation’s struggle against colonialism. Second, the liberation of Palestine rested 
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on building a solid national social and military base that would shift the balance of power 
towards the Arab states. Arab unity was the most viable source to achieve this goal. 
Third, the liberation of Palestine was a long and difficult task given the international 
balance of power; unless Arabs drew on their national strength and resources this balance 
would remain unchanged.
234
 
The three official papers al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, and al-Jumhuriyah, began 
publishing news about the guerilla activities inside Israel when they commenced in 1965. 
Despite focusing on the operations and their significance, none of the papers referred to 
the organization responsible that is Fatah and al-Asifa. The papers used the unspecified 
term “Arab groups” in their headlines in reference to the fedayeen.235 This pattern 
reflected the Egyptian regime’s attempts to contain Palestinian politics within the 
framework of the PLO and its newly formed army the PLA.
236
  
The 1967 defeat led to a major shift in media representations. The fedayeen 
operations began taking precedence in the three formal newspapers, marking the 
beginning of the second phase from 1967 till 1970. The defeat caused severe frustration 
and disillusionment among the Arab masses, a situation that needed a quick remedy to 
restore the peoples’ self-assurance and trust. This remedy came in the form a sudden 
interest in covering the news about the fedayeen and their operations in the occupied 
territories. This dramatic increase in press coverage might be attributed to the regime’s 
desire “to restore the spirits of the defeated Egyptian public. Much of this coverage was 
aimed at demonstrating that Arab resistance did not die and that the struggle of the 
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Palestinians in particular was far from over.”237 This surge in coverage on the front pages 
and in bold headlines came also in accordance with Nasser’s statement referring to the 
Palestinian resistance after 1967 as the noblest phenomena resulting from the defeat, 
adding that the Palestinian revolution is destined to survive.
238
          
The three papers reported extensively on the resistance operations and the fierce 
Israeli retaliations.
239
 The press also reported in detail on the Karameh battle, which 
lasted for sixteen hours on 21-22 March 1968. The battle started with an aggressive 
Israeli attack aiming at destroying the Palestinian resistance in al-Aghwar area. The 
Palestinian groups along with the Jordanian army waged a counter-attack which managed 
to successfully force an Israeli withdrawal with significant loses on the Israeli side. The 
outcome of the battle despite the causalities was paramount and proved the resilience of 
the Palestinian resistance. Several writers praised the fedayeen, calling for unity and 
steadfastness among the Palestinian groups. Al-Akhbar published such headlines like 
“Israel launches a brutal assault in Jordan the next day the Palestinian resistance agreed to 
political and military co-ordination.”240 Al-Ahram also published headlines which 
emphasized the necessity of unity while recalling Nasser’s words that Israel is an alien 
body created by imperialism to destroy the Arab world.
241
 Al-Jumhuriyah published 
headlines that the Israeli assault was a preemptive strike that aimed at dismantling the 
Palestinian resistance movement.
242
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             However, since the press during the Nasserist era was captive to the regime, it 
got caught in the web of political tensions. This is illustrated in the case of the Rogers 
Plan and the Egyptian-Palestinian tensions ensued following Egypt’s acceptance of the 
Plan. Heikal attempted to rationalize the decision in al-Ahram. He quoted Nasser’s 
declarations to a Sudanese delegation explaining that he accepted the cease-fire only to 
buy more time to re-build his army and prevent Israel from Judaizing Gaza, Jerusalem, 
and the Golan Heights. He added that despite knowing that Israel would not commit to 
any agreements, he needed to accept the American proposals as a strategy to bring the 
United States into the Arab-Israeli equation. This is due to the fact that the United States 
was more capable than any other country to exert enough pressure on Israel to abide by 
resolution 242. Nasser insisted that accepting the plan stemmed from his obligations 
towards the Arab nation and Palestine rather than focusing solely on Egypt’s national 
interests. Heikal also criticized those calling the struggle a Palestinian-Israeli struggle 
rather than an Arab-Israeli one. He maintained that despite its bravery and commitment 
the Palestinian resistance movement cannot win a decisive war against the enemy. He 
went on to explain that the case of Palestine is different from the cases of both Vietnam 
and Algeria, where the numbers, capabilities, and the geographical conditions 
(mountains, caves, forests, borders) are not in favor of the resistance groups. He also 
argued that only regular armies and the official backing of Arab states like Egypt are the 
only viable means to liberate Palestine, insisting that Egypt will not wage a guerilla war 
across its eastern borders.
243
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Other writers defended Nasser’s decision, arguing that it was the leader’s support 
that brought Palestinian factions international recognition. The Palestinian Marxist writer 
Muein Bisseiso wrote an article in al-Ahram entitled “Despite the Noise Rising in the 
Political Stock Market, I Vote with Abd al-Nasser.”244 He attacked the Palestinian groups 
which rejected the plan and argued that Nasser’s Egypt supported them and the 
Palestinian rights through thick and thin; disagreements between them should not turn 
into an open confrontation. He went on to remind the Palestinian factions that Egypt was 
not the enemy and that Nasser’s diplomacy saved them from crises in Jordan and 
Lebanon and afforded them a Soviet recognition.
245
 Other writers like Musa Sabri harshly 
attacked the anti-Nasser propaganda accusing the propagators of having “hateful voices” 
that aimed to wage war at the expense of Egyptian sacrifices. Although not directly 
naming the Palestinians the meaning could be easily inferred since they maintained a 
hardline against the cease-fire.
246
 In al-Mussawar magazine, Ahmed Bahaa al-Din 
expressed his anger at the out-bidding games waged against Nasser, and strongly 
defended his decisions. He concluded his article by “directing severe criticism at some 
Palestinian factions, accusing them of being no more than appendages of certain Arab 
political parties.”247 Additionally, the press reduced its coverage of guerilla operations, 
moving the news that did appear to the inside pages with limited coverage. By contrast, 
the press devoted a majority of the space to pieces that supported Nasser’s decision to 
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accept the plan.
248
 Also, al-Ahram published a caricature by Salah Jahin depicting Nasser 
holding a chess-piece taking the shape of Rogers with the caption “checkmate”; Nasser 
the message screamed, was in control.
249
 The course of the Egyptian press during that era 
shows that being a captive press tied its direction with that of the regime which limited its 
scope and freedom. In moments of political tensions the press became a political tool that 
promoted the regime’s policies and discredited those who opposed it.      
Palestinian Social Organizations in Egypt 1954-1970 
Nasser incorporation of the Palestine question as one of the pillars of his political 
discourse necessitated certain measures. One example is the formation of Palestinian 
social unions in Egypt during the Nasserist era. The government encouraged the 
formation of several unions to promote the sense of Palestinianism within the context of 
Arab nationalism. The regime encouraged union activities as long as they did not 
interfere in the internal affairs of the state.
250
 Again, here we see the dynamic of 
simultaneous social support and political containment. For example, the Arab Palestine 
Club was founded in 1953 in Cairo with branches in Alexandria, Al-Arish, and Port-Said. 
Despite its cultural orientation the club “boasted a strong Arab nationalist line, calling on 
Arab progressive forces to restore Palestine to its people.”251 The Nasserist era also 
witnessed the formation of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) in 1959, 
but its origins date back to the 1940 activism of Palestinian students, which raised public 
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awareness on Palestine before 1948.
252
 GUPS, known to be the most active of Palestinian 
mass unions, engaged in “overt political activities and extra-Palestinian 
manifestations.”253 The GUPS acted as a “training school that produced the political 
cadres in the Palestinian national movement”; when it joined PLO apparatus in 1964 it 
became “the Palestinian reserve army in exile.”254 Due to its extensive political activism 
GUPS faced several crises in the Egyptian regime. Again, it is clear that political 
conditions affect the rights of refugee communities to express their own views and 
function independently. While boosting solidarity with the Palestinians, the regime would 
harshly react against any views that did not conform to its discourse. For instance, in 
1961 following the collapse of the UAR the Baathists faced detention the same applied to 
the Baathist students in the union who faced mass deportation. Later the union resumed 
its activities in February 1964 when “the Arab nationalists (i.e. Nasserites) took over the 
leadership of the union in Egypt.”255 Another confrontation occurred when GUPS 
members joined Egyptian students protesting the light sentences passed against some 
military officers accused of negligence during the 1967 war. GUPS participation in those 
protests marked the first time a Palestinian union openly demonstrated against the 
Egyptian regime, all the protestors were arrested.
256
 The third clash occurred in 1970 
when Nasser accepted the Rogers Plan. Palestinian students in Jordan who belonged to 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) (both forming the rejectionist front which 
opposed any peace settlements with Israel) organized anti-Egypt demonstrations. In 
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retaliation Nasser “deported all Palestinian students affiliated to the PFLP or PDFLP, and 
he arrested members of all Palestinian unions – Workers’ Union and the Women’s Union 
– who did not belong to Fatah.”257 GUPS would face other major crises in the 1970s 
during Sadat’s era, which culminated with its permanent ban in 1977. 
The General Union of Palestinian Workers was also established in this period in 
1965. The union’s origins date back to the Palestinian Arab Workers. The latter was 
established in Haifa in 1925; it called for equality between Arab and Jewish workers. In 
1965 the first congress of the Palestinian Trade Union Federation convened in Gaza and 
announced the formation of the union.
258
 The union avoided involvement in political 
affairs and potential clashes with the Egyptian regime. Indeed, the union’s Domestic 
Charter “clearly forbade its members from intervening in the political and religious 
affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt.”259 In this respect, the union acted as a syndicate 
for the Palestinian labor force in Egypt. It focused on protecting workers’ rights including 
wages, work-permits, and legal appeals. The union also had several social initiatives 
including social welfare contributions, organizing cultural seminars, and acting as a 
social link bringing the different Palestinian unions in Egypt. The cultural activities 
organized by those unions helped in bringing Egyptians and Palestinians together. 
260
 
The third organization was the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), 
established in 1965. Founded in Jerusalem in 1965, its origins date back to the Arab 
Ladies Association of Jerusalem founded in 1919 as the first Palestinian women’s union. 
                                                          
257. Ibid. 44 
258. Ibid. 47 
259. Ibid. 48 
260. Ibid. 48-56 
80 
 
The union had eleven branches in different host countries.
261
 Similar to the Workers’ 
Union, the GUPW avoided any political activities and its charter also forbade any 
involvement in internal Egyptian affairs. Its work focused on social welfare, education, 
and vocational training.  
The fourth organization established in this period, was the General Union of 
Palestinian Writers and Journalists in Egypt. In 1966 the first congress of the Palestinian 
Writers convened in Gaza and announced the formation of the union.
262
 The union 
focused on Palestinian public relations, it also organized several lectures to present the 
Palestinian political perspective. The union would later openly criticize Sadat’s pro-
American policies and the prospect of a peace settlement with Israel. This led to its 
disbandment in 1977 but it resumed its activities in 1983.
263
    
The General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT) was founded in 1969. The 
union focused on raising political awareness, improving the quality of education of 
Palestinian children, and monitoring the status of Palestinian schools. The GUPT 
succeeded in obtaining a permit from the Egyptian Ministry of Education allowing 
“Palestinian students to obtain the Egyptian two-year Educational Diploma.”264 This 
diploma improved Palestinian career, for those who could not afford the regular fees 
required for university degrees.
265
   
Lastly, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) began operating in Egypt in 
1970. The PRCS began operating in Jordan in 1968. However, following Black 
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September all PLO related activities including independent medical services were banned 
in Jordan.
266
 The union established the Gawad Hosni Polyclinic in Central Cairo and a 
small hospital in Heliopolis.
267
 The PRCS enjoyed an autonomous status within the PLO. 
A resolution passed by the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in 1969 defined the PRCS 
as “an ‘independent’ formal organization within the PLO apparatus…capable of setting 
its provisional and operational plans, recruiting its health and administrative team, and 
implementing the relevant and most appropriate policies in each country in which it 
functions.”268 The PRCS extended its medical services to Palestinians and Egyptians 
alike without any distinctions in payment.
269
 Due to its medical and social services the 
PRCS did not pose a threat to the Egyptian regime, thus, the government did not restrict 
its expansion.
270
 
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees in Egypt 1954-1970 
This section attempts to examine the legal status of the Palestinian refugees in 
Egypt during the Nasser years. During the early phases of their rule and before 
introducing concrete legal changes, the Free Officers “made education, health, and other 
services available to Palestinians.”271 With the consolidation of his power in 1954 Nasser 
issued several laws with the aim of equating the refugees with Egyptian nationals in 
several venues. The articles referring to the Palestinians “did not apply the word foreign 
to Palestinians in administrative matters.”272 Further, Egypt ratified without reservations 
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the Casablanca Protocol issued on 10 September 1965. The protocol stipulated that 
Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries are entitled to the same rights accorded to 
nationals in such fields like employment, residency, and freedom of movement.
273
 
Despite providing a comprehensive legal framework to protect the refugees, the 
provisions of the protocol remained vulnerable to the internal politics of each host state 
and the course of political relations with Palestinian factions. For instance, following the 
collapse of the UAR Baathist students faced detention and deportation.
274
 By 1970 and 
due to the Egyptian-Palestinian clash over the Rogers Plan, all non-Fatah Palestinians 
were deported.
275
 Arbitrary deportation on the basis of political difference contradicts not 
only with the provisions of the protocol but with one of Nasser’s presidential resolutions. 
According to the first section of Article 18 of Presidential decree 89, 1960 Palestinian 
refugees in Egypt fall under the special-residency category.
276
 Article 26 of the same 
decree forbade the deportation of special-residency foreigners unless they prove to be a 
credible threat to national security and after conducting a thorough investigation through 
a special committee and providing clear evidence.
277
 The deportation cases cited above 
are examples of political disagreement that does not mount to be a threat to national 
security. This is a case when refugee communities suffer the backlash of political 
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tensions. The loose term of protecting national security serves as the perfect pretext 
disguising violations against refugees’ rights.  
Residency and Travel Documents 
Residency permits for Palestinian refugees in Egypt fell under different categories 
based on the time of arrival. In most cases the issue and renewal of such permits depend 
on providing a reason for staying in Egypt such as employment, marriage, or education 
enrollment. A document released in 1994 by the Department of Travel, Immigration and 
Nationality shows the number of travel documents issued for each category.
278
 First, there 
is type (A), which refers to those refugees who arrived to Egypt prior to 1948 and 
includes a total number of 1,075 refugees. The permit for this category was renewable 
every five years. It could also be renewed for a period of ten years if the applicant could 
provide a proof of being a continuous resident in Egypt for a decade.
279
 Second, type (B) 
refers to the refugees who arrived after the nakba and totaled 13,032. The residency 
permit for this category was renewable every five years.
280
 Third, type (C) refers to the 
refugees entering Egypt proper during and after the Tripartite Aggression (the Suez War) 
of 1956, and their total number was 142. For this category the permit is renewable every 
three years.
281
 Fourth, type (D) related to the refugees who arrived during the Six Day 
War of 1967 and totaled 6,417. The permit for this category was renewable every three 
years.
282
 The fifth and final, type (H) was applicable to the refugees who arrived after the 
1967 war and totaled 236,307. This category receives a temporarily residence permit 
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renewable every three years depending on the Egyptian laws of entry.
283
 According to a 
report issued in 1994 the total number of Palestinian refugees in Egypt was 256,973. 
However, other sources point to the fact that their actual numbers do not exceed 100,000. 
The remaining number do not live in Egypt due to the restrictions imposed on their 
freedom of movement and their inability to re-enter Egypt despite having an Egyptian 
travel document. The Egyptian travel document for Palestinians carrying residency 
permits comes with very strict regulations. To secure a valid entry the holder of this 
document whether traveling or residing abroad must return to Egypt every six months. 
Alternatively, the authorities will issue a one-year return visa upon receiving a proof of 
work or education enrollment prior to the renewal date. Failing to meet such conditions 
will result in denying entry and deportation, knowing that such document cannot be 
renewed or extended from Egyptian embassies.
284
 Further, in 1995 the Ministry of 
Interior conducted a survey calculating the number of the Palestinian Gazans living in 
Egypt proper and they totaled 89,000. The report also indicated to another inconclusive 
number revolving between ten to twenty thousand refugees scattered within different 
governorates and villages.
285
       
Additionally, Egypt issues another type of travel documents for Palestinian 
refugees who do not have a residency permit. This document is valid only for travel 
purposes and does not include any residency rights. This document is held by thousands 
of Palestinians mainly from the Gaza Strip. During the Egyptian rule in Gaza this 
document was issued upon request for any resident from Gaza. This document is 
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renewable through Egyptian embassies and most of its holders fall under category (H) 
referring to those refugees arriving after the 1967 war. However, this document does not 
provide any protection for its holders. A case in point, during the Gulf War 1990-1991 
the Gulf States expelled thousands of Palestinians on the grounds of political tensions 
rising from Arafat’s stance on the war. The majority of the Palestinians expelled from 
Kuwait held the second type of Egyptian travel documents and were refused entry in any 
state. Those who managed to arrive to Egypt faced prompt deportation. Only Palestinians 
carrying Israeli re-entry permit to Gaza were issued seventy-two hours transit visas.
286
 
This in fact contradicts with the provisions of the Casablanca Protocol the second article 
of which stipulated that refugees residing in signatory countries and in accordance with 
their interests “have the right to leave and return to this state.”287         
Residency Regulations during the Nasser Era 
Law 89 of 1960 related to the entrance, residency, and departure of foreigners 
from Egyptian territories divided residency permits into three categories: special, 
ordinary, and temporary. This law stipulated in its third section article 18 that Palestinian 
refugees residing in the “Northern Regions” which during the  Egyptian-Syrian union 
referred to Syria would fall under the category of foreigners with especial residency. 
Members in this category are entitled to a ten-year residency permit to be renewed upon 
request.
288
 Also, article 37 of this law gave the Minister of Interior the power to exempt 
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any category of foreigners from “the application of (part of) the law.”289 Additionally, the 
Egyptian government issued decision 28 authorizing the issuing of travel documents 
(TD) to Palestinians.
290
 In 1961 the Minister of Interior issued decision 9 of 1961 to 
amend some of the legal provisions in decision 28 of 1960. The first article stipulated that 
article seven from the previous resolution should be amended to be read as follows: “the 
travel document is valid for two years since the issuing date. It is renewable for another 
two years, then one more year making the document valid for five years.”291 Another 
resolution followed in 1964 amending some provisions in Law 89 of 1960. This came in 
the form of issuing decision 180 of 1964 where its article 13 exempted Palestinian 
refugees, their wives, and their underage children from paying fees to issue residency 
permits, they are also entitled to one free return visa annually. The article also gave the 
head of immigration, passports, and nationality the right to extend the validity of the exit 
visa for more than once.
292
 Further, resolution 181 of 1964 related to the issue of 
travelling documents provided that Palestinian refugees in Egypt are entitled to issue 
temporarily travelling documents. The applicants should provide a proof of being 
classified as refugees and have a valid residency card to prove their status. The fourth 
article stated that the document is valid for two years, renewable for another two years 
and one more year. Thus, the document is valid for a period of five years. Article five 
stipulated that the travel document does not grant entrance or transit in Egypt without 
securing a valid entrance, transit, or exit visas in advance. While article ten states that the 
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fees required for issuing the travel documents are twenty-five Egyptian piasters and for 
free for those who could prove their financial inability. The documents are also renewed 
for free, and the holders of those documents are exempted from paying the fees required 
for a return visa.
293
 Despite the fact that Egypt strictly applies the provisions of those 
laws, their application was relatively relaxed during the Nasser years.
294
 However, like 
most foreigners residing in Egypt, Palestinian refugees with a long-term residence 
“qualify only for a temporary residence permit, which is valid for one to three years.”295 
The second article of the Casablanca Protocol stipulated that Palestinian refugees residing 
in signatory countries have the right to leave and return to this state. Nonetheless, 
Palestinian refugees whether born in Egypt or lived there for a long period “have no 
automatic right to leave or reenter the country, but must renew their visas every six 
months to three years, depending on the category.”296 Those who need to travel through 
Egyptian territories should secure a valid transit visa prior to entry date.
297
 The Egyptian 
laws fell short from extending legal protection toward non-refugee Palestinians carrying 
Egyptian travel documents. This document is held by a substantial number of Palestinians 
from the Gaza Strip. The document is valid for five years and does not include a 
residency permit. Holders of this document cannot enter Egypt without securing in 
advance a valid entry, transit, or return visa and are not permitted to reside in the 
country.
298
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Education 
In the field of education during the Nasser era, Palestinians where entitled 
services as Egyptian nationals. This approach resonates with provisions of the Casablanca 
Protocol and Nasser’s stance on the Palestine cause and its centrality to his pan-Arab 
project. Education would nourish Palestinian nationalism while keeping it in check and in 
accordance with Nasserism. Palestinian students like their Egyptian counter-parts enjoyed 
free education in schools and universities. The government extended free university 
education to Gazans during Egyptian rule over the Gaza Strip.
299
 The government also 
provided financial assistance of about forty-eight Egyptian pounds (about 110 US 
dollars) for 1,192 Palestinian students during the period of 1965-1966.
300
 In one instance 
Nasser issued Presidential Decree 1223 of 1958 exempting five Palestinian students 
enrolled in the Police Academy from tuition fees for their entire period of study.
301
 
Outstanding students received one hundred Egyptian pounds (230 US dollars). Also, the 
government provided a number of scholarships to Palestinian students; these reached 
about 1,030 during the 1960s. Access to education and scholarships led to an increase in 
Palestinian enrollment in Egyptian schools and universities. Palestinians in universities 
exceeded 20,000 students and 5,642 were from Gaza alone.
302
     
Employment 
Egypt has a highly regulated work environment where work permissions for 
foreigners are difficult to obtain and depend on the terms of reciprocity treatment. The 
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rationale behind those regulations “is the protection of the interest of Egyptian 
nationals.”303 However, the first article of decree 21 of 1961 temporarily exempted 
foreign residents with both ordinary and special residency permits from fulfilling the 
condition of reciprocity treatment.
304
 The provisions of this decree affect Palestinian 
refugees since they fall under the special-residency category as explained above. Also, 
during the Nasserist era unlike the monarchal days “Palestinians were permitted to obtain 
commercial registers and, unlike other Arabs, were accorded the right to import and 
export.”305 By the 1960s several laws facilitated employment opportunities for 
Palestinians in Egypt. However, it should be noted that “the laws were not drafted solely 
for Palestinians. Rather, they were general laws promulgated to regulate professions and 
in each case an article dealing with Palestinians was included.”306      
Presidential decree 66 of 1962 stated in its first article that it is permitted to 
appoint Arab Palestinians in state positions and the public sector on the same basis 
applied in hiring the citizens of the UAR.
307
 Laurie A. Brand argues that the timing of 
this law had a political connotation. This decree came after the collapse of the UAR and 
the rapid deterioration of Egyptian-Syrian relations. Brand argues that this move may 
have been “a means by which Nasser sought to boost his pan-Arab credentials. Given the 
employment situation of Palestinians in other Arab countries, the move was certain to 
have substantial propaganda value.”308     
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Several other laws followed in the footsteps of the decree explained above. For 
instance, the Minister of Labor issued Ministerial decree 39 on 10 May 1962 exempted 
Palestinians from obtaining work permits.
309
Also, Presidential decree 46 of 1964 related 
to regulating the status of civil officials in state employment stipulated that Palestinians 
do not fall under the foreigners’ category.310 Further, Egyptian laws stipulated that 
practicing medicine, pharmacology, and dentistry is only permitted to Egyptian nationals 
and foreigners whose countries observe the principle of reciprocity treatment. However, 
those laws included articles exempting Palestinian refugees from those conditions. For 
instance, Article 14 of Law 537 of 1954 related to practicing dentistry stated that due to 
their status as refugees, Palestinian dentists are authorized to practice dentistry in Egypt 
given the fact that they have a degree in the field as required in article 2. In some cases 
the applicants could also be exempted from the required examination stated in Article 3 
(related to those who carry non-Egyptian degree in dentistry).
311
 Additionally, article 15 
of Law 415 of 1954 related to the practice of medicine permitted Palestinian doctors to 
practice medicine in Egypt due to their status as refugees residing in the country. The 
applicants are also exempted from the required qualifying examination applicable for 
those who carry non-Egyptian degree in medicine.
312
 Section seven of article 87 of Law 
127 of 1955 related to practicing the profession of pharmacy allowed Palestinians to 
practice pharmacy in Egypt, due to their status as refugees. The applicants are also 
exempted from taking the qualifying examination required from those who carry non-
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Egyptian academic degree under the condition that they carry the required degree stated 
in article 2.
313
 
The Palestinian Private Sector during the Nasser Era 
The 1948 refugees suffered from their inability to secure legal jobs in Egypt. This 
stemmed from al-Nuqrashi’s government orders to prohibit the employment of 
Palestinians.
314
 For al-Nuqrashi, the refugees were a threat to national security that should 
be curtailed from a permanent stay in the country.
315
 When the Free Officers seized 
power, they abolished the no-work restriction imposed on Palestinian refugees.
316
 Early 
Palestinian businessmen faced several obstacles during their early beginnings in Egypt. 
First, their numbers were relatively small and they lacked enough knowledge of the 
requirements of the Egyptian market. Second, they also lacked enough capital and 
expertise to match the European investors already established in Egypt for decades. 
Third, they faced much opposition from “foreign establishments, especially the Jewish 
ones, who fought the birth of any Palestinian business.”317 Nasser had hoped that 
encouraging Palestinian investments would help in breaking the European monopoly over 
Egypt’s economic sector. However, the earlier obstacles proved hard to overcome, as 
many early Palestinian businesses failed and the owners either left Egypt or enrolled in 
the public sector.
318
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 The Tripartite Aggression of 1956 created major shifts in the Egyptian economic 
sector. Following the war thousands of Jews left Egypt and the state seized all their 
properties. This created a new economic environment attracting Palestinian entrepreneurs 
mainly from Gaza to invest in sectors previously monopolized by Egyptian Jews 
including “manufacturing enterprises, wholesale and retail trade and small hotels and 
restaurants.”319 Also, during the Egyptian-Syrian union many Palestinians residing in 
Syria decided to invest their capital in the Egyptian commercial and industrial sectors. 
This helped in generating and circulating Palestinian capital and proved beneficial to the 
Egyptian economic sector. Those private projects used Egyptian raw materials to produce 
export-quality products, and earned Egypt foreign currency and international reputation. 
Those projects also offered jobs for both Palestinian and Egyptian workers.
320
 Following 
the 1967 war and Israel’s occupation of Gaza, most Gazans transferred their assets to 
Egypt with the aim of expanding their investments in the Egyptian markets. Between the 
years 1967-1973 the Egyptian economic sector included a total of 222 different 
Palestinian businesses. Their varied activities included the production of food, textiles, as 
well as jewelry making in addition to, tourist agencies, contractors, leather and carpenter 
workshops, and cosmetic factories.
321
 Palestinians could invest in and cultivate 
agricultural plots. Although Law 15 of 1963 prohibited foreigners from owning 
agricultural or cultivable lands, yet, its first clause granted Palestinians a temporary 
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exemption. Thus, Palestinian refugees in this period could own and cultivate agricultural 
plots just like Egyptian nationals.
322
  
Nonetheless, economy and politics are mutually interrelated and political tensions 
negatively affected economic relations. Two incidents during the Nasserist era illustrate 
this point. First, the collapse of the UAR had its ramifications on the Palestinian private 
sector in Egypt. During the union many Palestinian businessmen came to Egypt to 
expand their activities, however, after the union’s collapse and the rapid deterioration in 
Egyptian-Syrian relations many of them sold their businesses and returned to Syria. 
Additionally, some Palestinian businessmen faced arbitrary treatment where their 
properties were confiscated based on the mere suspicion of collaborating with Syrian 
reactionary elements.
323
 The second incident occurred during the political crisis that 
ensued following Nasser’s acceptance of the Roger’s Plan of 1970. The PLO pressed 
Palestinian businessmen in Egypt to voice their opposition to Nasser’s decision. 
However, Nasser’s strong crackdown on PLO offices and radio stations sent a decisive 
message Palestinian opposition to Nasser’s decisions was no longer tolerated. 
Businessmen in order to protect their capital tried to maintain a neutral stance during the 
debacle, since “[t]he penalties inflicted by the Egyptian government were great: they 
ranged from loss of employment to imprisonment or deportation.”324      
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter examined the Nasserist era and the status of the 
Palestinian refugees during that period. Nasser placed the Palestine cause at the forefront 
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of his political discourse in order to build a political leadership for Egypt and rally both 
domestic and regional support for his version of pan-Arabism. On a parallel line the 
Egyptian government and in accordance with Nasser’s stance issued several legal 
exemptions to accommodate the Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt proper. The bulk 
of those laws equated Palestinians with Egyptian nationals in fields of employment, 
education, and healthcare. This however, does not negate the fact that political tensions 
affected segments of the refugees in the form of arbitrary detention, deportation, or the 
seizing of assets as explained above in the cases of the GUPS students or Palestinian 
investors. Although Egypt’s residency laws stipulated that deportation cases should 
provide clear evidence of a credible threat to national security, and despite Nasser’s 
rhetoric on Palestine, opposition to some of his political decisions triggered harsh 
repercussions. Laws in such cases proved inefficient, and the state could easily utilize and 
manipulate the loose term of national security to contain opposition, which could be little 
more than the expression of political differences. Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
the regulations and exemptions related to Palestinians in Egypt remained intact and fully 
effective during the entire Nasserist era.    
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Chapter Three 
The Sadat Era 1970-1981 
 
Historical background 
 This chapter will focus of the era of President Anwar Sadat, 1970-1981. Sadat 
was Nasser’s vice-president and after Nasser’s sudden death on 28 September 1970 took 
the position of a President. The chapter explores Sadat’s foreign policy in post-October 
1973 war era and the peace process with Israel. It will particularly focus on how such 
policies affected Egyptian-Palestinian relations and Egypt’s Palestinian refugees.  
         Sadat’s political project did not crystalize until the late 1970s after the October 
War.  Following Nasser’s death Sadat faced two political dilemmas. On the one hand, he 
had to deal with an internal political struggle with the Nasserists mainly the top members 
of the ruling party known as the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The power struggle 
revolved around shaping the course of Egyptian politics after Nasser’s death. From the 
outset Sadat and the newly appointed vice-president Ali Sabri subscribed to two opposing 
ideologies. Sabri along with other top members of the ASU close to Nasser believed that 
Sadat should consult them before passing any decisions. They assumed themselves more 
qualified to fill in his position.
325
 Sabri stood for the pillars of Nasserism, mainly those of 
socialism, militancy towards Israel and maintaining close ties with the USSR. By 
contrast, Sadat had several reservations against Nasser’s policies especially in relation to 
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foreign policy. He believed that Egypt’s isolation from the West had limited its foreign 
policy options.
326
 Sabri was dismissed from his position on 2 May 1971 and imprisoned 
during Sadat’s “Corrective Revolution” in early 1971. The latter targeted members of the 
Nasserist camp in the government and security forces. A group of prominent figures of 
the Nasser era were put either in prison or under house arrest. They were accused of 
plotting to overthrow Sadat and were put on trial.
327
 The crack on the leftist cadres 
indicated a breach with Nasser’s political circle and a sign of warning to their Soviet 
allies. In another turn of events marking further departures from Nasserism, Sadat 
embarked on a counter policy to gain domestic support through reconciling those who 
came under fire during the Nasser years. Those included hundreds from the Muslim 
Brotherhood, journalists like Ali and Mustafa Amin, members of the former royal family 
who received new passports, and civil servants dismissed under Nasser. The common 
thread between those beneficiaries was “the fact that they all suffered under Nasser. 
Although some leftists might have benefited, the Egyptian right was the major 
beneficiary.”328 Other measures included the restoration of former confiscated private 
property to its original owners. A high court verdict ordered that all private property 
expropriated under Nasser should be restored to the original owners, since the process of 
seizing such property was deemed illegal.
329
 Additionally, Egyptian-Soviet relations 
suffered considerably during the Sadat era. Sadat expressed his openness towards the 
West in general and the United States in particular; he also expressed his preference 
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towards capitalism and diversifying weaponry sources. Sadat complained that the Soviets 
were reluctant in supplying Egypt with necessary arms; ultimately, he ordered the 
dismissal of all Soviet experts and military advisors from Egypt. Sadat’s decision to expel 
the Soviets probably stemmed from his desire to involve the United States as a mediator 
with Israel. The more Egyptian-American ties improved, the more its Soviet counterpart 
deteriorated. Following the October War Sadat argued that the Soviets “opposed military 
action against Israel and withheld arm supplies in an attempt to influence Egyptian 
policies.”330 Sadat would continue attacking the USSR on several occasions claiming that 
wherever the Soviets go they spread hatred and bloody class struggles.
331
    
On the other hand, Sadat had to deal with the Israeli occupation of Sinai and the 
closure of the Suez Canal since the 1967 war. Sustaining the stationed army became a 
huge economic burden. Also, public pressures calling for ending this impasse made it 
clear that the state of “[n]o war – no peace was rapidly becoming more intolerable to 
Egypt than the risks of war.”332 
Initially Sadat showed openness towards diplomacy and negotiations to break the 
deadlock with Israel. However, he soon realized that Egypt has to fight to force a change 
on the ground and that is why he opted for the military option. Sadat’s war strategy 
focused on waging a limited war that “would unite the Arab world behind Egypt, forcing 
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use of the oil weapon; … [and] shatter the myth of Israel’s invincibility and hence her 
belief in security through territorial expansion and, above all, pave the way for an 
American-sponsored peace.”333 In this sense, the war was a spearhead which opened the 
way for peace negotiations and gave Egypt strategic leverage to secure a better political 
bargain.
334
 In short, Sadat’s strategy “was not to fight Israel directly, but to attack Israel’s 
monopoly of support in the United States…the more Sadat tied Israel, Egypt, and the 
United States together, the stronger his position would be and the weaker Israel’s.”335 
During the October War, Egypt successfully crossed the Suez Canal by destroying the 
Bar Lev Line which stretched for 160 km along the canal.
336
 However, the war ended 
with a cease-fire on 25 October 1973 after Israel regained its power and started a 
counterattack aided with extensive US military support.
337
 Between 1974 and 1975 Egypt 
signed the Sinai Accords I and II.
338
 The accords acted as a framework for disengagement 
and effectively eliminated the military option from the equation of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The accord only exchanged a minimal Israeli withdrawal in Sinai for a nominal 
Egyptian military presence and American observes stationed between them. The accord 
ended the war option for Egypt and largely naturalized its role in the Arab-Israeli power 
balance.
339
 The accords also paved the way for the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the 
Egyptian – Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979. Such moves represented a glaring breach with 
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Nasser’s pan-Arab policies; the accords seemed to be a unilateral deal which “decisively 
undermined the prospects of a general Arab – Israeli settlement. The agreement was also 
a first step in Egypt’s withdrawal from the Arab world.”340 Egypt’s leadership in the Arab 
world decreased significantly after signing the Second Sinai Accord as Arab financial aid 
decreased and Egypt started relying exclusively on US financial and military aid.
341
 
Relations with the PLO and the rest of the Arab states further deteriorated in the wake of 
the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty where “Arab sanctions were imposed: 
diplomatic relations were severed, the Arab League transferred from Egypt, aid payments 
and several joint enterprises suspended.”342 Further, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko referred to the agreement as anti-Arab stating that “[t]he separate deal between 
Egypt and Israel resolves nothing. It is a means designed to lull the vigilance of peoples. 
It is a way of piling up on a still greater scale explosive material capable of producing a 
new conflagration in the Middle East.”343 Additionally, between 1977 and 1979 the Arab 
League held several summits that condemned Sadat’s Jerusalem visit and later his 
decision to pursue a separate peace treaty with Israel. For instance, on 5 December 1977 
a summit held in Tripoli, Libya adopted a resolution to sever diplomatic, political, and 
economic ties with Egypt. Subsequent summits followed and stressed the same stance 
culminating with the Baghdad Summit held on 31 March 1979 which decided to 
withdraw the Arab ambassadors from Egypt and to remove the Arab League’s 
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headquarters from Cairo to the Tunisian capital, Tunis.
344
 A war of words ensued 
between Sadat and the rejectionists compromising Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South 
Yemen. Sadat severed diplomatic relations with those states and insisted that the Arabs 
envy Egypt and conspire against its prosperity. Envy, hatred, and conspiracy persisted in 
Sadat’s speeches which emphasized on Egypt’s sacrifices and the Aras’ ingratitude. Such 
themes reinforced and justified Sadat’s Egypt First policy. In other words, Egypt fought 
on behalf of the Arabs but they deny it prosperity, so it’s time for Egypt to focus on its 
own interests. A wave of harsh criticism dominated Sadat’s speeches between the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Recurrent themes included accusing the Arabs of aspiring to 
replace Egypt’s leadership, hatred, and ignorance. He also claimed that Egypt does not 
need the Arabs, blaming Egypt’s economic woes on its sacrifices for the Arab world. On 
several occasions Sadat argued that the Arabs offered nothing to Palestine except slogans 
while Egypt fought their wars and got nothing in return except ingratitude.
345
 This 
discourse marked a glaring breach from Nasser’s pan-Arab rhetoric which stressed a 
united Arab front as an essential prerequisite to confront Israel. The more Sadat’s Egypt 
became isolated from the Arab world, the more dependent it became on US financial and 
military aid. Such dependency marred Egyptian political decisions in the following 
decades as they became closely tied to US interests.    
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 The shift in Egyptian policies and priorities under Sadat resulted mainly from the 
change in the political leadership. Unlike Nasser, Sadat did not aspire to be a pan-Arab 
leader. He believed that pan-Arabism limited Nasser’s political choices.346 Sadat also 
showed more accommodation towards the West in general and the United States in 
particular. His political project had an Egyptian-centric stance. “Egypt First” would later 
become the emblem of Sadat’s political discourse; an early indication toward this policy 
is illustrated in adjusting the state’s official title and restoring the name Egypt. According 
to the Constitution of 1971, Egypt’s official title changed from the United Arab Republic 
to the Arab Republic of Egypt.
347
 It is worthy to note that despite the collapse of the 
Egyptian-Syrian union, Nasser retained the UAR as Egypt’s official name. This shift 
towards a more Egyptian less Arab political order appeared since signing the Sinai 
Accords. Signing the accords seemed to be a unilateral move which neutralized Egypt’s 
role in the Arab-Israeli struggle and eliminated all prospects of an Egyptian military 
intervention in the struggle with Israel. Later and despite Arab rejection, Sadat signed the 
Camp David Accords followed by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Those moves 
proved Sadat’s Egypt-oriented policies and his desire to withdraw from the Arab political 
scene. He stressed that choosing war or peace is ultimately an Egyptian decision.
348
 
Additionally, Sadat showed preference toward free market capitalism and more 
integration into the world capitalist market in what became to be known as infitah (the 
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open door policy). This breach with Nasser’s socialism resulted from both “domestic 
demands and foreign constraints.”349 Sadat needed to attract foreign investments 
especially American ones and gain the support of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to consolidate 
his power. Further, since economic and political relations are interrelated, Sadat 
considered infitah as an integral component of his foreign policy. He hoped that 
abandoning state socialism for a neoliberal free market would win Egypt both investment 
and political support from the United States.
350
      
Egyptian – Palestinian Relations during the Sadat Era 1970-1981 
Egyptian-Palestinian relations did not witness significant changes during Sadat’s 
early years in office; in fact “Egypt was a cosponsor of the resolution at Rabat in October 
1974 which officially proclaimed the PLO the sole, legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.”351 Also, in an attempt to prove himself as a democratic liberal, Sadat 
ordered the reopening of the PLO offices and radio stations closed by Nasser during the 
Rogers Plan crisis.
352
 Singing the Sinai Disengagement Accords in 1975 put some strain 
on Egyptian relations with the PLO but did not have any impact on the status of the 
Palestinian community in Egypt. However, Egyptian-Palestinian ties started to rapidly 
deteriorate when Sadat announced his intention to visit Jerusalem in a speech delivered at 
the People’s Assembly in November 1977.353 The shocking announcement followed by 
                                                          
349. Hinnebusch, Jr.  Egyptian Politics Under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-
Modernizing State, 59 
350. Ibid. 59-60, also see “Palestinians Discuss Sadat’s Moves,” MERIP Reports, No. 65 (Mar., 1978), 12-
14 
351. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State, 60, see also 
Lukacs, ed. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record, 1967-1990, 464-465 [Full text] 
352. Dajani, The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt, 94 
353. A speech delivered by Sadat on the occasion of the opening session of the People’s Assembly on 9 
November 1977 where Sadat declared that he would go to any extent even to the Israeli Knesset to 
negotiate peace,  http://sadat.bibalex.org/speeches/browser.aspx?SID=641 [Arabic Source]  
103 
 
the famous visit angered the PLO which responded by releasing the Six – Point Program 
on 4 December 1977 condemning the visit, rejecting UN – Resolution 242 and all 
international conferences based on its provisions including the Geneva Conference, and 
calling for severing all ties with Sadat’s regime.354 The visit, the first of its kind by an 
Arab leader and specifically an Egyptian one perplexed the entire region. Egypt had a 
long history of wars against Israel since 1948. It acted as the uncontested leader of the 
Arab world. But the trip signaled an Egyptian formal recognition of Israel, Sadat’s 
insistence on ending the war option for Egypt, and his gradual withdrawal from the Arab-
Israeli struggle.
355
 The visit also triggered Palestinian students in Egyptian universities, 
thus, fueling several demonstrations against the regime. The government swiftly 
retaliated through expelling all active students and ultimately banning the GUPS in 
1977.
356
 
As noted earlier, since its inception, GUPS became highly involved in overt 
political activism leading to several clashes with the Egyptian regime during the late 
1960s and throughout the 1970s. During the early 1970s GUPS organized several 
demonstrations; for instance during 1970-1971 the Palestinian students demonstrated 
against the Egyptian government inaction regarding the massacres of Black September. 
In 1972 the GUPS joined the Egyptian masses in large demonstrations against Sadat’s 
policies especially the “no-war no-peace” impasse. However, vocal opposition would no 
longer be tolerated leading to the banning of other active Palestinian unions like the 
General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. Only unions focusing on social 
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non-political activities survived the onslaught including the unions of workers, women, 
and the Red Crescent.
357
 In essence, the crack shows the regime’s intent to contain all 
platforms that could incite opposition and rally Egyptian leftists and Islamists who 
strongly opposed Sadat’s quick approach to a peace settlement without enough critical 
thought or social debate. During that period the regime imposed severe restrictions on 
opposition to the peace treaty, for instance, in 1979 the government passed a referendum 
forbidding “the formation of a party that stood against the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.”358 The 
problem with this stance is that the regime equated between opposing the treaty and 
opposing peace altogether, while in fact, the opposition called for a just peace and a more 
calculated approach regarding Egyptian-American relations. 
The year 1978 marked a further turn for the worse for both Egyptian-Palestinian 
relations and Palestinians in the country. On 18 February 1978 a Palestinian armed group 
called Abu-Nidal Organization assassinated Youssef al-Sibai the Minister of Culture in 
Cyprus. The Egyptian regime perceived the assassination, although promptly denounced 
by the PLO, as an assault. There were severe repercussions that curtailed “many of the 
privileges that Palestinians in Egypt had enjoyed since the 1950s and 1960s” and many 
laws “were gradually reviewed and cancelled.”359 For instance, al-Ahram reported on 28 
February 1978 that “discussions in the People’s Assembly [were] calling for the re-
examination of the status of the Palestinian residents of Egypt.”360 The assassination and 
the subsequent Larnaca airport debacle triggered further tensions. Following the carnage 
the government (without proper prearrangements) sent Egyptian commandos to free the 
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remaining hostages but the Cypriot soldiers fired and killed them. This fiasco enraged the 
Egyptian regime and unleashed an anti-PLO press campaign where “[t]he Egyptian 
media, certainly with government approval, if not encouragement, began what was to be 
a three-and-a-half-year assault on the PLO in particular and Palestinians in general.”361 In 
retaliation Sadat “in major breaks with precedent, denounced fedayeen raids on Israel and 
repudiated the claim of the PLO to be the legitimate representative of Palestinians.”362  
 The Egyptian-Palestinian relations faced further deterioration in the months 
preceding signing the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978. Based on an 
American initiative the accords proposed a frame-work constituting basis for negotiating 
an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. However, Egypt ended up signing the accords as a 
separate Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement since the PLO rejected to participate. On 23 
September 1978, the PLO joined the so-called Summit of Anti-Sadat “Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front”, held in Damascus with participants from Algeria, Libya, Syria, and 
South Yemen. The Summit released an agreement which called for severing political and 
economic relations with Egypt and removing the headquarters of the Arab League from 
Cairo, while maintaining closer ties with the Soviet Union
363
. Arafat stated in an 
interview that the PLO along with the “Steadfastness Front” would fight in his words “the 
tripartite alliance – Carter, Begin, and al-Sadat.”364 Surprisingly, Sadat’s declarations 
grew obviously inconsistent. Sadat insisted on several occasions that there is no real 
peace in the region without a just and meaningful solution to the Palestine question based 
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on the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab land and east Jerusalem. He stressed 
that Egypt never sought a separate deal and that the question of Palestine lies at the very 
heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
365
 However, in reality, his government nurtured an 
aggressive anti-Palestinian campaign and issued a series of laws discriminating against 
the refugees. Sadat also disregarded all domestic and regional opposition and preceded 
with the accords dispute their flaws. 
In this respect, it is important to briefly explain the reasons behind the PLO’s 
decision to refuse signing the Camp David Accords. Since its inception the accords 
became promoted as a frame-work setting the basis for future negotiations. However, the 
clauses proposed failed to offer any tangible basis for the transition to self-governance or 
self-determination. From the onset the Camp David framework included within its 
clauses several terms that would eventually render autonomy and self-government 
ineffective. For instance, the responsibilities of the Palestinian authority governing both 
the West Bank and Gaza would later be defined through negotiations between 
representatives from Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. The Palestinian representation was 
confined to the stance of the Arab governments participating in the talks. Thus, denying 
Palestinians the right to choose their representatives. Further, this clause empowered 
Israel with the right to veto certain proposals or deny the admission of specific 
Palestinian representatives. Besides, the Palestinian delegation in this respect would be a 
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mere token representative of the Arab governments which selected its members rather 
than representing the Palestinian people in general.
366
   
 In essence, the Camp David Accords became more of a framework for further 
negotiations rather than providing substantial resolutions. It fell short from committing 
Israel to fully withdraw its forces from the West Bank and Gaza, it did not provide for 
measures to stop the expansion in building new illegal settlements. Further, the accords 
overlooked the status of Jerusalem and gave Israel the right to select which Palestinians 
are eligible for readmission. This clause essentially denied Palestinians the right to return 
to their homeland. It contradicted with previous UN resolutions affirming the 
unconditional right of return. Also the accords failed to acknowledge the status of 
Palestinian refugees displaced prior to the 1967 war.
367
 In short “the explicit provisions 
and the implicit terms of the Camp David Framework exclude, in practice, the realization 
of the most fundamental Palestinian rights: to sovereignty, statehood, self-determination 
and return.”368 Such shortcomings explain the reason why the PLO refused to sign the 
Accords as they significantly diminished the Palestinian rights and failed to provide 
concrete basis for a just solution to the Palestine question. 
 Regardless of Arab condemnation and vocal domestic opposition mainly from the 
Leftists and Islamists, Sadat signed the Camp David Accords on 17 September 1978.
369
 
He went on to sign the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty on 26 March 1979; the two 
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countries exchanged ambassadors along with full diplomatic relations.
370
 Egyptian-
Palestinian-Arab relations remained turbulent until the early 1980s when a radical Islamic 
group known as al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah assassinated Sadat on 6 October 1981.     
The Press during the Sadat Era 
As he consolidated his power, Sadat focused on the press establishment. Having 
headed the administrative board of al-Jumhuriyah newspaper, Sadat had acquired first-
hand the influence of such establishment. In fact, during his era the press became known 
as “the fourth-estate.” He promised that the era of prosecuting and jailing journalists was 
over, and insisted that freedom of speech would be protected. Article 47 of the 1971 
constitution stipulated that “freedom of speech whether written, spoken or photographed 
is guaranteed within the framework of the law and constructive criticism to safeguard the 
national structure.”371 Article 48 stated that “freedom of press and printing is guaranteed, 
press censorship and suspending newspapers was forbidden. Limiting those rules would 
occur only during cases of national emergency and/or war where a limited form of 
censorship would be enacted in matters pertaining to social safety and national security 
purposes.”372 However, implementing those laws proved to be a tough challenge to Sadat 
since “[h]is understanding of freedom of the press appeared to be only as a tool for 
conveying the political authority’s views to the public.”373 He appeared to be less tolerant 
toward criticism and implied his intentions to rid the Press Syndicate from his opponents. 
The case of Haykal is an indicative illustration of Sadat’s limits tolerating criticism. 
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Haykal, Nasser’s closest advisor and al-Ahram editor-in-chief for seventeen years 
clashed with Sadat on various issues. He repeatedly criticized Sadat’s failure to unify an 
Arab front against Israel and his stance from the Soviet Union. Haykal also expressed his 
concern about rushing into an alignment with the United States. He called for “a slower 
and more reasoned approach to the United States” mainly because he “was not convinced 
that the United States had actually shifted its policy toward more evenhandedness in the 
Middle East.”374 Impatient with his criticism, Sadat issued a decree dismissing Haykal 
from his position in February 1974, and appointed his rival Ali Amin as the managing 
editor of al-Ahram.
375
 In order to justify this decision, “Haykal was accused of forming 
“power centers” and of turning al-Ahram to a “state within a state”. He was further 
accused of “casting doubts on the President’s intentions and of being involved in 
fomenting past student riots.”376 
Following the dismissal of the Nasserist figures from the press, Sadat pushed to 
the forefront figures that did not flourish during the Nasserist era like Musa Sabri and 
Anis Mansour, or those who suffered in Nasser’s prisons like Mustafa and Ali Amin. 
Sadat had implemented his full control over the press establishment. He also aimed to 
nourish a new cadre of journalists who supported his policies and framed the 
dismantlement of Nasserism in a favorable light. Consequently, several writers launched 
a wave of articles highly critical of the Nasserist era. Topics varied between protesting 
arbitrary imprisonment, oppression, and the lack of liberty and justice. Other writings 
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criticized transgressions against landowners including detention and confiscating their 
properties.
377
     
In the post October war era, Sadat approved the emergence of independent press 
as a sign to win over the West prior to Camp David by posing as a liberal who tolerates 
and encourages opposition. It is however important to note that despite their status as 
independent, these newspapers were very much, dependent on the state owned printing 
houses.
378
 An opposition press emerged including al-Shaab the mouthpiece of the 
Socialist Work Party which appeared in May 1979, al-Ahali the voice of al-Tagamuu 
Party, and al-Daawa an Islamic newspaper representing the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-
Daawa first appeared in January 1951 but was soon suspended in 1952. It reemerged 
again in July 1976 with Omar al-Telmasani the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide as its 
editor.
379
 The opposition press challenged the regime especially during the prelude to the 
peace negotiations with Israel. Al-Ahali for instance, spearheaded the opposition press by 
explicitly attacking the Camp David negotiations, the deteriorating domestic economy, 
and the rise of a new class of entrepreneurs closely related to the regime.
380
 Due to its 
outspokenness the official press took an early aim at al-Ahali dismissing it and al-
Tagamuu Party as a corrupt and insufficiently Islamic communist party.
381
 After fifteen 
issues the paper was suspended in May 1978 only to be republished a month later. Before 
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suspending the sixteenth issue Sadat personally took an aim at al-Tagamuu and its 
newspaper. During one of his speeches, he dismissed the opposition as agents; he 
explained that while he did not oppose the Left but that it had to prove its loyalty to 
Egypt. As for al-Ahali Sadat accused them of stupidity and conspiring against social 
stability.
382
 Further, on another occasion when Sadat met with the chief-editors of the 
official press he said that “al-Ahali had published about sixteen issues by now and that is 
enough for them”; it is not surprising that the government seized the issue scheduled to 
be published on that same day.
383
 Upon its resumption the paper continued to openly 
attack the peace negotiations and the rising rates of corruption. By the time the paper 
reached issue number twenty-three “the state’s security agency charged the paper with 
such offenses as harming the interests of Arab and Islamic society, inciting hatred and 
rebellion, defying the law and committing the crime of publishing and spreading false 
news.”384 Issue 23 of 2 August, 1978 ran bold headlines, which attacked Camp David and 
the American pressures on behalf of Israel. The initial headline questioned the fate of the 
initiative, given the Israeli formula of land for peace.
385
 The same issue ran provocative 
editorials accusing the regime of approving the disposing of nuclear and atomic wastes in 
Egyptian soil. The subsequent issues faced prompt confiscating even before leaving the 
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print station, the advertisements on national television were cancelled, and ultimately the 
printing-house refused to print the newspaper altogether.
386
       
Al-Daawa represented another form of opposition from an Islamic perspective. 
Unlike al-Ahali, al-Daawa did not initially engage in a direct attack on Sadat’s regime. 
Instead it focused on attacking “Israel, the Nasserite era, and the Soviets.”387 However, 
by mid-1978 it became apparent that Sadat is going forward with the Camp David 
initiative, therefore, the paper openly attacked the proposed agreement. Al-Telmasani 
argued that the Zionists usurped the Arab land of Palestine and that Islam delegitimized 
recognizing land usurpers. In another editorial, he claimed that the accords would fulfill 
the Zionist scheme “to pursue a peaceful settlement in order to establish Israel’s control 
over lands conquered by war.”388 However, with the signing of the treaty, the paper 
moved toward analyzing its terms and their impact on Egypt and the Arab world. The 
paper warned that the treaty would become a means by which Israel would solve its 
problem of economic inflation. It explained that the treaty would open the Egyptian 
markets and later the Arab ones to Israeli products. This would eventually lead to an 
Israeli industrial expansion and facilitate controlling Egypt’s economic sector.389 The 
paper also stressed the fact that the treaty “left Palestine’s political future vague and 
undetermined.”390 It also lamented that the annex to the treaty maintained the reference to 
Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel. Al-Daawa further emphasized that the treaty 
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gave a permanent position to the international troops in Sinai known as the Multinational 
Forces and Observers (MFO) as forces of protection since the treaty had stipulated that 
“[n]o more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be 
stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez 
and the Suez Canal.”391 The treaty further stipulated that the Egyptian forces would be 
equipped with light weapons for normal security and police purposes. This in fact gave 
the international forces more precedence and a permanent presence in Sinai for protection 
reasons. Unlike the cease-fire signed following the Suez War of 1956 which gave Egypt 
the right to remove the international forces, this treaty stipulated that these forces “will 
not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United 
Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.”392 Attacks against the 
treaty intensified especially from Egyptian journalists writing in papers published in the 
Gulf States. In Egypt al-Daawa continued publishing intense articles warning against 
normalization, which would facilitate Israeli penetration into the Egyptian and Arab 
cultural fabric. Further articles criticized the trend of promoting Israel as the only 
advanced country in the region and warned against the ramifications of Egypt’s isolation 
from the Arab world.
393
 The regime first retaliated by issuing the Morality Law of 1980 
that “defined certain actions as attempts to disturb the social peace and alarm public 
sensitivities.”394 Law 148 of 1980 posed several restrictions on the press and eventually 
facilitated the arrest and dismissal of hundreds of journalists.
395
 By August 1981 al-
                                                          
391. Camp David Frame Works for Peace (September 17, 1978) in Laqueur and Rubin, eds. The Israel 
Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, [Full Text: 222-227] 227, Article (A) of 
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393. Al-Daawa, May 1980 
394. Talhami, Palestine in the Egyptian Press: From Al-Ahram to Al-Ahali, 264 
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Daawa and al-Shaab were closed followed by the arrest of several members from al-
Tagamuu party. The regime’s onslaught on the press known also as “Autumn of Fury” 
culminated with promulgating Article 74 of the constitution concerning the state of 
emergency.
396
 This article allowed enacting several extreme measures to protect social 
security in cases of emergencies, a state that obviously did not exist during the clash with 
the press during September 1981. Despite the decisive curtail of freedoms and the 
imprisonment of hundreds of journalists including members of the Press Syndicate’s 
executive council, the official press “applauded these measures as a “new revolution.”397   
The official press on the other side firmly subscribed to the regime’s discourse 
and constantly promoted its views and policies. For instance, following the Jerusalem trip 
the official press ran headlines supporting the forthcoming peace talks and at the same 
time attacking the rejectionist front. On 10 December 1977 Akhbar al-Youm ran several 
declarations made by Sadat warning that anyone who had insulted the Egyptian people 
will be forbidden from entering Egypt, adding that the rejectionists who convened in 
Tripoli are searching for a fake leadership and motivated by hatred and envy.
398
 On 12 
December 1977 al-Ahram published another headline quoting Sadat stating that he 
severed diplomatic relations with the Arab states that participated in the Tripoli summit 
to prove their insignificance. He also accused the Syrian Baath of pressuring Arafat to 
reject the peace initiative.
399
 Further the official press disregarded the voice of the 
opposition whether domestically or regionally and focused instead on reporting the wide 
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approval given to the initiative.
400
 The press coverage in this sense became one-
dimensional stressing all views agreeing with the regime’s discourse while belittling and 
strongly attacking any opposition. For instance, Akbar al-Youm, al-Ahram and al-
Jumhuriyah ran headlines reporting the arrival of a Palestinian delegate from Gaza 
followed by other delegates from other Palestinian cities declaring their full support of 
Sadat’s initiatives.401 AL-Akhbar also ran declarations made by the head of the Gaza 
delegate stating that Sadat’s initiative had finally revived the hopes of the people of 
Palestine. Al-Ahram ran other headings quoting declarations made by the Palestinian 
delegation from Rafah and Gaza stating that the rejecting minority are puppets to the 
Soviets.
402
 Other headings quoted Sadat’s claim that his initiative was motivated by from 
ending the struggle of the Palestinians whereas the rejectionists preferred empty slogans. 
He also called on the rejectionists to stop manipulating the PLO.
403
      
In one of his articles, Youssef al-Sibai wrote that the popular reception which 
greeted Sadat upon his return from his visit to the United States was the best response to 
the rejectionists’ anti-Sadat propaganda. He argued that peace was the choice of the 
Egyptians themselves who supported and identified with Sadat and his initiative. He 
claimed that those millions sent a decisive message to the rejectionist front, stressing that 
Egypt unlike them has no history of betrayal.
404
 Additionally, al-Mousawar magazine ran 
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December 1977 attacking the rejectionists as the enemies of Egypt and peace, and emphasizing that peace 
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several editorials harshly attacking the rejectionist front, claiming that their conspiracy 
against Egypt dates back to years prior to the Jerusalem visit. The article argues that the 
conspiracy aimed at maintaining the continuity of the no-war no-peace situation so they 
keep outbidding each other while the Palestinian refugees suffer in their camps. The 
article claimed that the rejectionists intended to nourish the internal strife in Egypt in an 
effort to abort its newly found democracy which in turn threatens the dictatorships in 
Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen.
405
 Musa Sabri emphasized a similar argument by stressing 
that the Arab states were threatened by a strong Egypt, they instead wished that Egypt 
would always remain besieged by wars and internal economic troubles. He stressed that 
Sadat did not seek a unilateral deal, nor forced any Arab leader to join his initiative since 
he realized that the Arabs are more interested in posturing.
406
 Another article called on 
the Arab peoples of the rejectionist states to rise and bring down their leaders who 
ruthlessly rule them.
407
 Further, in his column entitled “Smoke in the Air” Galal al-Din 
al-Hamamsy wrote that some Arab states dealt with Sadat’s peace initiative from a 
narrow perspective. He emphasized that Egypt and the Egyptian people have suffered 
alone and sacrificed a lot and that the time had come to focus on Egypt and solve its 
chronic problems. He also insisted that Egypt was capable of overcoming present or 
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future problems without relying on any external support.
408
 Helmi Salem wrote another 
article entitled “The Warriors of Words” he questioned the motivations of the 
rejectionists and their anti-Sadat campaign, and insisted that they have enough man-
power, financial, and military resources to wage a war against Israel. He argued that 
apparently it was Egypt’s fate to fight and sacrifice its blood and resources to fight their 
wars. He also accused the Egyptian opposition of betraying their nation and selling their 
conscience for worthless Iraqi and Libyan Dinars.
409
 Ibrahim Seada in his weekly column 
“Last Column” criticized the Nasserist and leftist opposition for their anti-Sadat 
declarations. He argued that their rhetoric was outdated and contradictory. He concluded 
his comment by reminding the opposition that the freedom of speech they enjoyed was 
the by-product of Sadat’s democracy insisting that they would have been crushed had 
they dared to oppose the Nasserist regime.
410
 Other articles attacked the Soviet Union’s 
stance on Sadat’s peace initiative.  In his column “An Idea,” Mustafa Amin criticized the 
Soviets as hesitant and contradictory. He explained that when Egypt decided to go to war 
the Soviets advised against it, and when Egypt chose peace they asked for war. Amin 
argued that the Soviets acknowledged Israel as a state five minutes after the Americans, 
adding that the Soviets refused to supply Egypt with vital arms and pressured Sadat to 
declare an immediate cease-fire. He stated that those same Soviets who attack Sadat now 
advised Nasser following the 1967 defeat that peace is the right choice. The Soviets 
argued then, that it is impossible to cross the Canal without an atomic bomb. He 
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concluded his article by stressing that Egypt’s crime is that it refuses to be enslaved by 
the Soviets.
411
                  
Amin’s remarks reflected the same stance adopted by the regime during that 
period. For instance, al-Ahram quoted Sadat accusing Moscow of spear-heading a 
manipulative campaign to raise doubts and pressure Egypt to reject the peace initiative. 
He also accused the Soviets of fabricating the separate deal rumors to divide the Arab 
world. He added that during Egypt’s crisis the Soviets refused to sell much needed wheat, 
and they still refused to sell Egypt any arms or spare parts.
412
 Al-Akhbar ran other 
declarations by Sadat insisting that the Soviets supply Syria with weapons that remained 
unused in storage while denying Egypt any military support. He emphasized that the 
Soviets chose Syria over Egypt because they knew that Syria cannot face Israel on its 
own.
413
 The same argument was repeated in “al-Ahram Comment” which accused the 
Soviet Union of disrupting the region and spreading strife and disunity for its own 
ends.
414
 Another article entitled “Moscow Attacks” criticized the Soviet propaganda 
against the Camp David negotiations. The article warned against the Soviet conspiracy 
against the Arab world calming that their sole goal is to fuel tensions across the region in 
order to keep spreading communism and sell arms.
415
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The official press maintained the same pattern of coverage following the signing 
of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian – Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979. 
Following his return from Camp David, the three official papers ran multiple headlines 
reporting the massive popular reception greeting Sadat and proclaiming him the hero of 
peace.
416
 Also, the periodicals published by the official religious establishment al-Azhar 
had to follow the regime’s footsteps by devoting several issues of al-Din wa al-Hayat 
(Religion and Life) to promote and justify the peace treaties. The sheikhs in all mosques 
had to follow the government’s political line.417 This is due to the fact that since the 
1960s, al-Azhar came under the government’s supervision to make sure that their 
religious output conforms to the regime’s political and religious discourse. Further, the 
press devoted much space to report on international reactions to Sadat and the peace 
process.
418
 Additionally, the press maintained a hardline against the rejectionist front. A 
repeated set of accusations dominated the official press of that era. Such accusations 
included labeling the rejectionists as Soviet agents and puppets envious of Egypt. Other 
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416. Al-Akhbar 22 September 1978: “Hundreds of Thousands Greet Sadat Upon his Return from the 
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unflattering comments claimed that the Arabs want Egypt to fight till the last solider and 
blamed Egypt’s dire economy on its wars on behalf of the Arabs.419 In his column “Word 
from the Editor” Abdel Hamid Abdel Ghani wrote “Egypt and the Arabs after the Camp 
David Conference.” He argued that the conference and the accords signed created new 
realities and gained worldwide support. He then proceeded to attack the rejectionists and 
their declarations dismissing them as irrelevant and unable to influence the Egyptian 
people. Abdel Ghani also emphasized the sacrifices Egypt endured over the course of 
four wars against Israel. Those wars resulted in the death of over hundred thousand 
Egyptians along with spending millions of pounds in military purchases to defend the 
Arab region ultimately crippling the Egyptian economy and burdening it with heavy 
debts.
420
 Blaming Egypt’s economic distress on wars against Israel became a recurring 
theme that the regime deployed to win over the people with the promise that peace would 
bring economic prosperity. For instance, a couple of months after the signing of the 1979 
peace treaty, a report described how it had revived the economic sector and attracted 
investments in different economic arrays.
421
 By equating domestic economic prosperity 
with peace, the regime sought to justify the peace settlement and allure the population. 
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The regime orchestrated double-edge press propaganda. On one hand, official press 
launched an anti-Arab campaign and dismissed them as envious and ungrateful. On the 
other hand, the press repeatedly stressed Egypt’s human and financial sacrifices. The 
Egyptians, were thus, made to believe that their economic distress resulted solely from 
external factors (the wars against Israel). The Egyptians had also to believe that the Arabs 
were not only ungrateful but they collaborated against the wellbeing of their country. 
This campaign attempted to distance the Egyptians emotionally and mentally from the 
Arab world and turn inward. This stance echoed Sadat’s Egypt First rhetoric, and acted as 
a justification to his unwillingness to invest and lead the Arab world.   
The official press coverage in the period between 1975 and 1981 witnessed 
turbulent political events. The official press remained captive to the state, just as it was 
under Nasser, albeit with different directions and priorities. During the Nasser era the 
press adopted the regime’s anti-imperial anti-Western discourse while emphasizing Arab 
nationalism and non-alignment. Further, the press mirrored the regime’s rhetoric in 
moments of political tension between Egypt and other Arab regimes as for instance the 
cases of the Baghdad Pact and the Rogers Plan debacle. Similarly, the official press 
during the Sadat era shifted its course and adopted the new regime’s discourse. Sadat’s 
regime used the press to dismantle several Nasserist foundations especially those of 
socialism and foreign policy. The official press played vital role in promoting the peace 
initiative with Israel. The press fully adopted the regime’s discourse, viciously attacking 
all kinds of opposition and dismissed them as Soviet agents collaborating against the 
wellbeing of Egypt. The press in both eras lacked freedom and diversity, and was more 
repetitive propaganda than journalism. The press was confined and lacked neutrality. The 
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following section will be looking at the image of the Palestinians in the official Egyptian 
press during the Sadat era with special emphasis on the second half of the 1970s, which 
witnessed a rapid deterioration in Egyptian-Palestinian relations in the wake of the 
Jerusalem journey and the peace initiative which, soon followed.            
Palestine in the Egyptian Press during the Sadat Era 
 The image of Palestine remained stable during the first half of the 1970s with 
official statements stressing Egypt’s commitment to a just solution to the Palestine cause. 
The three official papers maintained running headlines stressing that the PLO is the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, that the Palestinian cause is at the 
heart of the Arab – Israeli conflict, and that peace cannot be achieved without the 
complete withdrawal from the occupied territories and Jerusalem.
422
 Prior to the October 
War the official press gave wide coverage to Palestinian guerrilla operations. For 
instance, the Munich incident of 1972 when a militant group from the PLO known as 
Black September organized an attack on Israeli athletes gained wide coverage and 
support from the major official papers.
423
 Al-Ahram published the news of the attack on 
its front pages; the headlines stated that the incident is not an act of murder but a result of 
the Israeli pressures exerted on the people of Palestine. In a sense, the title implied that 
the operation is a sign of despair rather than an act of resistance. This shift in tone tried to 
downplay the futility of resistance in favor of negotiations. Other headlines argued that 
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the fedayeen were the victims of an Israeli intelligence trap and accused Germany of 
giving in to American-Israeli pressures. Further articles published in both al-Ahram and 
al-Akhbar defended the fedayeen arguing that the operation came as a response to Israeli 
violence and transgressions; the conclusion was that a just solution to the Palestine 
problem is the only way to put an end to such operations.
424
 The official press also did 
not refrain from covering Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets while covering news of the 
October war at the same time.
425
    
However, after the signing of the cease-fire and beginning in November 1973 the 
pace of coverage decreased in the face of prospects of an impending peace conference 
and a possible Palestinian delegation. During this period the official papers emphasized 
the necessity of Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinian right to self-determination and an 
independent state. Nonetheless, none of the papers managed to provide a clear 
comprehensive idea explaining the means to achieve the desired peace plan.
426
 Slight 
cracks in Egyptian-Palestinian relations began surfacing prior to the singing of the 
Second Sinai Accord, when Sadat refused to meet with a PLO delegation in response to 
Arafat’s unflattering declarations.427 In, 1975 Lebanese civil war began along with Syrian 
intervention and the massacre of the Palestinian refugees in Tel al-Zaater. The Egyptian 
press openly attacked the Syrian regime and accused it of coordinating attacks with 
Israel. However, after settling the political differences between Sadat and Hafez al-Assad 
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those accusations disappeared from the official press. Further, the Egyptian press did not 
criticize the American intervention in Lebanon; it maintained a positive stance toward the 
United States. The regime clearly sought to improve ties with the United States and 
secure its sponsorship of the impending peace talks.
428
 Further, following announcing his 
peace initiative, Sadat openly criticized the PLO’s stance claiming that by joining the 
rejectionists whom he dismissed as terrorists the PLO thwarted all efforts to achieve 
peace. The leaders of the PLO, he added, had forgotten about their prisoners in Israeli 
jails, they preferred to live abroad and use terrorism in the name of being 
revolutionaries.
429
 Accusing the PLO of terrorism marked a significant departure from the 
Nasserist discourse which hailed the resistance movement as the noblest outcome of the 
1967 defeat. Sadat belittled the significance of such militant operations and obviously 
shifted to the Israeli-American stance regarding the PLO and its military operations.      
           Nonetheless, the official press continued reporting on the Palestinian military 
operations, stressing that Egypt fully supports the Palestinian resistance and condemns 
the violent Israeli repression and terrorism. The press also emphasized that a just and 
comprehensive peace settlement was the only way to put an end to those operations. 
However, a major change of tone emerged by late 1977, early 1978 in the months leading 
to the Camp David Conference. The official press began turning a blind eye to most PLO 
operations except for those that were impossible to ignore. For instance, the resistance 
carried a major operation inside Tel Aviv in which the fedayeen hijacked three buses 
killing thirty Israelis and wounding seventy others. The three official papers covered the 
operation on their first pages. However, unlike the late 1960s and early 1970s when the 
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press endorsed, justified, and fully supported the Palestinian resistance, the tone of this 
coverage coincided with the regime’s “peace” discourse. For the first time the headlines 
used the term “armed men” instead of the usual Palestinian fedayeen. The reports 
depended on Israeli and foreign sources, while overlooking the PLO’s account. Several 
editorials explained that the operation was a sign of desperation, not resistance. By 
arguing that peace was the only guarantee for security, the press seemed to directly 
address the Israeli public with an unusually sympathetic tone.
430
         
Egyptian-Palestinian relations continued to deteriorate following Abu Nidal’s 
assassination of Youssef al-Sibai the Minister of Culture and the head of the Board of 
Directors of al-Ahram on 18 February 1978 in Cyprus. The murder resulted in a massive 
attack on Palestinians who were now accused of treachery and ingratitude. The following 
day al-Ahram wrote under the headline “Black Terrorism” that the perpetrators of the 
crime harmed the Palestinian cause; it warned that terrorism would tarnish the nobility of 
the Palestinians’ struggle to attain their national rights.431 This heading was the first of its 
kind to openly utilize the term “terrorism” in reference to the Palestinian armed resistance 
signaling a massive shift in the regime’s official stance and contradicting its discourse 
defending and supporting the national rights of the Palestinians.
432
     
The assassination and its aftermath trigged a massive anti-Palestine campaign. For 
instance, in a letter sent to al-Ahram Sadat referred to the Palestinian factions as “paid 
agents,” threatened severe repercussions, all the while stressing a firm commitment to 
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defend Palestinian rights.
433
 In his speech at the Egyptian soldiers’ funeral Sadat stressed 
that Sibai’s murder was an act of treason; he proclaimed that he would go to the end of 
the world to avenge Egypt’s dignity. He concluded that while Egypt fought for 
Palestinian rights, their leaders acted as agents and paid murderers. Egypt would step 
over the “dwarfs” and, no one would dictate or direct Egypt’s will.434 Another editorial 
written by Ali Hamdi al-Gammal directly attacked the PLO and Arafat accusing the 
organization of going astray and claiming that Arafat is clueless. He added that Arafat 
had lost all his legitimacy as a national leader the moment he joined the rejectionist 
summit in Tripoli. Gammal claimed that the PLO was lost; its leaders driven by 
individual interests and subject to certain Arab regimes serving the Soviets. He concluded 
by arguing that only Egypt struggled for Palestine.
435
 The official press disregarded 
Arafat’s condemnation and his repeated declarations stressing his gratitude to all the 
Egyptian efforts on behalf of the Palestine cause.
436
 It also overlooked the fact that “Abu 
Nidal had been expelled from Fatah and the PLO with much fanfare in the early 1970s 
and was widely known to be their sworn enemy.”437 In this respect al-Ahali although 
clearly condemning the assassination directly criticized the regime’s reckless operation in 
Larnaca Airport and held it responsible for the death of many innocent soldiers.
438
      
On 28 February 1978 al-Ahram published a summary of the discussions in the 
People’s Assembly, which called on reevaluating the status of the Palestinians residing in 
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Egypt, while disregarding other reasonable voices which rejected the onslaught on the 
Palestinian resistance movement and its leaders.
439
 Additionally, the three official papers 
printed the transcript of Sadat’s interview with an American television station in which 
he held the PLO responsible for Sibai’s death despite its broad condemnation.440 Mustafa 
Amin wrote that everyone at Sibai’s funeral questioned if this was what Egypt deserved 
for its sacrifices. He argued that Egypt alone sacrificed its blood and money so other 
Arabs could live. Like so many before him, he blamed Egypt’s poverty and economic 
distress on the four wars “waged on the Arab’s behalf.” He went a step further to claim 
that Egyptian students had sacrificed their places in schools and universities so that 
Palestinians could enjoy free education.
441
 From thereafter, a new pattern appeared in the 
official press that would last until the death of Sadat in 1981. This pattern revolved on the 
internal conflicts between the leaders of the Palestinian factions along with promoting the 
image of the “bad Palestinian.”442    
The press unleashed a defamatory campaign and promoted myths. One such myth 
was the claim that Palestinians sold their land to European Jews before 1948 and were 
responsible for the nakba. The Arabs, for their part, were represented as ignorant, envious 
of a strong and stable Egypt, and wanting to exhaust Egyptian. The leaders of the 
Palestinian factions including the PLO were misguided and oblivious agents to these 
hostile Arab regimes and the Soviets. Another prominent theme stressed that Palestinians 
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lived abroad like millionaires and used their national cause to gain more profits.
443
 
Indeed, Sadat stated in an interview with Monte Carlo radio that in Egypt there are tens 
of thousands of Palestinians and most of them are millionaires.
444
 Sadat’s remark did not 
go unnoticed as the official press started running articles reproducing the image of the 
rich Palestinians to provoke resentment among the Egyptian population who were to 
believe that while they suffered from economic distress, the Palestinians sucked Egypt’s 
wealth.
445
 This hostile tone mirrored Sadat’s claim that Egypt’s wars on behalf of the 
Palestinians destroyed its economy, whereas “peace with Israel would bring prosperity to 
Egypt.”446 Besides, the under-lying tone of articles alleging that Palestinian investors are 
thriving and growing within Egyptian economy appeared to be an implicit invitation to 
the state in order to curb Palestinian enterprises. Surprisingly, this tone flourished at a 
time when the opposition press especially al-Daawa repeatedly warned against the 
flooding of Israeli products into Egyptian markets. The paper argued such economic 
collaboration would eventually empower and sustain Israeli economy. In return it will 
destroy the national industrial sector, increases Egypt’s isolation from its Arab 
dimension, and foster its economic reliance on American aid. This trend manifested 
another glaring departure from Nasserism where Nasser had encouraged Palestinian 
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investments to break the European-Jewish monopoly over the Egyptian economy during 
the first half of the twentieth century till the Suez war of 1956.  
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees during the Sadat Era 
 As explained earlier the legal status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did 
not encounter any changes during the first half of the 1970s. The disengagement accords 
of 1975 although raising some Egyptian-Palestinian political tensions did not affect the 
community’s legal status. However, the official tone toward the Palestinians hardened 
prior to Sadat’s Jerusalem trip in November 1977. Palestinian students organized several 
rallies against the trip leading to the detention and deportation of hundreds of them and 
the permanent ban of the GUPS in Egypt. The assassination of Sibai in February 1978 
marked a tragic turn of events against the Palestinians in Egypt, since the regime used the 
crime as a pretext to justify curtailing the legal exemptions accorded to the Palestinians 
since the Nasser era. The entire Palestinian community faced the repercussions of the 
assassination. The regime formulated the unjustified claim that since the perpetrators 
were Palestinian so the entire community should be blamed. Accordingly, on 28 February 
1978 a ministerial decision stipulated the reconsideration of all regulations treating 
Palestinians as nationals. Sadat issued administrative regulations 47 and 48 which 
annulled “all regulations treating Palestinians as nationals.”447 In deed during Sibai’s 
funeral, the Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Riyad declared that, “no more Palestinians 
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after today.”448 The comment implied that Palestinians were no longer tolerated. In 
essence this meant that Palestinians could no longer work in the public sector, entry to 
Egyptian universities was restricted, scholarships and tuition subsidies got cancelled 
along the access to free health care. Like foreigners, Palestinians had to pay in hard 
currency in order to access education or medical care. The organized anti-Palestine 
campaign nourished by the regime and the official press led to a decrease in the sense of 
solidarity with Palestine among average Egyptians, since the press portrayed the 
resistance leaders as rich and corrupt, while blaming the Palestinians for dragging Egypt 
into four wars.
449
 This occurred at a time when Egypt had ratified on 22 May 1981 the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees issued by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
450
 Egypt ratified the convention with reservations 
to some of its articles. For instance, Egypt had a reservation against Article 12 (paragraph 
1) which stated that the personal status of the refugee “shall be governed by the law of 
the country of his domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his 
residence.”451 This article contradicted Article 25 of the Egyptian civil code, which states 
that in cases of aliens without a nationality or with more than one nationality “the 
Egyptian law must be applied.”452 In essence, there is no contradiction between the 
original article and Egyptian concerns since “it is obvious that no refugee with Egyptian 
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citizenship would apply for refugee status from Egypt.”453 Besides, there is nothing that 
could hinder applying Egyptian law in case of stateless refugees residing in Egypt.
454
 
Egypt also had reservations regarding Articles 20, 22 (paragraph 1), 23, and 24 of the 
convention. Those articles stipulated that the contracting states should accord refugees 
the same treatment as nationals in terms of rationing system, elementary education, 
public relief, and labor legislation and social security.
455
 However, Egyptian authorities 
formulated reservations regarding the aforementioned articles which consider the refugee 
as equal to the national, preferring instead, to consider granting privileges to refugees on 
a case-by-case basis.
456
  
 Egyptian officials argued that Egypt’s economic burdens, overpopulation, and 
high rates of unemployment were the main reasons the state could not extend those 
services to include refugees. Yet, several studies revealed that Egypt’s subsidy program 
for instance, suffers from severe mismanagement as it is the costliest program in the 
world. Rearranging this program would help integrate refugees within its parameters.
457
 
In terms of social security [Article 24 (b) and 24 (3)], the convention included Article 24 
(b) (paragraph 1), which stipulated that each contracted state has the right to determine 
the means of extending the provisions of social security to refugees.
458
 The Egyptian 
reservation in this sense proves the government’s detached attitude that aims to exclude 
refugees from various governmental services. In the case of the right to elementary 
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education [Article 22 (paragraph (1)], the government argued on one hand that public 
education in Egypt suffered from grave crises and was unable to stretch its resources to 
include refugees. On the other hand, the administrative documents required to apply in 
public schools exhausted parents. For instance, obtaining an embassy letter is 
inapplicable to stateless refugees. Besides, private schools established specifically to 
serve refugees like the Sacred Heart faced several problems enrolling their students in 
national exams. These schools, are not recognized by the government, had to pay high 
fees for their students to sit for the exams in accredited centers.
459
 Egypt did not 
formulate a reservation against Article 17 of the Convention related to Wage-Earning 
Employment, which stipulated that the contracted state should provide refugees with “the 
most favorable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same 
circumstance, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.”460 However, 
the government imposes severe restrictions on hiring refugees under the pretext of 
avoiding competition with national labor. Therefore, most refugees in Egypt fail to 
acquire legal work permits and they earn their living in the insecure informal sector.
461
 
Nonetheless, those reservations proved that the Egyptian government is unwilling to 
engage directly with refugees’ problems as Egyptian officials regard “refugees as not an 
Egyptian problem, it is a problem that comes from abroad.”462 Placing severe legal 
barriers on refugees in Egypt cripples assistance programs and refugees are dependent 
solely on UNHCR and other NGOs to fulfill their basic needs. The situation of 
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Palestinian refugees is further complicated because the provisions of the 1951 
Convention excluded them from their scope as far as they receive protection from another 
UN organization. Palestinian refugees unregistered with UNWRA should fall under the 
mandate of UNHCR. But the ambiguity of the text left Palestinian refugees with less 
international protection and more vulnerable to host states’ maneuvers.463 Against this 
backdrop the next section will attempt to examine the ways in which political conflicts 
affect refugees’ rights and render them vulnerable to the ebb and flow of political 
relations.        
Residency 
In the wake of al-Sibai’s assassination and in a prelude to the Camp David 
agreement, most of the laws pertaining to Palestinians’ residency and employment were 
either reconsidered or cancelled altogether. The new administrative regulations annulled 
all laws and decrees stipulating the equal treatment of Palestinian refugees as Egyptian 
nationals. Consequently Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt became classified under 
the foreigners’ category; they were required to pay renewal fees for their visas, and to 
show a proof of spending a certain amount in hard currency or its equivalent per 
month.
464
 Failure to comply with those regulations could potentially result in 
deportation.
465
 Theses strict provisions were yet another indication of the breach with 
Nasserist regulations, since during the 1960s Palestinian refugees did not pay renewal 
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fees.
466
 Ministerial Decree 280 of 1981 stipulated in Article 3 that an amount of five 
Egyptian pounds should be paid upon issuing a residency permit of three years and the 
same amount upon its renewal.
467
 Those conditions increased the financial burdens of the 
refugees; those who could not afford those expenses had to live in fear of being deported 
on the grounds of being illegally residing in Egypt.
468
 Besides, stipulating a threat of 
deportation in case of failing to meet any of those provisions contradicts with Article 29 
(paragraph 1) of the 1951 Convention, which forbids the contracting states from 
imposing any charges or duties upon refugees which are “higher than those which are or 
may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.”469 Further, in order to secure a 
valid re-entry into Egypt, Palestinians holding Egyptian travel documents and travelled or 
resided abroad had to return every six months or provide a proof of employment or 
education enrollment, in which case a one-year extension would be allowed.
470
  
Additionally, the government embarked on a policy of detaining and deporting 
hundreds of Palestinians especially male young adults under the pretext of preserving 
national security; the numbers of those detained or deported remain unspecified.
471
 The 
police would raid Palestinian homes and arrest young males on the basis of mere 
suspicion or even rumor. The Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti, for example, was 
deported from Egypt in 1977 despite graduating from an Egyptian university, being 
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married to an Egyptian university professor and having his only child born in Egypt.
472
 
Barghouti writes that he never engaged in politics and did not voice any opposition to 
Sadat’s initiatives; his deportation “was a preventative deportation, the result of a false 
accusation put together, as we found out after several years, by a colleague in the Union 
of Palestinian Writers.”473 He describes the humiliating process: six agents from the State 
Security Services arrived at his home took him to the Passport Department in the Tahrir 
compound in downtown Cairo. Later the same night the officers took him back to his 
home to pack his bags and accompanied him to the airport. During this whole process 
Barghouti remained handcuffed until boarding the plane when the officers finally took 
the handcuffs off his wrists.
474
 Barghouti would remain banned from entering Egypt until 
the mid-1990s.        
           The case of Barghouti and other hundreds of Palestinians reveals the vulnerability 
of refugees to political tides, arbitrary deportation, and the lack of efficient protection 
frameworks. The regime would repeatedly cite preserving national security as an easy 
pretext to justify cases of deportation. In this respect no clear information exist explaining 
the investigation process, the validity of the charges, and whether or not the defendant 
had a proper legal representation before passing the expulsion verdict. Instead all 
deportation decrees follow the same identical format citing the phrase “for reasons related 
to national security and public order.”475 From a legal perspective arbitrary expulsion is 
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forbidden and clearly contradicts Egyptian and international laws. In Egypt article 26 of 
Law 89 of 1960 forbade the deportation of special-residency foreigners (Palestinians fall 
under this category) unless a special committee had clear substantial evidence that such 
person poses a credible threat to national security.
476
 On the international level Article 32 
(paragraph 2) of the 1951 Convention stipulated that the decision to expel a refugee 
should go through the appropriate legal process. The article also stipulated that in cases 
where there are no compelling reasons threatening national security, the refugee “shall be 
allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the 
purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the 
competent authority.”477     
Education 
During the Nasser era Palestinian students enjoyed the same treatment as 
Egyptian nationals in terms of free education and scholarships. This consequently led to 
an increase in Palestinian enrollment in Egyptian schools and universities since the 
graduates could join the public sector without any discrimination. However, this situation 
changed altogether after the assassination of Sibai. Presidential Decrees 47 and 48 of 
1978 annulled all legal provisions equating Palestinian refugees with Egyptian nationals 
in terms of employment, education, and health care. Consequently Palestinian students 
were treated as foreigners and had to pay for their tuition in private schools in foreign 
currency (an amount ranging between 600-1200 Sterling pounds). Those conditions even 
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included those holding permanent residency statuses.
478
 Also, Palestinian students 
became forbidden from enrolling in certain colleges such as medicine, pharmacology, 
science, politics, economics, and journalism.
479
 By contrast, during the Nasser era 
Palestinian students could join such faculties in the same manner as Egyptian nationals. 
The only students exempted from Sadat’s restrictive laws were the ones whose parents 
worked for either the ‘Ayn Jaloot Units (PLA units stationed in Egypt), or the public 
sectors in Gaza.
480
 Further, despite the fact that newly issued laws should not be 
retroactive, these particular laws included a retroactive clause. Enrolled students had to 
abide by the new rates in order to receive a graduation certificate.
481
 Such restrictions led 
to a significant drop in the numbers of Palestinian students in Egypt and threatened to 
cause an increase in the rates of illiteracy since many of the families could not afford the 
elevated fees.
482
 Palestinian males reaching the age of eighteen risk deportation if they 
fail to show a proof of either employment or education enrollment.
483
 The following table 
shows the number of Palestinian students enrolled in Egyptian universities (graduating 
classes and those enrolled in post-graduate studies) during the period from 1970 till 1981 
to illustrate the impact of the restrictions imposed on accessing public education.
484
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Further restrictions would later shut off Palestinian students from pursuing post-graduate 
studies in public universities.
485
    
Table (1): Palestinian students enrolled in graduating classes and post-graduate studies: 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
3551 4031 3570 5107 5749 6589 7930 11739 10601 8680 7616 3915 
 
The previous numbers show a steady increase during the period from 1970 till 
1977, then starting in 1978 at the peak of the Egyptian-Palestinian crisis; the numbers 
began to decrease reaching their lowest in 1981. From 1979 until 1985 the rate of 
education scholarships provided to Palestinian students decreased dramatically to reach 
only eleven scholarships (constituting two percent of the total scholarships) compared for 
instance with 312 scholarships given to the Sudanese students (fifty-one percent) or 
students coming from Northern Yemen with a total of 113 scholarships (eighteen 
percent).
486
 The following table shows the number of Palestinian students accepted in 
Egyptian universities during the period from 1970 till 1981.
487
 
Table (2): Palestinian students accepted in Egyptian universities between years 1970-
1981: 
70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 
190 221 267 1272 1335 2340 2629 1397 340 434 415 
 
The numbers again show a steady increase in enrollment reaching its height in the 
academic year 1976/1977. A noticeable decline appears in 1977/1978 and the lowest rate 
occurred during the academic year 1978/1979. The numbers showed a slight increase 
between 1979 and 1981 but fell far below the ratings prevailing during the 1950s, 1960s, 
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and the first half of the 1970s. Egypt is a signatory to the Casablanca Accords of 1965 
which stipulated treating Palestinian refugees in Arab host countries in the same manner 
accorded to nationals. Those provisions remained theoretical without any practical 
frameworks ensuring their application regardless of any political tensions that might 
occur between the host state and Palestinian factions.  
Employment and Property Ownership 
Following the assassination debacle and the issuing of administrative decrees 47 
and 48 of 1978 annulling all regulations treating Palestinians as nationals, Palestinian 
refugees faced an employment crisis. The Ministry of Labor issued a warning against 
hiring foreigners including Palestinians. The Ministry also forbade them from working in 
commerce and the import and export of goods with the exception for those married to 
Egyptian women for more than five years.
488
 Further, the department of Immigration, 
Passports and Nationality stamped all Palestinian travel documents or residency permits, 
“forbidden from being hired whether with or without payment.”489 Additionally, Article 
16 (paragraph 1) of Law 48 of 1978 related to the work in the public sector, along with 
Article 26 of Labor Law 137 of 1981 stipulated that hiring foreigners should depend on 
observing the condition of reciprocal treatment, which is obviously inapplicable to 
stateless refugees.
490
 Decree 25 of 1982 relating to the conditions for issuing work 
permits for aliens stipulated in Article 3 that granting work permits should not constitute 
competition to national manpower. The qualifications and the professional experience of 
the alien worker should conform to the requirements of the profession for which the 
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permit is requested. The decree also gave priority to aliens born and permanently residing 
in Egypt. Article 4 stipulated that the number of alien workers in any establishment 
should not exceed ten percent of the total workforce. Article 5 (sections A & B) 
stipulated that the required fees to issue a work permit for the first time is one-hundred 
Egyptian pounds with a renewal fee of fifty Egyptian pounds.
491
 Such requirements 
complicated the process of securing a legal job in Egypt; many refugees either left to the 
Gulf States or joined the informal market which lacks any official protection or 
supervision.       
              Decree 52 of 1978 related to the conditions and regulations of exempting 
Palestinians from obtaining a work permit as stipulated in Article 1 that Palestinians 
holding valid Egypt travel documents were exempted from acquiring a work permit.
492
 
Nonetheless, this decree did not provide much help, since the regulations governing 
obtaining travel documents and renewing residency permits became increasingly 
complicated. Besides, most of the refugees in Egypt arrived after the 1967 war; thus, they 
fall under category (H) which stipulates that residency permits for this category are valid 
for three years depending on the prevailing Egyptian entry laws.
493
 This category also 
required in case of residing outside Egypt to return every six months to secure a valid re-
entry.
494
 It could be concluded that the revised Egyptian labor laws did not differentiate 
between foreigners and refugees. Despite being a signatory to the 1951 Convention, the 
Egyptian government did not introduce any legal amendments to comply with the 
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provisions of the said convention. For instance, the government did not abide by the 
provisions of Articles 17 and 18 related to wage-earning employment and self-
employment. The first article stipulated that the contracted state should provide refugees 
with the most favorable treatment accorded to other foreign nationals in the same 
circumstances in terms of engaging in wage-earning employment. The second article 
stipulated that the contracted state should provide a refugee with the most favorable 
treatment “as regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, 
handicrafts, and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies.”495 The 
convention also stipulated in Article 7 that the contracted state should consider exempting 
refugees from observing the condition of legislative reciprocity.
496
 The Egyptian 
government passed decrees prohibiting Palestinian refugees from engaging in self-
employment including commerce and import.
497
 Insisting on the reciprocity condition 
effectively shut out Palestinian refugees from joining the official labor market.    
Property ownership did not fare better. Law 81 of 1976 related to organizing 
owning property by foreigners forbade in its first article any foreigners from owning both 
buildings and vacant lands. The only exemptions provided in Article 2 included buildings 
owned by diplomatic consulates or other cases that could qualify for an exemption 
depending on the approval of the cabinet. The conditions applying for that case include: 
owning one property for personal use and transferring the price of the said property into 
foreign currency.
498
 Additionally, Law 136 of 1981 stipulated that aliens renting 
properties would have their contracts revoked upon the expiration of their residency 
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permits. Article 17 stated that in case the foreigner was married to an Egyptian woman, 
she and her children would retain the contract unless they have permanently left the 
country.
499
 Those laws again did not differentiate between foreigners and refugees in 
contradiction with Articles 13 and 21 of the 1951 Convention related to movable and 
immovable property and housing respectively. Article 13 stipulated that the contracted 
state should accord refugees the most favorable treatment regarding the acquisition “of 
movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and 
other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.”500 Article 21 stipulated that 
the contracted state should provide the refugees residing in its territory with the most 
favorable treatment accorded in matters related to housing.
501
 Further, Law 143 of 1981 
banned foreigners from owning desert lands.
502
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the present chapter attempted to look at the Sadat era with the 
purpose of analyzing the impact of political tensions on Egypt’s Palestinian community. 
The Sadat era witnessed several major political events starting with the October war of 
1973 through the singing of the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace Treaty of 1979 and ending with Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The first half of the 
1970s did not witness any social or legal changes in the status of Palestinian refugees 
residing in Egypt. The Sinai Accords of 1975 created some political tensions between 
Sadat’s regime and the PLO, yet this did not affect the Palestinian community. However, 
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rapid deteriorations occurred starting with the Jerusalem trip in 1977, which led to the 
permanent ban of the GUPS and the deportation of hundreds of Palestinian students and 
writers. The assassination of Sibai in early 1978 became a crisis for the Palestinian 
refugees who faced the regime legal retaliation. The official press after the assassination 
and in a prelude to the impending Camp David conference waged an anti-Palestinian 
campaign stressing their ingratitude, blaming Egypt’s economic problems on its 
sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinians, and stressing that peace with Israel was the only 
way to achieve the promised economic prosperity. The backlash against the Palestinian 
refugees clearly illustrate the ways in which political conflicts are utilized as a pretext to 
revoke whatever regulations exist and hold the state accountable to its refugee 
community. The second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s witnessed the issuing of 
several restrictive laws treating Palestinian refugees as any other foreigners residing in 
the country regardless of their statelessness. Such laws burdened them with extra 
financial duties, restricted their movement and effectively excluded them from education, 
health care, and employment. Those laws also marked Egypt’s effective withdrawal from 
the Casablanca Accords of 1965, as Egypt no longer treats its Palestinians as equal 
nationals. Also despite ratifying the 1951 Convention in 1981, the state did not attempt to 
reevaluate its legal system or introduce amendments that would comply with the 
convention and extend its provisions to its refugees. This attitude shows that the 
government is unwilling to engage directly with the refugees. This also shows that the 
regime insists on alienating the refugees while approaching them through the security 
mentality assuming that refugees are a threat to national security that should be contained 
if not eliminated altogether. Indicative of this trend is the fact that the topic of the 
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Palestinian refugees in Egypt is handled through the Ministry of Interior. Further, the 
case of the Palestinian refugees in Egypt and the discrimination they endured during the 
Sadat era show that international conventions remain by and large theoretical and lack 
practical means to ensure the implementation of their provisions. It also shows that 
despite being a humanitarian non-political case, refugees remain vulnerable to the whims 
of the host state, its national and political priorities, and the course of its relations with 
Palestinian organizations.              
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Chapter Four 
The Mubarak Era 1981-2011 
 
Historical background 
This chapter examines the era of President Hosni Mubarak stretching for almost 
three decades. Mubarak, who commanded Egypt’s air force during the 1973 war served 
as Sadat’s vice-president. He was sworn in as president following Sadat’s assassination in 
1981.
503
 Mubarak’s era is essentially a continuation of Sadat’s political discourse. He 
maintained peace with Israel, close ties to the United States, as well as strengthening 
capitalism and the private sector. The chapter analyzes the regime’s political framework 
and the course of Egyptian-Palestinian relations during that period. It also discusses the 
legal and social status of Palestinian refugees in Egypt by investigating how fluctuations 
in political relations and national priorities affect their rights.   
 Mubarak commenced his term by declaring a state of emergency. He tightened 
surveillance over universities and the press, and arrested many Islamists. But he released 
the political prisoners arrested under Sadat.
504
 In an attempt to gain national trust, 
Mubarak promised economic and social reforms, and posed as an advocate of democracy. 
He stated that democracy is the best guarantee for a better future declaring his refusal to 
long-term presidential rule.
505
 He explained his belief that a president “should not exceed 
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the period of two terms in office,” adding that “I will be the first President to apply such a 
rule.”506  
While Mubarak’s foreign policy, and in particular with regards to the United 
States and Israel, was merely a continuation of Sadat’s, he attempted to consolidate and 
legitimize his position through “express[ing] his determination not to visit Israel, and he 
gave the impression that he was going to be much more cautious in his relations with the 
United States than his predecessor.”507 On 25 April 1982 Egypt retained the rest of Sinai 
but talks with Israel stalled. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon forced Mubarak to re-call 
the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, transforming ties between the two states into the 
condition of so-called “cold peace.”508 Regionally there were significant changes as well, 
Egypt received Arafat in 1983 for the first time since the late 1970s, and resumed its 
diplomatic relations with the Arab states in 1987.
509
 In 1989 the Arab League reinstated 
Egypt relocating its headquarters to Cairo in 1990.
510
 
Nonetheless, Mubarak did not attempt to alter Sadat’s dependency and alignment 
with the United States. Indeed, Egypt kept receiving millions of US dollars in economic 
and military aid.
511
 Such dependency dictated Egypt’s “foreign policy, its policy toward 
                                                          
506. A speech to the parliament in April 1984 [Arabic Source] 
507. Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak, 1981-2011, 143, see also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “The 
Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post – Sadat Era,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring, 1982), 769-788, 
777 
508. Goldschmidt Jr. and Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 386 
509. In a press interview published in al-Akhbar newspaper on 3 January 1982, Mubarak stressed that the 
days of Egypt’s isolation from the Arab world were over. He insisted that restoring Egypt’s diplomatic ties 
with the Arab states was a chief priority [Arabic Source] 
510. http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/03/200852518428191556.html , also see 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/arab_league/index.html , also see  
Boutros-Ghali, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post – Sadat Era,” 781  
511. “Egypt: The Development of Foreign Policy,” http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-
4156.html  
147 
 
the Arabs, its relations with Israel, and its economic policy.”512 This political and military 
alignment did not strengthen Egypt’s position. Instead it focused on containing radical 
nationalist forces in the region such as the Baathist regime in Syria and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon rather than Israel.
513
 The Egyptian regime maintained its ties with Israel despite 
the lack of any tangible progress in peace negotiations. The regime acted passively 
toward Israeli aggressions, including the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 
1981, its invasion of Lebanon both in 1982 and 2006, and its bombing of the PLO 
headquarters in Tunis on 1 October 1985 in “Operation Wooden Leg.” The Egyptian 
regime also failed to react toward the US strike on Libya in 1986.
514
 Mubarak appeared 
helpless in the face of US demands on Egypt during the second Gulf war, “Operation 
Desert Storm,” in 1990-1991.515 The regime dispatched a military unit along with the US 
coalition in return for the exemption of some of Egypt’s previous debts and an increase in 
aid packages.
516
 The United States, the Gulf States, and Europe “forgave Egypt around 
$20 billion-worth of debt, and rescheduled nearly as much again.”517 Mubarak’s regime 
acted as a US ally during the war on Iraq in 2003 known as “Operation Iraqi Freedom” 
through providing logistical aid.
518
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Mubarak seemed content with Sadat’s foreign policy and did not attempt to alter 
its course.
519
 He believed that Egypt should play the role of a regional mediator 
especially between the Arabs and Israel in an attempt to push forward the peace talks.
520
 
This attitude significantly diminished Egypt’s regional status as its foreign policy “was 
dependent and subservient to the US administration’s positions, and by extension, those 
of Israel.”521 The result was the gradual erosion of Egypt’s influence and its impact on 
decisions on the Arab, African, and international level. Cairo’s political and cultural 
leadership waned; its participation and contributions in meetings and conferences were 
nominal and consistently marked by innumerable abstract declarations.
522
 Egypt’s foreign 
policy followed a static formula based on selling out its policies in the search for 
financial solvency. Egypt utilized its regional and international leverage in its attempts to 
resolve its persisting financial problems. The assumption was that foreign policy was a 
natural extension to the domestic one.
 523
   
The rapid decline in Egypt’s regional and international status and its 
subordination to Washington’s directives paved the way for states like Turkey, Iran, and 
Qatar to achieve prominence in Arab and regional affairs.
524
 The political decline 
coincided with a cultural decline as well. During the first half of the twentieth century 
Egypt significantly contributed to culture, literature, and political thought through the 
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writings of figures such as Taha Hussein, Abbas al-Aqqad, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Naguib 
Mahfouz, Ahmed Bahaa al-Dine, and Yusuf Idris. This role greatly diminished during the 
past two decades. Egyptian media also failed to compete with the rising Arab satellite 
channels like Al-Jazeera. This cultural decline stemmed from Egypt’s mounting political 
and economic predicaments including its inability to force its will or deal with political 
crises. Egypt became a paralyzed “soft state,” and in turn its intellectual production 
lacked both quality and creditability.
525
  
Despite repeatedly denying normalization with Israel, the regime’s policies in 
recent years proved quite the contrary. On 14 December, 2004, the Egyptian government 
signed the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) treaty with Israel.  The treaty stipulated the 
establishment of three free-trade zones in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said. The textile 
products of those areas qualify for customs-duties exemption upon entering US markets 
on the condition that they contain at least twelve percent Israeli raw materials.
526
 The 
treaty was not new; in fact the US first offered it to Egypt and Jordan in 1996. Jordan 
singed immediately but Egypt at that time linked its approval to progress on the peace 
talks.
527
 By the early 2000s the government altered its stance and finalized the agreement. 
Egyptian officials argued that the treaty would open international markets for Egyptian 
products, improve the derailed textile industry, increase revenues, and create new jobs.
528
 
Many Egyptians resented this treaty. It seemed to be another manifestation of the 
regime’s subordination to US demands. It also came at a time when peace talks were (as 
always it seems) stalled and Israeli hostilities against Palestinians intensified. The 
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opposition mainly the Leftist parties like al-Tagamuu and the Muslim Brotherhood 
further argued that the government acted in isolation from its people by joining 
American-Israeli economic alliances. They disputed the regime’s claim that the treaty is 
only economic without political dimensions. Criticism against the treaty focused on its 
drawbacks including, weakening the national economy and threatening its independence, 
strengthening the enemy’s economy, and opening Arab markets to a flood of Israeli 
products. The treaty had several economic and political implications. First, it rendered the 
national economy vulnerable to Israeli political interests. Second, the treaty mistakenly 
implied that the Arab world could co-exist with Israel with the Palestinian resistance as 
the only obstacle against such peaceful coexistence.
529
  
But the QIZ was not the only Egyptian-Israeli treaty. In 2005 the Egyptian 
government signed a gas-export treaty with Israel. The deal again angered many 
Egyptians who argued that Israel received the gas for bargain prices. Critics also 
expressed their frustration that the government uses Egypt’s natural resources to sustain 
the enemy’s economy.530  
            By 2005 opposition against Mubarak’s regime increased significantly. The regime 
failed on multiple levels. The state of emergency had persisted since 1981. There were 
innumerable reports of police brutality against opposition and dissent. The regime rigged 
parliamentary elections and suffocated freedom of speech.
531
 At the onset of his reign, 
Mubarak promised to protect democracy and freedom of speech. By the 1990s the regime 
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had transformed into an authoritarian structure dominated by Mubarak’s ruling party, the 
National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP maintained its majority in all parliamentary 
elections with only some token seats for the opposition.
532
 Before 2005, Egypt never held 
presidential elections. Instead there were referendums to approve the president chosen by 
the ruling party.
533
 Due to the growing domestic and international pressures calling for 
multi-candidate elections, a referendum to the 1971 constitution introduced article 76 of 
2005.
534
 However, the article included several strict requirements. For instance, the 
candidate should secure the approval of 250 elected members of councils and parliament, 
all of which are dominated by the NDP. The candidate should also belong to a party 
registered with the government for at least five years. At that time no opposition party 
could meet those conditions and compete with the NDP’s candidate.535 The NDP also 
included in its membership many of the wealthy tycoons who controlled most of the 
national economic sector. Social and economic gaps widened significantly. Recent 
reports suggested that eighteen percent of the population live under poverty line. The 
number increases to forty percent in rural Upper Egypt.
536
 The regime barely fought, and 
indeed many argued it nourished, state corruption. In 2010 Transparency International 
released its Corruption Perceptions Index report (CPI) where Egypt ranked ninety-eight 
out of the 178 countries included in that report with a total score of 3.1 out of ten.
537
 
Political, social, and economic frustrations mounted and on 25 January 2011 thousands of 
protesters from different socio-economic and religious backgrounds marched to Tahrir 
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Square in Cairo demanding the overthrow of Mubarak’s regime. The protestors voiced 
several grievances focusing on political and economic issues including corruption, police 
brutality, the state of emergency, as well as high prices, inflation, and increasingly 
soaring rates of unemployment.
538
 Violent clashes erupted between the protesters and the 
police in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez leading to the death of over 800 and the injury of 
several thousands. On 11 February 2011 Mubarak resigned from his position as a 
president and turned power over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).
539
 
Egyptian-Palestinian Relations 1981-2011 
Egyptian-Palestinian relations stalled following the signing of the Camp David 
Accords and the Peace Treaty. Following Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak in an attempt to 
consolidate his power and secure popular legitimacy focused on restoring Arab relations 
and limiting Egyptian-Israeli affairs to the diplomatic level.
540
 The invasion of Lebanon 
in 1982 angered Egyptians who believed that the peace treaty had neutralized Egypt and 
empowered more Israeli aggression on neighboring Arab states.
541
 The Egyptians’ 
frustration with Camp David stemmed from unmet promises that peace would bring 
economic prosperity and a just solution to the Palestine question.
542
 The President’s 
advisors grasped the genuine popular sentiments toward Arab and Palestinian causes. 
They believed that extending formal support to the Palestinian cause would enhance the 
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regime’s legitimacy against the Islamist opposition.543 In December 1983, Arafat visited 
Egypt amid the violence of the Lebanese civil war, 1975-1990.
544
 The visit provided 
Mubarak with an opportunity to break the deadlock of Egypt’s isolation from the Arab 
world and “assume patronage of the Palestinian resistance.”545 The Egyptian government 
believed that Egypt must actively engage in Arab politics and the Palestine question to 
secure a bargaining position with both the United States and Israel.
546
 The regime’s 
approach aimed to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement by fulfilling the 
prerequisite of Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders on all fronts.547 In 1984 the NDP 
broke its complete silence on the PLO since 1980 and addressed it as the “legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people.”548 While the party’s initial program stressed its 
full support and commitment to the Camp David Accords, by 1984 the party erased all 
reference to that matter from its electoral platform.
549
 
On the public level, the opposition, silenced during the Sadat era, openly 
condemned Israeli aggression and expressed solidarity with the Palestinian resistance. 
During the summer of 1982 representatives of various opposition parties, the Muslim 
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Brotherhood, trade unions, professional associations, and university professors formed 
the National Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian and Lebanese People.
550
 The 
NDP declined to join this committee due to the sensitivity of its position as the ruling 
party and its commitment to peace with Israel.
551
 The committee held several political 
meetings discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict, it also tried to raise some funds to help the 
victims of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. However, the committee’s attempts to reach 
the masses failed. Fearing that the committee’s activities might unleash social unrest, the 
government quickly thwarted their efforts to organize public demonstrations.
552
   
Egyptian popular support increased significantly during the first intifada 
(uprising,) of 1987-1993. The uprising against the Israeli occupation began in Jabalya 
refugee camp and swiftly spread to include Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.
553
 
Several intertwined factors fueled the Palestinian uprising. These included the persistence 
of the Israeli occupation, its systematic brutality and oppression (including mass killing, 
detention, and deportation), and the failure of the PLO and the Arab states to achieve any 
meaningful progress to alleviate Palestinian suffering.
554
 The immediate incident serving 
as a catalyst for the intifada occurred on 8 December 1987, when an Israeli army tank 
transporter ran into a group of Palestinians from Jabalya refugee camp. The incident led 
to the death of four and injured others. Subsequently, demonstrations against Israeli 
occupation broke in the camp and quickly spread throughout the occupied territories.
555
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In Egypt the uprising inspired a wave of solidarity and admiration and led to the 
establishment of the Egyptian National Committee in Support of the Palestinian Uprising. 
The committee focused on mobilizing support for Palestinians through raising awareness 
about the uprising, collecting funds, and organizing solidarity activities across the Arab 
world.
556
 The committee succeeded in bringing together a myriad of political parties 
including the NDP, unions, professional syndicates, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and non-political unions. The committee also opened branches in different 
governorates.
557
 In order to spread knowledge about the uprising, the committee edited 
and published a newsletter entitled al-Intifada, to document the developments in the 
occupied territories. Nonetheless, the committee’s contributions in raising funds 
remained modest, as it succeeded in collecting only one hundred thousand US dollars 
compared to three million US dollars that the Republic of Yemen had raise.
558
 The 
committee’s call for an Arab peace march towards the Israeli borders did not materialize, 
since the governor of North Sinai declared his inability to guarantee the march’s 
security.
559
 The most remarkable achievement credited to the committee occurred on 11 
October 1988 on the occasion of celebrating the birthday of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad). 
The celebration took place at the Journalists’ Syndicate in Cairo, and held the title of the 
Day of Abu Jihad, the Day of Palestinian Independence. Abu Jihad’s widow and Arafat 
were in attendance. The occasion succeeded in bringing together representatives of 
almost all active political and social forces in Egypt whether recognized by the 
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government or not in order to show “support of the national rights of the Palestinian 
people.”560   
The regime’s official response to the uprising was more cautious. Mubarak 
seemed to prefer mediation to confrontation. During the spring of 1988 he proposed 
suspending the intifada temporarily in return of an Israeli promise to improve living 
conditions in the occupied territories. This proposal came at a time when the intifada had 
gained both regional and international momentum as well as wide domestic solidarity.
561
 
The Egyptian public opinion however, rejected and criticized the content and timing of 
the proposal. Ultimately Mubarak abandoned his proposal and declared that Egypt will 
not pressure the Palestinians to accept the terms of the Camp David Accords that 
concerned them.
562
    
Following the second Gulf War, the PLO suffered diplomatic isolation resulting 
from the PLO’s opposition to the US intervention in the Gulf crisis.563 In essence, the 
PLO did not endorse the annexation of Kuwait, but saw Saddam Hussein’s challenge to 
the United States and the Gulf states as a means of shifting regional balance toward more 
focus on the Palestine question. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia responded by suspending their 
financial aid to the PLO.
564
 Palestinians in Kuwait faced systematic violence and mass 
deportation diminishing the population from 400,000 to less than 30,000 by 1998.
565
 By 
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the end of the war the United States sought to stabilize its position in the region by 
promoting a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
566
 Consequently, the United States 
and the Soviet Union jointly issued an invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference on 30 
October 1991.
567
 The co-sponsors of the conference explained that the objective was to 
achieve through direct negotiations a comprehensive and real peace between the Arabs 
and Israel based on UN-Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
568
 The governments 
invited included those of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Palestinians attended as part 
of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, while Egypt attended the conference as a 
participant. The framework proposed negotiating over a period of one year for setting an 
interim self-government. Once an agreement was reached the interim self-government 
arrangements would in turn last for five years. Negotiating the permanent status based on 
Resolutions 242 and 338 would commence during the third year of interim self-
government.
569
  
To a certain extent the Oslo Agreement signed on 13 September 1993 resembled 
the Camp David Accords of 1978. Both offered loose frame-works for further 
negotiations without any specific outcome. Both delayed vital issues like the refugees’ 
problem, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of the Israeli settlements until the never 
realized negotiation of permanent status.
570
 Lacking substantial Arab and international 
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diplomatic support, the PLO signed the accords despite their critical flaws.
571
 Israel and 
the PLO signed the agreement and exchanged mutual recognition, while the United States 
and the Russian Federation acted as witnesses.
572
 The agreement stipulated the creation 
of a five-year interim government and electing a council representing the Palestinians in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Declaration of Principles established an Israeli 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho; further withdrawals from unspecified areas 
of the West Bank were supposed to occur over the course of the five-year interim 
government.
573
 The PLO formed a Palestinian Authority (PA) to rule the areas from 
which the Israeli forces had redeployed. In 1996 the PLO held elections for the 
Palestinian Legislative Council, and Arafat conveniently won the Presidency of the 
PA.
574
 
Progression in the negotiations stalled during subsequent years. The various 
Labor and Likud governments showed obvious reluctance to commit to serious 
negotiations. Both governments permitted the construction of many new settlements, 
expanding existing ones, and establishing networks of roads to connect the settlements 
with Israel proper. The Oslo accords in this respect failed to develop any mechanism to 
halt Israeli unilateral violations.
575
 The PLO also faced an internal challenge in the form 
of the rising Islamic movements like the Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance 
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Movement (Hamas). Both groups preached armed struggle against Israel and rejected 
negotiations.
576
        
 The case of the Oslo Accords witnessed an obvious decline in the role of 
Egyptian diplomacy. The PLO accepted the accords at a time when it suffered from the 
lack of sufficient Arab political and economic support. Egypt joined as a participant, 
while the United States controlled the negotiations process. Despite its flaws, during the 
Camp David negotiations, Sadat stressed that regional peace is unachievable without 
restoring all Palestinian national rights.
577
 By contrast, during the Oslo negotiations 
Egypt did not attempt to provide a counter-balance against US bias toward Israel. The 
Oslo accords failed to commit Israel to any measure until the final stages of negotiations. 
Egyptian diplomacy shaped its course to conform to US interests. This resonated with 
Mubarak’s understanding of the role of Egyptian diplomacy in the post-Sadat era. He 
based his foreign policy on shifting Egypt’s role from a key negotiator to a mere mediator 
between the Arabs, Israel, and the United States.
578
 This shift in political attitude 
weakened the Palestinian position which needed a persistent negotiator rather than a 
weak mediator.       
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The regime did not attempt to alter its political stance through the 2000s. Oslo 
stalled, and several conferences convened in attempts to revive the waning peace 
process.
579
 The United States posed as the key player in peace negotiations, whereas 
Egypt settled for such roles including being a witness, a mediator, or hosting a summit. 
The peace process faced further setbacks by the early 2000s. On 28 September 
2000 the second intifada also known as al-Aqsa Intifada erupted. The ongoing grievances 
of Palestinians under occupation, an occupation that Oslo had heightened rather than 
addressed, were the causes of the uprising. The trigger occurred when Likud leader Ariel 
Sharon staged a visit to the Temple Mount / al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem during 
Friday prayers.
580
 The way Sharon entered the holy site accompanied by nearly one 
thousand police officers and media personnel angered Palestinians. Violent clashes 
erupted protesting the visit. Between 28 September 2000 and the year’s end, more than 
three hundred Palestinians were killed and thousands wounded.
581
   
The intifada revealed the condition of the Arab world generally and the Egyptian 
regime particularly. It exposed Arab diplomacy’s failure to pressure Israel or alleviate 
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Palestinians’ ongoing political oppression. The Egyptian regime faced an awkward 
dilemma. Since signing the Camp David accords, Egypt posed as the regional peace 
broker and key player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
582
 The eruption of the uprising 
and Israel’s brutal retaliation proved the impotence of negotiations and highlighted the 
limitations of Egypt’s influence.        
The Egyptian regime had always been keen on preserving regional stability. The 
eruption of Palestinian-Israeli clashes threatened this proclaimed stability and perplexed 
the regime. Mubarak quickly warned that escalation would lead to disastrous 
consequences. He swiftly acted with the aim of defusing the tension, restoring regional 
stability, and resuming peace negotiations. Mubarak resorted to diplomacy as the only 
viable path; he stressed that war was an outdated idea and no longer an option.
583
 In order 
to bridge the gap between the regime’s preserved rhetoric and the enraged popular 
sentiments; Mubarak verbally attacked Israeli brutality but maintained diplomatic 
channels.
584
 He also had to ward off radical Arab outbidding especially the Baathist 
regime in Syria, so he hosted a meeting on 17 October 2000 in Sharm el-Sheikh.
585
 
However, Egypt withdrew its ambassador in Israel in November 2000 due to Israel’s 
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excessive use of force. This decision marked Egypt’s frustration with Israel but was also 
a maneuver that intended to deflate domestic and Arab criticisms.
586
      
During its first year, the intifada gained international momentum. However, the 
tragic attacks of 11 September 2001, the rise of the war on terrorism, and the election of 
Sharon as prime minster forced new realities and weakened support for military 
resistance. Mubarak realized that the prospects of US military operations in the Gulf were 
looming. As a US ally he aimed to assist in this effort by reducing Palestinian-Israeli 
tensions. He extended an invitation to Sharon to come to Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss the 
possibilities of resuming negotiations. On a parallel path, the Egyptian intelligence 
managed to get the Palestinian factions to sign a unilateral ceasefire within both the 
Occupied Territories and Israel proper.
587
 In April 2002 Israel led a brutal assault on the 
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town of Jenin in response to a Palestinian suicide bombing of a Passover celebration. The 
massacre leveled most of the refugee camp; thousands were killed and injured while 
more than four thousand Palestinians became homeless. The Israeli army blocked 
medical and humanitarian aid from accessing the camp.
588
 In Egypt huge demonstrations 
erupted denouncing Israel and calling on the government to take serious action and 
protect the Palestinians only to be confronted with the anti-riots police. The official 
Egyptian response however, did not deviate from cliché condemnations of Israeli 
brutality and empty warning against the ramifications of violence and counter-violence. 
Mubarak stated in a televised speech that Israel had gone too far and its attempts to 
undermine the PA and Palestinian rights will never be fulfilled. He explained his firm 
belief that negotiations were the only means to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He 
also added that Palestinian attacks stemmed from “the sense of despair, frustration, and 
hopelessness.”589 The choice of the words such as despair and hopelessness echoes the 
same themes used in Egyptian press and official statements during the post Camp David 
era. Prior to signing the accords the press praised Palestinian operations as acts of brave 
national resistance. Later the press changed its tone, and adopted the regime’s rhetoric 
that the operations were signs of despair. Mubarak expressed his understanding of 
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popular anger but reminded his people that they should be wise and rational so as not to 
jeopardize Egypt’s political and economic interests.590 The underlying message 
reaffirmed the regime’s stance as a peace broker while eliminating any prospects for 
military options.           
Arafat died on 11 November 2004 of an unidentified illness.
591
 In January 2005 
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as the President of the PA, Abu Mazen 
served as a Prime Minister between March and September 2003. With the advent of the 
Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas decided to participate. Hamas was founded in 
February 1988 during the peak of the first intifada, 1987-1993. Its founders including 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin were linked to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and adopted its 
ideologies. Like the Islamic Jihad, Hamas called for a holy war to liberate all of Palestine, 
refused Israeli negotiations, and posed as an alternative to the PLO. Hamas called for 
establishing a Palestinian state based on religious principles instead of the PLO’s semi-
secularism.
592
     
Hamas gained popularity among Palestinians due to their commitment to national 
resistance to liberate Palestine. They rejected the PLO’s negotiations path. Hamas gained 
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Palestinians’ respect for their strength and the free-social services they provide during 
increasingly oppressive conditions. Palestinians identified more with Hamas than the PA 
which they perceived at best as “a corrupt and failing organization and at worst as a 
subcontractor for the bureaucracy of the occupation.”593 Hamas also established a 
military wing known as Ezz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, named after the shaykh who led 
a group of fighters resisting the British occupation during the early 1930s. The brigades’ 
operations against Israeli targets garnered Hamas some momentum and revived the hopes 
of liberating Palestine.  
Hamas decided to run for the Palestinian Parliamentary elections of 2005. Hamas 
won with a landslide much to the shock of Israel, the PA, and the George W. Bush 
administration. The United States had been backing the PLO since Oslo; it contributed 
with a total of two million US dollars to assist Fatah during the elections.
594
 The United 
States however, did not show much tolerance to other Palestinian factions. During the era 
of war on terrorism the Bush administration dismissed armed resistance as acts of 
terrorism. Following Hamas’ victory the United States rejected the results and pressured 
the European community to cut-off funding to the PA.
595
 This decision led to an 
economic crisis in Gaza which hosts a population estimated at 1.5 million depending 
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primarily on UN and non-UN donor aid. It is also estimated that sixty-five to seventy 
percent of Gazans are considered impoverished.
596
  
Gaza faced a serious economic crisis. Hamas also had its doubts about the loyalty 
of the Presidential Guards.
597
 It was reported that the United States channeled an amount 
of eighty-four million US dollars in aid packages to enhance the fighting capabilities of 
the Presidential Guards loyal to Fatah.
598
 Additionally, the United States asked the 
governments of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to aid Fatah 
financially and logistically.
599
 Tensions emerged between Abbas and the newly appointed 
Prime Minister Ismail Haniya. Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the Hamas 
government. Fatah also launched a series of operations targeting Hamas cadres.
600
 The 
first round of clashes occurred during December 2006 when Palestinian National Security 
Forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah following Hamas accusation that Fatah 
conspired to assassinate Haniya. Several Palestinians were wounded during those 
clashes.
601
 During March 2007 Fatah and Hamas agreed in Mecca to form a unity 
government.
602
 However, tensions escalated and more than one hundred Palestinians 
were killed. Confrontations grew lethal between May and June 2007 with both sides 
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committing atrocities. It is estimated that at least 118 Palestinians were killed and more 
than 550 wounded in the week leading to June 15.
603
 On June 14, 2007 Abbas dissolved 
the unity government, declared a state of emergency, and dismissed Haniya as prime 
minister.
604
 On June 15, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as a new Prime Minister. Hamas 
dismissed Abbas’ actions as an attempt to overrule the results of a democratically elected 
Legislative Council. Hamas thwarted a CIA designed coup, took-over the Gaza Strip and 
removed Fatah officials.
605
 Since 2007 a tragic internal split persisted with the PA ruling 
the West Bank and a Hamas-led government ruling over the Gaza Strip. During the past 
years several reconciliation initiatives were initiated, but a comprehensive settlement 
remains elusive.
606
     
The internal Palestinian chasm disturbed the Egyptian regime. As an American 
ally, the regime believed that it had to preserve regional peace and thwart the rise of 
militant radicalism. The Egyptian regime was always keen on preserving the PA as it 
represented Oslo and the preference of negotiations over militancy. The victory of Hamas 
in 2005 troubled the regime on several levels. First, the results of the elections positioned 
Hamas as a viable political alternative to Fatah. The results also brought Fatah’s 
weaknesses to the surface where Palestinians expressed their frustration with the impasse 
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of their cause, economic woes, and corruption allegations within the PA. The tide of 
change annoyed the regime, since many of the Palestinians’ grievances especially those 
having to do with economic distress and state corruption echoed the complaints of the 
Egyptian middle and working classes. Second, Hamas with its Islamist doctrine and ties 
to the Muslim Brotherhood represented another vital concern. The Brotherhood was 
banned in Egypt since 1954 and the Mubarak regime had exerted much effort to suppress 
them. The regime feared that the rise of Hamas across the border would empower the 
Brotherhood and elevate the group’s popularity (The Brotherhood has been sympathetic 
to the Palestinian cause since the 1930s and its fighters participated in the 1948 war).
607
 
Third, Hamas made it clear that militancy not negotiations was their ideology and 
stressed their refusal to acknowledge the existence of Israel. On the one hand, their 
philosophy challenged the post Camp David discourse which stressed that negotiations 
were the only feasible way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Hamas 
attacks against Israeli targets appealed to the Egyptian masses that never really adhered to 
peace with Israel and rejected all forms of normalization. For the Egyptian regime, the 
rise of Hamas to power meant that the envisioned US peace was waning against the 
Egyptian popular desire for a more firm stand against Israeli transgressions. It also 
exposed the impotence of the Arab regimes dependent on the United States.                  
The news of Hamas’ takeover of the Gaza Strip startled the Egyptian regime, 
which was quick to denounce Hamas. It also expressed its unequivocal support to Abu 
Mazen and the PLO as the legitimate Palestinian leadership.
608
 The regime issued a 
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statement expressing its deep concern over the prospect of establishing a Hamas-led 
radical “Islamic emirate” supported by Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. The statement 
claimed that the creation of such an entity on Egypt’s eastern borders was a clear threat to 
national security. Mubarak referred to the situation in Gaza as a coup against the 
legitimate Palestinian leadership and warned against its negative consequences for 
Palestinians.
609
 The Egyptian government took several measures to regionally isolate 
Hamas and strengthen Abu Mazen. On 19 June 2007 the Egyptian Foreign Minister 
Ahmed Abu al-Gheit ordered the transfer of the Egyptian diplomatic mission from Gaza 
to Ramallah in the West Bank. The move reflected Egypt’s official recognition of 
Ramallah as the seat of the legitimate Palestinian authority. Egypt also recalled its 
security delegation which was stationed in Gaza on permanent basis. The government 
fearing from militancy flooding into Egyptian territories closed the crucial Rafah crossing 
between Egypt and Gaza without credible evidence of any imminent threats. Sealing the 
borders intensified the harsh Israeli blockade imposed on the strip since the advent of 
Hamas.
610
 In an attempt to justify its decision, the government argued that the crossing 
operated and monitored by the PA under the supervision of the European Union (EU) 
monitors. The government further explained that the process was regulated in accordance 
with the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) of 2005 to which Egypt is not a 
signatory.
611
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Deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza intensified combined with several 
Israeli deadly raids. On 22 and 23 January 2008, thousands of Palestinians marched 
towards the Rafah Border crossing destroying parts of the barrier. Palestinians flooded 
into Egyptian territories seeking food and supplies.
612
 Egyptian troops allowed the 
crossing, but Palestinians were not allowed to go beyond El-Arish. Further infiltrations 
occurred and the Egyptian police began repairing the breaches and closed the border on 
February 3, 2008.   
Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, Israel launched a lethal 
operation against Hamas in Gaza known as Operation Cast Lead.
613
 Palestinians suffered 
high rates of causalities and the sealed borders added intense complications where 
paramedics and hospitals suffered from power cuts and the scarcity of medical supplies. 
Doctors and humanitarian groups lined up on the Egyptian side of the border but “despite 
the severity of the situation Egypt maintained access to Gaza tightly restricted.”614 
Mubarak explained in a televised address on 30 December 2008 that Egypt cannot open 
the border crossing with Gaza without the presence of both the PA and EU. He added that 
Egypt is not a signatory to the AMA and opening the border without resolving the 
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Hamas-Fatah conflict would deepen the internal rift. He further argued that opening the 
crossing was an Israeli trap that intended to put Egypt in charge of the Strip. He held 
Hamas responsible for the Israeli attack claiming that their refusal to renew the cease-fire 
incited the aggression.
615
 Various top Egyptian officials echoed Mubarak’s rhetoric, they 
stressed that any Hamas presence across the border was rejected altogether. The officials 
added that this decision is final as Egypt only acknowledged the legitimacy of Abu 
Mazen and the PA and rejected any other alternative.
616
  
By December 2009, the Egyptian government embarked on erecting a huge 
underground steel barrier to prevent smuggling across the tunnels between Sinai and 
Gaza.  News about the barrier raised harsh criticism against the Egyptian government 
both domestically and regionally, since its creation frames Egypt as a complicit with 
Israel in strangling Gaza. Egypt’s Foreign Minister defended the decision by claiming 
that the constructions across the border aim to protect Egypt’s national security.617 The 
regime in an effort to thwart opposition and legitimatize its wall instructed Al-Azhar to 
release a fatwa (Islamic decision) “declaring that it was permissible in matters of Sharia 
law for Egypt to build the barrier.”618 The late Sheikh of Al-Azhar declared that Egypt 
has the right to defend its territories against uncontrolled smuggling across the tunnels. 
He added that those opposing the barrier were violating the commands of Islamic law.
619
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The fatwa triggered wide condemnation from the opposition, Hamas, and various Arab 
states. Hamas argued that it never attempted to threaten the stability of Egypt and 
questioned the logic behind the barrier. Hamas condemned the fatwa reminding Al-Azhar 
that the barrier does not protect Egypt from the Zionists but it shuts-off food and medical 
supplies urgently needed by children and patients entrapped in Gaza.
620
 The aggressive 
blockade forced the Gazans to dig hundreds of tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border in an 
attempt to secure their basic needs.
621
        
In yet another televised speech Mubarak defended the steel barrier arguing that he 
would stop at nothing to maintain national security. He added that the construction is an 
act of sovereignty on Egyptian territories. Echoing Sadat’s “Egypt First” discourse, 
Mubarak explicitly declared that Egypt will never abandon the Palestine cause, but 
Egypt’s national interests come first and foremost. He referred to the death of an 
Egyptian solider across the border and criticized Hamas accusing them of being evasive 
and contradictory. He added that although Hamas pledges resistance and opposes peace, 
they neither resisted nor achieved peace.
622
 In return Hamas expressed its disappointment 
explaining that they would never threaten Egypt and that their sole aim is to end the Gaza 
blockade.
623
 Mubarak’s speech raised domestic criticism as well. Several legal and 
diplomatic experts explained that Mubarak’s rhetoric was based on a political stance and 
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not a legal one. Judge Ahmed Mekki explained that Mubarak’s stance stemmed primarily 
from Egypt’s inability to confront Israel as well as the strength of external and mainly US 
pressures. Mekki also explained that according to international law and the Geneva 
Conventions Egypt had to open the border crossing for humanitarian reasons since the 
gates are located on Egyptian territories and operate under Egyptian sovereignty. He 
explained that Egypt’s actions legitimize the Israeli blockade and shift the blame from 
Israel. In other words, international condemnation toward Israel decreases since another 
Arab country contributes to the inhuman blockade of the Gaza Strip.
624
 By the second 
half of 2010, Egypt partially opened the Rafah border crossing but mainly for people and 
not aid. The manager of the border crossing explained that the gates were open for 
patients, holders of foreign passports, students, and those who have a proof of residency 
in other countries. Nonetheless, Egyptian authorities denied the passage of much-needed 
aid supplies including food, medicine, electric generators for hospitals, and construction 
materials.
625
      
It is however important to examine the Egyptian regime’s stance on the border 
issue. Egypt’s troubled relation with Hamas and its insistence on sealing the border 
despite domestic and regional condemnations stemmed from both internal and external 
pressures. Domestically, the regime had been engaged in a long battle to suppress the 
Muslim Brotherhood and curtail its power as an organized opposition with a sizeable 
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popularity. The rise of Hamas, an offshoot of the Brotherhood, immediately next to the 
Egyptian border signaled a threat to the regime. Mubarak feared that the Hamas takeover 
might empower the Brotherhood and increase their popularity among the masses. 
However, the Brotherhood was only one among several external pressures exerted upon 
the Mubarak regime. On one hand, Abu Mazen urged Mubarak to seal the border so as 
not to strengthen Hamas and undermine Fatah. On the other hand, Israel initiated a 
campaign accusing Egypt of being passive regarding the smuggling of weapons through 
the tunnels, thus, contributing to threatening Israeli security. For several years the regime 
adopted a blind-eye policy toward the tunnels. However, the regime’s lax attitude 
changed when Hamas started to use the tunnels to smuggle heavy weapons into the strip. 
In 2009 the Egyptian government discovered an elaborate multi-national plot linked to 
Hezbollah that involved smuggling weapons, and planned ultimately to target Israeli 
tourists in Sinai and to fire at ships in the Suez Canal.
626
 The regime perceived such 
developments as a direct violation to Egypt’s sovereignty, a credible threat to national 
security, and potentially jeopardizing its turbulent relations with Israel. More importantly, 
the United States pressured Egypt to keep the border closed and end the smuggling. Israel 
demanded that the United States make its annual 1.3 billion US dollars in military 
assistance to Egypt conditional on Mubarak’s efforts to halt smuggling.627 In return, the 
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Egyptian regime deeply depended on US aid since Camp David, unable to face Israel, 
and battling wide domestic challenges had to bow and contribute to the Gaza crisis.
628
               
The previous section attempted to analyze the Egyptian-Palestinian relations 
during the Mubarak years. It traced Egyptian official discourse regarding the Palestine 
cause in the post Camp David era. It also discussed the ramifications of the Hamas 
takeover, the internal strife with Fatah, and the Egyptian-Hamas conflict over the Rafah 
border. The next section will address the press during the Mubarak era and its attitude 
toward Palestine with a special emphasis on moments of political conflict.   
The Press during the Mubarak Era 
Mubarak started his presidency by attempting to downplay the ramifications of 
Sadat’s “Autumn of Fury." He released all politicians and journalists detained under 
Sadat, and promised to respect the role of the press and freedom of speech. By the mid-
1990s, the regime grew less tolerant to rising criticism, issuing Law 96 of 1996, which 
posed several restrictions on issuing new papers.
629
 For instance, article 50 banned those 
who are deprived from practicing their political rights from publishing papers. This 
article targeted mainly the Islamic opposition since most of its members faced 
imprisonment more than once in a variety of cases. Article 52 stipulated that private-
owned papers must deposit a huge sum of money in an Egyptian bank prior to 
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publication.
630
 The law also expanded the role of the Higher Press Council headed by the 
President of the Shura Council.
631
 The law stated that freedom of speech and the 
exchange of information were protected as far as nothing threatens national security or 
social peace.
632
 Article 5 stated that seizing papers or canceling their licenses was 
forbidden. Nonetheless, the Labor’s Party (Hizb al-Amal) mouthpiece al-Shaab was 
ordered to shut-down following the People’s Assembly’s Committee on Political Parties 
decision to freeze the party in May 2000.
633
 Additionally, the law stipulated several 
penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment in matters related to criticizing the 
president, the government, or heads of foreign states.
634
 However, private and party 
papers remained mostly depended on state-owned publishing houses for circulation. They 
also did not attract lucrative advertisements compared to those advertised in the official 
papers. Party journals exhibited the same weaknesses suffered by opposition parties. 
During the Mubarak era the few existing opposition parties (including al-Wafd, al-
Tagamuu, and the Nasserite Party) suffered from internal conflicts, weak leadership and a 
shrinking popular base. Set against the NDP hegemony, opposition parties and papers 
suffered from systematic weakening and marginalization.
635
             
Although Law 96 of 1996 expanded journalists’ rights and protected their 
freedom of speech, Mubarak did not refrain from criticizing opposition press accusing 
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them of lacking enough knowledge about the priorities of the population.
636
 Further, 
unlike his predecessors (Nasser and Sadat), Mubarak did not establish any special 
relations with particular journalists. He maintained normal relationships with chief-
editors and met them during office hours only. He communicated with the press through 
telephones regarding official matters. He also opposed any negative press relating to both 
Nasser and Sadat.
637
  
           By mid-2000s and in response to pressures for more freedoms several independent 
newspapers appeared including: al-Masry al-Youm (The Egyptian Today), al-Youm al- 
Sabi’ (The Seventh Day), and Sawt al-Umma (The Voice of the Nation). However, 
several reports surfaced documenting physical violence and harassment targeting 
opposition journalists.
638
 Opposition papers focused on criticizing the regime’s 
corruption, the impotence of the government, and Egypt’s failing regional diplomacy. 
The official press however remained attached to the regime and largely adopted its 
discourse.     
The previous survey examined the conditions of the press during the Mubarak 
years in light of Press Law 96 of 1996. The next section investigates how the Egyptian 
press handled the Palestinian cause and the image of the PLO in the post Camp David 
era. It also analyzes how the press reacts toward Egyptian-Palestinian political tensions. 
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From the onset of his presidency, Mubarak was determined to achieve full 
reconciliation with the Arab states and regionally reintegrate Egypt. In this respect he 
explicitly criticized the vilification campaigns initiated by the Sadatist press. He believed 
that such abusive campaigns had destructive ramifications and urged journalists to halt all 
anti-Arab propaganda.
639
 Further, by early 1982 Egyptian press regained some interest in 
the Palestine cause after years of marginalization following the signing of the Camp 
David Accords. Al-Ahram published several editorials tackling the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The editorials attacked Israeli systematic aggression and invoked the image of the 
oppressed Palestinian who resists with whatever means available.
640
 However, the official 
press showed a preference toward the image of the “victimized” Palestinian over that of 
the “resisting” one. In resonance with the discourse in place since the late 1970s, the 
press stressed that peace was the most viable path to resolve the conflict.
641
 The brutal 
invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 gained wide and detailed coverage in 
Egyptian press. The press revived the term “Palestinian resistance” that had been out of 
use since Camp David. The press gave more emphasis to the image of the Palestinian 
fighter rather than the victimized one. Many editorials attacked the betrayal of the Soviets 
and the Syrian regime. The press praised Palestinian heroism and criticized the labeling 
of their courage in fighting as “acts of terrorism.”642 More significantly, al-Ahram made 
numerous references to the PLO stating that the organization was the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people.
643
 The paper also praised the organization’s 
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strength against Israeli attempts to liquidate it.
644
 This attitude represented a significant 
departure from Sadatist press which dismissed PLO leaders as paid agents to the Soviets 
and reactionary Arab regimes. Nonetheless, the bulk of editorials gave precedence to 
images of “victimization” and “betrayal” over those of “resistance” or “fedayeen 
action.”645 This approach reinforced “the dominant line in the Egyptian media, which 
favors a peaceful solution over the military option.”646   
The eruption of the first intifada gained extensive coverage in Egyptian press as 
opposed to the rather limited analysis on national television.
647
 Al-Ahram led Egyptian 
newspapers in providing extensive coverage of all developments in the occupied 
territories through dispatching its own correspondents. Opposition press mainly al-Wafd 
and al-Ahali reported extensively on the uprising. Al-Ahali famous for its rejection of 
Camp David as well as US hegemony more broadly praised the Palestinians and urged 
them to continue their armed struggle and capitalize on their gains.
648
 The Islamist press 
represented in the Brotherhood’s mouthpiece al-Liwaa al-Islami, praised the intifada and 
expressed its support of the PLO. However, unlike the official and opposition press, the 
Islamist coverage depicted the uprising as a holy war referring to it as the “revolt of the 
mosques” instead of the more common “revolt of the stones.”649 Further, Arafat’s stance 
during the Gulf War, 1990-1991 led to some anti-Palestine editorials. For instance, 
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Ibrahim Seada wrote an open letter to Mubarak calling upon him to not trust Palestinians 
calling them “killers” and “ungrateful cowards.” He also advised against allowing them 
to study or work in Egypt, and to prevent them from seeking refuge in it.
650
           
Al-Aqsa intifada gained wide coverage in Egyptian media and initiated large 
demonstrations calling on Mubarak to sever all ties with Israel and protect Palestinians. 
The official press quickly ran several editorials reminding readers that Mubarak was a 
wise calm man and would not be dragged to a state of war. National press in this respect 
glorified Mubarak as the advocate of peace and the defender of Palestinian and Arab 
causes.
651
 Mohammad Abdel Moneim explained that Mubarak had steel nerves and 
would protect peace at all costs.
652
 The underlying message of this editorial and several 
others was to remind the people of Egypt’s ties with Israel and to reaffirm that declaring a 
state of war is out of question.
653
      
The issue of Palestinian suicide bombers raised another concern for the regime. 
Although the national press reported extensively on the uprising, there was an obvious 
stance against glorifying suicide bombings. The official press, crippled within the 
regime’s parameters, repeatedly warned against the futility of the cycle of violence and 
counter violence. The government papers persistently praised Mubarak policies. The 
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press repeated its clichéd condemnations of Israel and demanded that the United States 
and Europe pressure Israel to end its aggression and resume peace negotiations.
654
 By 
contrast, the opposition and religious press praised the heroism of Palestinian fighters as 
sacrificing their lives to resist occupation. The Egyptian Mufti Dr. Ali Jumaa explained 
that Palestinian resistance is religiously legitimate and in defense of truth and justice. It 
was a form of jihad (holy war) against terrorism and was condoned by the sharia.
655
 Al-
Ahali took the intifada as an opportunity to attack the regime’s passivity and question the 
legitimacy of the Camp David Accords. Nabil Zaki explained that on signing the 
agreements, Egyptians were promised peace and prosperity. Twenty-five years later none 
of those promises was fulfilled, and the region’s reality remained lamentable.656          
In another editorial, Mustafa Bakri attacked the regime’s silence and lack of 
action toward Israeli aggression. He complained that the Arab rulers wasted Arab dignity 
by passively watching the growing line of Palestinian martyrs.
657
 Further, Abdel Halim 
Qandil wrote several harsh articles criticizing the regime’s passivity and its utter 
surrender to Washington. He attacked Mubarak’s relentless attempts to put an end to the 
uprising and force a US-sponsored peace settlement. Qandil explained that the intifada 
inspired the oppressed Arab masses to rise against oppression and injustice; therefore, it 
threatened the US-backed Arab dictatorships. He added that the United States wanted to 
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end the intifada, and Mubarak as a US ally had to follow those orders despite Palestinian 
pain and blood.
658
    
The Fatah – Hamas clash and the subsequent Gaza takeover initiated an organized 
condemnation campaign from official and non-official papers alike. The campaign 
reflected Egypt’s both uneasiness toward and suspicion of Hamas. This attitude stemmed 
from the historical ties between Hamas and the Brotherhood. Reports also stated that 
Gaza housed radical groups, which might infiltrate Egyptian territories through the 
tunnels and threaten national security. Other reasons encouraging negative press 
campaigns included the Egyptian-Fatah relations and Egypt’s perception that Fatah stood 
for Oslo and the peace option instead of Hamas militant strategy. Further, the reported 
ties between Hamas and Iran represented yet another challenge to the Egyptian regime. 
Egypt severed its diplomatic relations with Iran following the Islamic Revolution of 
1979. Egypt feared that Hamas with its alleged Iranian ties across the borders would 
disturb regional power-order, compete with Egypt’s Arab leadership, and jeopardize 
Egypt’s national security. Indeed, several editorials appeared in the official paper, al-
Jumhuriyah bitterly attacking Hamas and dismissing it as an Iranian proxy. The paper’s 
editor Muhammad Ali Ibrahim argued that Hamas’ ultimate goals were to fulfill Iran’s 
orders, harm Egypt’s political and economic interests, and threaten its national security. 
He called for an “Iron Fist” policy against Hamas whom he accused of being criminals 
aiming to stab Egypt in the back. In other editorials Ibrahim stated that Iran had been 
spying on Egypt and the Arab world through financing Hamas and Hezbollah with the 
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sole aim of controlling the Arab world and spreading its “culture of violence and 
terrorism” camouflaged as resistance.659   
The press campaigns adopted a one-sided anti-Hamas approach which maintained 
that Hamas had defied the legitimate authority. The coverage seemed to intentionally 
overlook the fact that Hamas won a democratic election and constitutionally had the right 
to form a cabinet. During June 2007 several editorials denounced the Gaza takeover and 
warned that Hamas threatened both Palestinian and Egyptian interests and national 
security. For instance, Makram Muhammad Ahmed argued that Hamas took the Gazans 
as hostages to serve its own ends. He added that Hamas was an Iranian protégée and they 
serve Iranian interests in regional expansionism.
660
 Tareq Hassan warned that Hamas was 
the by-product of the Muslim Brotherhood and their rise would empower the 
Brotherhood to challenge the regime and threaten national security.
661
 Al-Akhbar’s 
Editor-in-chief Muhammad Barakat echoed similar themes arguing that Hamas militancy 
would damage the Palestinian cause and endanger Egyptian and Palestinian security.
662
 
Karam Jaber and Abdallah Kamal of Ruz al-Yusif newspaper went a step further, 
claiming that Gaza under Hamas was in fact controlled by al-Qaeda radical terrorists. 
Kamal argued that the presence of Hamas in Gaza meant a full-fledged Taliban state 
across the Egyptian border.
663
 Lutfi Nassef chose a different angle. He accused both 
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Fatah and Hamas of destroying the Palestinian cause and fulfilling Israel’s desire to 
eliminate Palestinians. He added that the long awaited dream of liberating Palestine was 
shattered when both parties decided to destroy each other for power instead of uniting 
against their common enemy.
664
             
The breach of the Rafah border in January 2008 added further complications to 
the deteriorated relations between Egypt and Hamas. The press waged another attack 
condemning the incidents at Rafah and blaming Hamas for Gazans’ suffering. Makram 
Muhammad Ahmed held Hamas responsible for the chaos across the border. He 
explained that Hamas used the humanitarian situation in Gaza to blackmail Egypt and 
force a change in Egypt’s policies toward Gaza. He added that Egypt condemned the 
Israeli blockade but refused to jeopardize its national security. He also attacked Hamas 
and dismissed their resistance as nothing but vague slogans. He added that instead of 
fighting the Israeli occupation, Hamas turned its weapons against members of Fatah and 
committed atrocities in the Gaza Strip.
665
 Other editorials echoed the same themes 
condemning the border breach as a threat to Egyptian national security, which they 
repeated was nonnegotiable. Karam Jaber explained that Mubarak would protect 
Egyptian national security against all internal and external threats and at all costs.
666
 A 
similar argument appeared in Muhammad Ali Ibrahim’s column in al-Jumhuriyah. He 
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praised Mubarak’s speech on the occasion of Police Day. He warned against conspiracies 
targeting Egypt’s stability and accused those who criticized Mubarak’s stance on Gaza of 
being paid agents.
667
 Abdallah Kamal explained that the border incident was a direct 
outcome of the harsh Israeli blockade. However, he stressed that no matter how much 
Egyptians may sympathize with the Palestine cause, they rejected the idea of threatening 
their own security to solve the Gaza problem. He added that Egyptian national security 
could not be subject to blackmail under any pretext.
668
 Ibrahim Nafaa of al-Ahram and 
Muhammad Barakat of al-Akhbar chose to praise Mubarak’s “considerate” and 
“humanitarian” decision to open the Rafah cross border for Gazans to buy food supplies. 
They did not attack Hamas but called for an unconditional Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. 
Barakat also blamed Israel and the West for the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Egypt, he 
argued, had a historical role as a secure haven for the distressed Palestinians. It is 
interesting to note that Barakat chose to criticize the lack of a Western conscience, while 
overlooked the Egyptian regime’s insistence on participating in the Gaza blockade.669          
Usama Sarayia argued that the term “human rights” was more than often 
misinterpreted. He attacked the European Union (EU) and the international organizations 
calling for protecting human rights while ignoring the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. 
Sarayia explained that the Gazans were the victims of both the Israeli occupation and 
Hamas’ recklessness; it was only Mubarak who effectively responded to the Gaza crisis 
by opening the border.
670
 Sarayia failed to mention that Gazans had forced their way 
through the closed gates and Mubarak had to allow them into Sinai to avoid domestic 
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agitation. Ibrahim Seada argued in his daily column that the internal Palestinian conflict 
gave Israel the opportunity to freeze peace negotiations under the pretext that it cannot 
negotiate peace while Hamas shells Israeli settlements. Seada blamed Hamas for 
escalating the situation to serve its own ends and drag the Arab world into a web of 
violence. He accused Hamas of using the humanitarian crisis of over a million and a half 
Palestinians trapped in Gaza to achieve any political win regardless of price.
671
       
Fahmy Huwaydi however, adopted a rare opposing argument. In a series of 
articles Huwaydi criticized the Egyptian regime’s intolerant policy against Hamas and the 
Gaza Strip. In one of his articles, Huwaydi warned against the loose use of the term 
“national security.” He argued that this term needed redefinition within a specified 
parameter. The regime had repeatedly utilized the term “protecting national security” 
beyond its original scope. He added that the Mubarak regime used this term to protect its 
own interests and silence the opposition.
672
 In another article, Huwaydi criticized the 
government and its press for exaggerating the Rafah border incidents. He explained that a 
national security threat is defined as an imminent danger that jeopardizes the state’s 
ability to protect its national interests. He added that the border breach cannot be defined 
under that rubric as the Gazans acted out of desperation and their urgent need for basic 
supplies. For Huwaydi, the Rafah incident did not mount to any threat to national 
security. He reminded the regime that the Gazans were Arab neighbors in need and not 
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enemies. The real threat to national security, Huwaydi maintained, was the Israeli 
occupation, its nuclear stations, and its numerous attempts to weaken Egypt.
673
        
The previous section attempted to analyze the press during the Mubarak years. 
Like the Nasserist and Sadatist eras, the official press under Mubarak maintained its 
intimated attachment to the regime and adopted its discourse. The newly established 
independent newspapers provided an alternative venue to discuss crucial topics like state 
corruption and the decline of Egypt’s regional role. Nonetheless, the opposition press 
suffered from various obstacles including lawsuits, intimidations, as well as organized 
campaigns questioning their credibility, and accusing them of bias and suspicious 
financing. On the Palestine question, the press maintained the regime’s course. By the 
early 1980s Mubarak focused on regaining Egypt’s regional status, the press started to 
report on the PLO and referred to it as the legitimate representative of all Palestinians. 
The two uprisings gained wide coverage in Egyptian press. Nonetheless, the official 
papers focused on the image of the victimized Palestinian rather than that of the fighter. 
This approach resonated with the regime’s stance and its insistence on peace negotiations 
as the only viable path to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its dismissal of armed 
resistance as futile. Egyptian-Palestinian tensions occurred following the Gaza takeover 
in 2007. The regime sided with Fatah and the press waged an anti-Hamas campaign 
accusing them of being Iranian proxies plotting against Egyptian national security. The 
breach of the Rafah border in early 2008 raised more tensions. Egyptian officials made 
                                                          
673. Fahmy Huwaydi, “Hakawa al-Amen al-Qawmy,” [The Stories of National Security], in al-Ahram on 
19 February, 2008. In another article Huwaydi criticized the Egyptian Foreign Minister for his aggressive 
declarations against the Palestinians and his threat that any attempt to breach the border will not be 
tolerated and would lead to severe repercussions. Huwaydi explained that Israel had repeatedly fired at the 
Egyptian borders and killed Egyptian soldiers but the regime maintained utter silence, while getting 
aggressive toward the helpless besieged Gazans. “Arrogant Diplomacy and Suspicious Media,”  in al-
Dostour newspaper on 4 July, 2008  [Arabic Sources]  
188 
 
several hostile declarations and the government press initiated further campaigns blaming 
Hamas for the Gaza crisis and warning that Egypt would not tolerate their schemes. The 
independent papers showed more, running several editorials criticizing the regime’s 
stance which aided Israel and defied international humanitarian ethics.              
The following section will explore the legal status of Palestinian refugees in 
Egypt during the Mubarak era. It will attempt to investigate whether or not their 
conditions witnessed any improvement over the course of three decades.  
The Legal Status of Palestinian Refugees during the Mubarak Era 
 The legal status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did not witness 
improvements during Mubarak’s era. Most of Sadat’s harsh laws of the late 1970s 
remained intact. Palestinian refugees remained legally defined as foreigners and never 
reverted to their status during the Nasser era as equal nationals. Although Mubarak 
repeatedly stressed his commitment to the Palestine cause, his declarations remained 
confined to the realm of rhetoric and did not aim to improve the status of the Palestinian 
community.     
Residency laws for Palestinian refugees did not witness amendments. Palestinian 
refugees are granted either a special residency permit or a temporary one depending on 
the date of arrival.
674
 Most Palestinians residing in Egypt arrived after the war of 1967 
and fall under the temporary residence category. The permit in this case is valid for one 
                                                          
674. For a detailed analysis of this point refer to chapter (2), 38-40. In 2011 the Minister of Interior issued 
Decree No. 1248 of 2011 related to the rates for renewing Traveling Documents (TD) for Palestinian 
refugees. The first article stipulated that the fees for issuing a TD are one-hundred and ten Egyptian 
pounds. The second article explained that there are two types of the TD. One is the ordinary type, valid for 
five years and could be extended for two more years only once. The second type is the mechanized TD; it is 
valid for a period of five years and cannot be extended. Al-Waqa’e al-Masriya: Issue No. 178 (Supplement) 
on August 3, 2011 [Arabic Source] 
189 
 
to three years depending on Egyptian laws of entry.
675
 Residency permits also depend on 
providing a valid reason for staying in the country, such as, education enrollment, valid 
work permit, or marriage. Those who fail to provide a reason for their stay risk 
imprisonment or deportation. Palestinian business-men who have enterprises operating in 
Egypt for over twenty years face difficulty in renewing their residency permits. They 
explained that during the eighties and nineties the Egyptian government provided several 
incentives to encourage Palestinian investment in Egypt’s economic sector. Among those 
initiatives was providing the Palestinian investor and his family a residency permit valid 
for five years. However, in 2008 a new rule stipulated that Palestinian investors have to 
renew their residency permit every year and the permit is valid for one year only. In a 
recent press report, Palestinian businessman Fayek Belal explained that the government 
informed them that this regulation was temporarily and meant to ensure the authenticity 
of the projects, however, the situation remained unchanged. Belal added that the process 
of renewing residency permits takes from three to six months to fulfill all the required 
documentation. The prolonged processes hinder the investors from properly running or 
promoting their projects. They also face other difficulties including their inability to drive 
their own cars as the driving licenses expire with the residency permit. Their children 
also cannot enroll in schools as education administrations require valid residency permits 
to accept enrollment applications.
676
 Egypt is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
since 1981, yet very few Palestinians are registered with UNHCR. In fact Palestinians in 
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Egypt fall under the category of “others” in UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheets.677 Those few 
registered with UNHCR and recognized as refugees receive six-month renewable 
residency permits.
678
 Palestinian refugees with residency permit receive a five-year travel 
document. Whereas those registered with UNHCR should apply for Convention Travel 
documents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the 1954 agreement between 
UNHCR and the Egyptian government, such refugees should receive a travel document 
with a return visa valid for a limited but sufficient duration, except for matters related to 
public security. In reality, however, the government does not automatically issue the said 
documents, but grants them occasionally and on a case-by-case basis.
679
 In addition, 
UNHCR hardly offers assistance or protection to Palestinian refugees who fall under 
Egyptian mandate.
680
        
Thousands of Palestinians originally from the Gaza Strip hold Egyptian travel 
documents without residency permits. Those documents were issued during the period of 
Egyptian rule in Gaza and are used for traveling purposes.
681
 During the crisis of the Gulf 
war and the expulsion of Palestinians from Libya in 1995, Egyptian authorities denied 
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holders of such documents from entering Egyptian territories.
682
 Residency permits 
renewal regulations did not change from the Sadat era. Further, in 1984 the government 
issued the Law of Developing State’s Resources. This law stipulated that all foreigners 
residing in Egypt including Palestinians had to pay forty-two and a half Egyptian pounds 
in residence fees. This newly added fee increased the financial burden on Palestinian 
refugees who were required to pay for renewing their residency permits, education, health 
care, and show a monthly proof of spending an equivalent of a hundred and eighty US 
dollars. It also should be noted that only two percent of Palestinian refugees in Egypt are 
considered financially able. The majority of face tremendous difficulties in obtaining 
formal jobs and had to depend on the less-secure informal market.
683
 This law also 
contradicted with the provisions of the 1951 Convention. Article 29 stipulated that 
signatory states shall not impose upon refugees charges, duties, or taxes of any 
description higher than those levied on their nationals.
684
 It is important to note that the 
second paragraph of article 1D of the 1951 Convention should be applicable to the case 
of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt. This article stipulated that those refugees, who 
do not receive protection or assistance from any UN organs, should directly fall under the 
mandate of UNHCR.
685
 Since Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt do not receive 
assistance from UNRWA, accordingly they are “ipso facto entitled to the benefits of the 
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[1951] Convention.”686 As a signatory of the Convention, Egyptian constitution stipulated 
that all UN-conventions signed by Egypt and published in the Official Gazette become 
part of its national legislative system.
687
 Nonetheless, the government overlooked those 
provisions and seems unwilling to co-operate with UNHCR in the process of 
documenting and extending international protection to refugees.
688
 In fact the state 
maintains the case-by-case method when approaching refugees’ needs. This method 
violates equality principles and renders refugees vulnerable to arbitrary decisions.                 
In 1996 the state issued Law 99 which amended some provisions in Law 89 of 
1960 related to the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territories of the United Arab 
Republic. Article 8 stipulated that nationals from certain countries have to report 
personally within seven days of their arrival to the police station in their residency 
district. They have to explain the purpose of their arrival, the duration of their stay, and 
present all necessary documentation. Such nationals also have to notify the Aliens 
Registration Office or the police station in their residing area in case they change their 
residency address or move to another city.
689
 Following this amendment the Minister of 
Interior issued Decree 7067 of 1996. The first article stipulated that Palestinians entering 
Egypt fall under the regulations introduced in Article 8 of Law 89 of 1960 as amended by 
Law 99 of 1996.
690
 By including Palestinians in this decree, the state proved its 
securitization approach toward refugees. Palestinians pose a special situation where their 
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statelessness should provoke reliability instead of legal rigidity. Article 26 of the 1951 
Convention called for granting freedom of movement to refugees within the territory of 
the contracting state. The article however, left the application of this condition depending 
on the regulations generally applied by each state regarding its alien communities. This 
leaves refugees vulnerable to the state’s arbitrary laws and regulations.     
Further, until 2004 Palestinian children born to Palestinian fathers and Egyptian 
mother were not entitled to Egyptian citizenship, as the Egyptian civil code did not grant 
the mothers the right to pass her nationality to the offspring. In this case those children do 
not fall under Egyptian laws as they are defined as foreigners despite having Egyptian 
mothers. Therefore, they would suffer from several difficulties including being deprived 
of the right to free education and health care. In the future they would also be deprived of 
their political rights; facing difficulty in obtaining residency permits, and securing a 
stable job.
691
 In 2004 the government issued Law 154 of 2004 to amend certain 
provisions of Law 26 of 1975 on Egyptian nationality. Accordingly the Minister of 
Interior issued Ministerial Decree 12025 of the year 2004. The first article stipulated that 
Egyptian mothers can now pass their nationality to their offspring born to non-Egyptian 
fathers.
692
     
The law did not name any exceptions and its provisions should have been 
applicable to all Egyptian women married to foreigners. Nonetheless, the government 
decided to exclude Egyptian women married to Palestinians from benefiting from this 
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law. The government argued that as a member in the Arab League, Egypt abides by its 
resolution of the year 1959 which stated: “Palestinians must not be granted any other 
nationality in order to preserve the Palestinian identity.”693 However, this decision 
became in fact obsolete following a report submitted by the permanent Palestinian 
delegation to the Arab League on 30 September 2003. The delegation stressed that given 
Egypt’s historical role in supporting the Palestine cause, there is no danger in passing 
Egyptian citizenship to children born to Egyptian mothers and Palestinian fathers.
694
 
Therefore, the Ministry of Interior’s insistence on rejecting all requests submitted by 
Egyptian women married to Palestinians is in fact illegal. It also reveals an underlying 
political will that opposes the integration of half-Palestinian half-Egyptian into Egyptian 
society. The roots for this attitude date back to the Sadat era which fostered a series of 
misperceptions and dismissed most Palestinians as an untrustworthy security threat.    
Following the January 25 revolution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued 
Ministerial Decree 1231 on 2 May 2011. It permitted children born to Egyptian mothers 
and Palestinian fathers to acquire Egyptian citizenship and directed the Ministry of 
Interior to take all the necessary steps.
695
 However, the process did not progress 
smoothly. Several applications faced unexplained delays and the Ministry of Interior 
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seemed to prioritize the applications of those who hold court orders entitling them to 
acquire the citizenship.
696
 Other complications stemmed from the rejection of many 
applications without clear legal explanation except for citing the vague phrase of 
“rejected due to security concerns.”697   
Palestinian refugees in Egypt have been subject to extensive arbitrary deportation 
since the Sadat era. Despite the fact that both Egyptian legislation and the 1951 
Convention stipulate certain legal measurements before issuing a deportation verdict, the 
Ministry of Interior maintained deporting Palestinians based on the ambiguous phrase: 
“due to security concerns”. None of the deportation decrees explained the charges, nor 
did they indicate that the deported person got the right for legal representation or 
appeal.
698
 The case of Tamim Barghouti is an example of many arbitrary deportation 
incidents. Barghouti was born in Egypt to an Egyptian mother and a Palestinian father.
699
 
He also finished his education in Egypt. Barghouti used to go to the American University 
in Cairo (AUC) located in Tahrir Square to study at its library for his post graduate 
studies. On 20 March 2003 news spread that the United States had started its war on Iraq. 
The opposition, students of the AUC, and Cairo University poured into Tahrir Square to 
protest the war and the regime’s passivity. Like most of the students, Barghouti 
participated in the peaceful protests. Two days later and after midnight, security forces 
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arrived at his home. They arrested him and searched the house without presenting a clear 
legal warrant. They took Barghouti to an unspecified location. A couple of days later he 
was forced to leave the country based on the claim that he was a security threat. Like the 
case of his father Mourid Barghouti who was deported in the late 1970s, Tamim went 
through the entire humiliating process. It took his father more than twenty years to return 
to Egypt, but in the son’s case the persistence of Egyptian and international activists led 
to his return a month later.
700
 Barghouti’s case exemplifies the ruthlessness of arbitrary 
deportation. More crucially, it shows the ramifications of Sadat’s backlash, which 
transformed Palestinians to foreigners and left them vulnerable to the regime’s whims. In 
this case Barghouti was treated as a foreigner despite being born in Egypt to an Egyptian 
mother. In similar cases when Egyptian students are arrested in protests, they are released 
within weeks or months at most. As a foreigner, Barghouti was harshly forced to leave 
the only country he knew. The following tables show samples of the numbers of deported 
Palestinians during the Mubarak era.                         
Table (1): Palestinians deported from Egypt between years 1982 to 1990: 
1982 1983 198
4 
1985
-
1986 
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Table (2): Palestinians deported from Egypt between years 1991-1998:
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
The 
Numbers 
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271-
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148-
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The previous tables show that Palestinians faced arbitrary deportation on regular 
bases. All the cases cited “preserving social wellbeing” as the common reason for all 
deportation cases. All the ministerial decrees followed the same format with no legal 
information explaining the case or justifying the verdict. The tables also show that the 
period during the Second Gulf war between the years 1991 to 1994 witnessed a surge in 
the number of deported Palestinians. This might have resulted from the PLO’s stance on 
the war. Arafat denounced the US intervention, a rhetoric shared by many Egyptians 
especially the students and the opposition. The regime by contrast, supported the US 
operation and dispatched units from the Egyptian army to participate in liberating 
Kuwait. Deporting many Palestinians during that period reflected the regime’s frustration 
with the Palestinian stance, and its intolerance toward sources that might trigger mass 
opposition to its policies. This proves that refugees’ status remains highly dependent on 
199 
 
political relations and national interests. Deportation cases continued throughout the 
Mubarak era till after the revolution.
702
    
Arbitrary deportation is not the only case of violating refugees’ rights. Palestinian 
refugees since the late 1970s experienced systematic marginalization mounting to a state 
of invisibility. However, the case of Palestinian refugees in Canada camp in Rafah shows 
that the government intentionally ignored the presence of an entire community residing 
on its territories.    
Canada Camp   
The Canada refugee camp is the only Palestinian refugee camp in Egypt. Its 
history dates back to the year 1973. Israeli forces decided to establish routes within 
Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza for security reasons. About five hundred Palestinians 
had to relocate to another spot in Rafah; a plot previously used by the UN that held 
Canadian forces. Following the signing of the Camp David Accords of 1978, the city of 
Rafah was divided into two halves on 25 April 1982. The area hosting the Canada camp 
came under Egyptian sovereignty. This split had major effects on the Palestinian refugees 
inhabiting the camp. Thousands of them were cut off from their families and their sources 
of income. In fact, the early wave of Gaza tunnels appeared during that era. Palestinians 
in Egyptian Rafah dug some tunnels to maintain ties with their relatives and help smuggle 
some goods. The tunnels came under attack in the Egyptian parliament since the 
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1990s.
703
 The expansion of the tunnel networks and their impact on Egypt’s national 
security remain highly debatable till the present. After exhaustive negotiations, Egypt 
agreed to acknowledge the residents of the camp as temporary refugees. The government 
issued them Egyptian travel documents renewable every six month without a work 
permit.
704
 Residents of the camp depended mainly on assistance provided by UNWRA, 
and engaged in small-scale agriculture and commerce activities. UNWRA fully financed 
primary education. Preparatory and secondary education depended on limited Egyptian 
aid of nearly twenty thousand Egyptian pounds equivalent to six thousand US dollars. 
Students seeking university degrees had to travel to al-Arish, Ismailia, or Cairo. 
However, when the camp’s youth attempted to engage in the first intifada through 
Egyptian territories, the regime retaliated by limiting their numbers in Egyptian 
universities to a maximum of fifty students.
705
           
The governments of Egypt and Israel agreed that the camp existed on a temporary 
basis and that Israel was committed to relocate the refugees into another area in Gaza. 
Between 1989 and 1991 Israel approved the relocation of one hundred and fifty 
Palestinian families in Tal al-Sultan area in the Gaza Strip. The PLO financed the 
relocation process but following its financial crisis during the Gulf war the process 
stopped. Further relocations occurred in 1994 after the formation of the PA. The process 
however, was interrupted following the second uprising of 2000, the peace impasse, and 
repeated Israeli raids on Gaza. The camp received newcomers fleeing Israeli raids on 
Gaza. Recent reports indicate that the camp holds about four thousand Palestinians who 
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live in impoverished conditions. Following the Gaza takeover and sealing the border, the 
refugees lost UNWRA assistance and are completely ignored by the Egyptian 
government. They live on whatever assistance available through the residents of Rafah 
and al-Arish or their relatives who have a permanent residence permit.
706
 Recent reports 
indicate that their living conditions are rapidly deteriorating. They are cut-off from their 
relatives in Gaza and unable to obtain any jobs in Egypt. Although residing in Egypt for 
years, the government never acknowledged their status and did not propose any 
initiatives to improve their living conditions.
707
    
 Since the Sadat years Palestinians like other foreigners had to pay to access 
education and healthcare services. Egypt had also made reservations regarding Article 22 
[paragraph (1)] of the 1951 Convention regarding equating refugee children with 
nationals in term of accessing elementary education.
708
 Palestinian children could only 
apply to private schools and pay their tuition in foreign currency. Ministerial Decree 162 
of 1989 stipulated that each Palestinian student should pay what is equivalent to one 
hundred and twenty Egyptian pounds to enroll in primary schools. The amount increased 
to one hundred and sixty pounds for preparatory schools and reached two hundred and 
fifty pounds for secondary ones. Students also had to pay an equivalent of one hundred 
and fifty US dollars to receive their certificates. In 1991, the government increased 
university fees by twenty percent. Students in colleges had to pay an equivalent of two 
thousand Sterling pounds for their first year, and an equivalent of one thousand Sterling 
pounds for subsequent years. In scientific colleges, students in their first year had to pay 
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an equivalent of three thousand Sterling pounds and an equivalent of a thousand and five-
hundred Sterling pounds in subsequent years. Fees for post graduate studies required 
more than double the previous fees. Those rates complicated accessing education and 
burdened the already struggling Palestinian families, resulting in an increase in illiteracy 
rates.
709
   
Refugee children unable to financially enroll in private schools access education 
through centers holding partnerships with UNHCR along with assistance from some 
church groups. For instance, the Catholic Relief Services implemented a partnership with 
UNHCR in 2002. It provides educational grants for school children and illiterate adults. 
St. Andrews Refugee Ministry, founded in 1979, provides educational programs for 
children including classes in English, Math, and Science and information technology. 
There also classes for adults in English, Business, Drama, and Computers. The Sacred 
Heart Church in Sakakini, Cairo runs five schools for educating refugee children.
710
 
However, those centers have limited spaces and resources. The government rarely 
acknowledges the centers’ degrees. In order to get official certificates, the centers had to 
pay high fees to allow their students to sit for exams in officially accredited centers.
711
    
In 1992, the Minister of Education issued Decree 24 related to procedures 
governing foreign children’s access to Egyptian schools. Article 5 of the decree gave 
Sudanese, Jordanian, and Libyan children the right to access free primary education in 
state-owned schools just as Egyptian students. The same article extended its provisions to 
Palestinian students provided that their parents work for the Egyptian government, the 
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public sector, the military in Egypt, or if the parents are retired.
712
 Nonetheless, the 
decree stipulated certain conditions to enroll Palestinian students in public schools. This 
in fact contradicted principles of equality and deprived children who do not meet those 
conditions from accessing free primary education. Further, issuing ministerial decrees 
instead of formal laws creates much confusion in interpretation. Formal laws become 
effective the moment they are published in the Official Gazette, while decrees go through 
a prolonged cycle from the ministerial level to school administration level. Abiding by 
the laws is mandatory, while decrees occasionally remain ineffective. Additional 
complications arise in case laws get amended; decrees in in this case become obsolete.
713
 
Besides, the overall education system in Egypt suffers from several strains. The 
overcrowded Egyptian public schools, as well as high rates of drop-out and illiteracy 
show the government’s inability to extend access to education to every Egyptian child 
which in return further minimalizes chances for refugees.   
Following Sadat’s regulations of the late 1970s that classified Palestinians as 
foreigners, they automatically lost eligibility to receive free healthcare in state-owned 
hospitals. Refugees recognized by UNHCR receive medical treatment through Caritas 
Egypt, UNHCR’s main implementing partner. Caritas covers fifty percent of total 
medical expenses, twenty-five percent of doctors’ fees, and in impoverished cases 
provides all costs of hospitalization.
714
 In 2005, the Minister of Health issued a new 
regulation allowing all foreigners residing in Egypt to access primary and preventive 
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healthcare.
715
 However, the deteriorating conditions of Egyptian public hospitals push 
refugees registered with UNHCR to wait for better care with Caritas. Those unrecognized 
by UNHCR like the majority of Palestinian refugees have to either seek low-quality 
public hospitals or charitable independent clinics.   
           Employment is another sensitive topic in Egypt. Egypt suffers from high rates of 
unemployment and hiring foreigners is a sensitive matter. Egypt did not formulate a 
reservation to Article 17 of the 1951 Convention related to wage-labor. However, 
Egyptian legislation set many conditions to restrict hiring foreigners. Many Egyptian 
officials hold negative perceptions of refugees including that they are “unskilled, 
uneducated, and illiterate” and, “compete for jobs with poor Egyptians.”716 Until 2003, 
refugee identity card issued through UNHCR (also known as the blue card), carried the 
stamp “Not permitted to work.” Negotiations between UNHCR and the Egyptian 
government failed to lift this limitation. UNHCR approached the case thorough stressing 
the refugees’ right to work, while the Egyptian government argued that refugees are only 
prohibited from working in the public sector. Taking into account that the private sector 
is highly competitive and requires certain qualifications, refugees remain dependent on 
the insecure and unstable informal market.   
Labor Law 12 of 2003, articles 27 to 30 explained regulations concerning hiring 
foreigners. Article 27 stipulated that hiring foreigners in any Egyptian economic sector 
must depend on observing reciprocity conditions. The regulations issued during the 
Nasser era included clauses clearly exempting Palestinians from meeting reciprocity 
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conditions due to their statelessness. But since Palestinians became defined as foreigners, 
the article left it to the competent minister to determine which nationals qualify for 
exemption from this condition. Articles 28 and 29 stipulated that obtaining work permits 
and valid residency was mandatory. Article 29 stated that the fees to be collected for 
issuing a new work permit would not be less than one thousand Egyptian pounds. Article 
30 stipulated that aliens should not compete with the local workforce or exceed a total of 
ten percent of the total number of workers. The article also stated that the concerned 
minister should issue a decree determining which professions aliens are prohibited from 
practicing.
717
 However, Article 6 of Resolution 136 of 2003 related to the procedures and 
conditions of work permits for foreigners exempted some foreigners including 
Palestinians from paying the high fees for work permits.
718
 Since most Palestinian 
refugees in Egypt suffer from low-living standards and inability to access enough 
education, they lack sufficient skills to compete with other well-trained foreigners. 
Accordingly, Palestinians fall prey to the informal market, which fails to provide a stable 
job and adequate insurance.      
The right to ownership did not fare better. Many Palestinians who settled in Egypt 
descended from a peasant background. When they arrived in Egypt, they bought small 
plots for cultivation purposes. Although Egyptian laws prohibit foreigners from owning 
agricultural lands, during the Nasser years Palestinians were exempted from this law.
719
 
However, in 1985 and despite the improvement in Egyptian-Palestinian relations, the 
government issued Law 104 of 1985. This law canceled the exception granted to 
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Palestinians in Law 15 of 1963 related to land ownership. Despite the fact that new laws 
should not apply to preceding cases, this law contained a retroactive clause. In other 
words, it annulled all previous Palestinian ownership. It also prohibited Palestinian 
owners from selling their lands to their Egyptian wives and stipulated that they sell to 
unrelated Egyptian buyers. Those who failed to comply with this law faced the 
confiscation of their property and imprisonment.
720
 This left refugees without any 
income, the law did not offer any compensation for the loss of property. Article 13 of the 
1951 Convention stipulates that the contracting state should afford the most favorable 
treatment to refugees in terms of acquiring movable and unmovable property. Article 18 
stipulated that the contracting states should allow refugees the right to engage in self-
employment including agriculture, industry, commerce and handicrafts. The Egyptian 
government violates these articles although it did not formulate any official reservations 
on signing the Convention in 1981.   
Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the Mubarak era, which in essence represented a 
continuation to that of Sadat. Mubarak made relations with the United States a strategic 
cornerstone of his foreign and economic policies. He was adamant that peace 
negotiations were the only viable way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. He dismissed 
the option of war and always warned that armed struggle increases violence. Egyptian-
Palestinian relations did not experience tough political tensions especially when Arafat 
opted for the negotiations path beginning with the Oslo Accords. Tensions did however 
occur, following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007. The Egyptian regime sided with 
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Fatah and attempted to isolate Hamas through sealing the Rafah border, which was the 
only viable vein sustaining the already entrapped Gazans.  
            Domestically, the status of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt did not change 
since the Sadat era. They remained classified as foreigners and struggled to provide for 
the costs of living, residency permits renewals, education enrollment, and the scarcity of 
secure jobs. The regime did not show any willingness to engage positively in improving 
the conditions of the refugees. Rather the regime approached the refugee issue with a 
sense of alienation and securitization. Palestinian refugees faced arbitrary deportations 
without clear legal procedures. It however remains to be investigated whether or not 
Palestinians residing in Egypt had experienced further complications in treatment 
following the Egyptian intense clash with Hamas between 2007 and 2010. 
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Conclusion  
 
            The Egyptian revolution of 2011 stemmed largely from mounting domestic 
grievances including poverty, oppression, and the lack of social justice. However, 
Mubarak’s foreign policies and Egypt’s declining regional status added more fuel to the 
growing dissatisfaction with his regime. Some observers argue that early manifestations 
of popular anti-regime agitation appeared during the mass protests of the early 2000s. 
During the brutal Israeli invasion of Jenin in 2002 and the war on Iraq in 2003, hundreds 
of thousands of Egyptians organized demonstrations protesting the regime’s passivity 
toward the massacres in both Palestine and Iraq. Solidarity with Palestinian and Arab 
grievances acted as a catalyst unifying Egyptian opposition from different trends 
including Leftists, Nasserists, Liberals, and the Muslim Brotherhood. This unified 
collaboration galvanized the opposition, culminating with the eruption of the 
revolution.
721
 Mubarak stepped-down as a president on 11 February 2011 leaving the 
SCAF in charge of the transitional period which lasted till 30 June 2012. During this 
interim period, many Egyptians sought significant political changes that would restore 
Egypt’s Arab leadership. The demands mainly called for a firmer stance toward Israel 
including ending all trade agreements such as QIZ and gas sales. Further calls demanded 
expelling the Israeli ambassador, opening the Rafah cross border, and reevaluating the 
                                                          
721. For a detailed analysis on this topic see Reem Abou-El-Fadl, “The Road to Jerusalem through Tahrir 
Square: Anti-Zionism and Palestine in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 
41, No. 2 (Winter 2012), 6-26 
209 
 
terms of the Camp David Accords of 1978 which pose several restrictions on Egyptian 
military presence in Sinai.
722
  
 On 9 September 2011 hundreds of protesters stormed the Israeli embassy in Giza. 
They threw many documents and one protester managed to remove the Israeli flag and 
replace it with an Egyptian one.
723
 The act came after months of Egyptian anger toward 
Israel in the wake of the death of five Egyptian border guards in July 2011 by Israeli 
forces. Israel stated that they did not target the Egyptian forces across the border but in 
fact were chasing militants smuggling weapons into Gaza. However, Egyptians 
demanded a firm stance to avenge the slayed soldiers and marched toward the embassy to 
evict it themselves.
724
 Following the incident Israel recalled its diplomatic convoy and the 
United States expressed its deep concern and called upon the Egyptian authorities to take 
all measures necessary to maintain order.
725
 The authorities in return, declared a state of 
emergency and dispatched thousands of police and military units to protect the embassy. 
However, the act itself remained significant as the first bold statement expressing 
Egyptian sentiments regarding diplomatic relations with Israel. During the Mubarak era, 
university students used to demonstrate against Israeli presence in Egypt and called for 
serving all ties with it in response to the mounting Israeli aggressions on Palestinians. 
However, the regime maintained a strict order and the anti-riot police always succeeded 
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in containing the protesters and confined them within campus gates. Through attacking 
the embassy, Egyptian protesters wanted to send a message that as a population they 
never really adhered to peace with Israel and still perceive it as their true enemy.  
The attack on the embassy stirred a controversy. Although applauded by many 
Egyptians and Islamic-oriented groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, many secularists 
and political activists condemned it. They argued that storming the embassy is not the 
solution and does not benefit Egypt’s interests, since it rendered the state chaotic and 
incapable of protecting foreign establishments.
726
  
Additionally, the gas pipes transferring Egyptian gas to Israel faced a series of 
anonymous attacks which left the lines inoperable. Talks between Israeli officials and the 
head of the Egyptian Company for National Gases (EGAS) regarding modifying sales 
prices have stalled since 15 September 2011. Egypt stopped supplying its gas to Israel 
indefinitely since early 2012.
727
   
Despite visible Egyptian-Israeli tensions and the surge in popular anti-Israel 
sentiments, the Egyptian government asserted its commitment to its treaties with Israel. 
With an economy highly dependent on Western financial aid and a turbulent transitional 
period, the government could not afford a confrontation with Israel and the West. The 
government in an attempt to engage more effectively in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
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revived the prisoners exchange negotiations. On 11 October 2011 Egyptian officials 
declared that a prisoner exchange deal had been finalized between Israel and Hamas.
728
 
On 18 October 2011 Hamas exchanged Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (captured in Gaza on 
25 June 2006) for 1,027 Palestinian security prisoners.
729
 However, Israeli prisons still 
hold thousands of Palestinian prisoners who suffer from inhuman treatment.
730
  
On 30 June 2012, the transitional period in Egypt officially ended when 
Mohammad Mursi won the presidential elections. Mursi, a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood declared that the “new Egypt” will regain its Arab leadership and play a fair 
role to reconcile Hamas and Fatah. He also stressed that he would end the Gaza blockade. 
On 28 July 2012 Egyptian officials stated that the Rafah cross border will resume 
operating on daily basis from nine o’clock in the morning till five in the afternoon except 
for weekends and official holidays where the gates shall remain closed.
731
 Further, the 
government allowed the passage of construction materials to help rebuild Gaza after 
successive Israeli raids.
732
 It is important to note that under Mubarak construction 
materials were prohibited from passing into Gaza through Rafah under the pretext that 
the cross border is designed for the passage of people only.       
Nonetheless, the tunnels spreading across the border remained a highly contested 
issue. The tunnels increased rapidly since 2007 with the intensification of the Gaza 
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blockade. Despite the reopening of the Rafah border cross, thousands of tunnels still 
operate under the ground. Following the revolution, Sinai suffered from a state of 
lawlessness, and several reports warned that the tunnels are being used to smuggle heavy 
weapons and transfer radical Islamists between Sinai and Gaza.
733
 On 5 August 2012 and 
during the holy month of Ramadan, a terrorist attack occurred in Sinai and resulted in the 
death of sixteen Egyptian soldiers and the injury of seven others. The perpetrators stole 
Egyptian military vehicles and drove them into the Gaza strip but Israeli forces managed 
to kill them.
734
 Mursi vowed a strong retaliation and declared that he would lead the 
military operations in Sinai to arrest suspected radical elements.
735
 However, 
investigations dragged and the attackers remain unidentified. The Egyptian army in return 
embarked on destroying the tunnels in an effort to contain suspicious activities.
736
 
Recently an Egyptian court ruled in favor of destroying all the tunnels to protect national 
security.
737
  
During early November, 2012 Israeli forces assassinated a leader in al-Qassam 
brigades, Hamas military wing. Consequently, Hamas retaliated by shelling Israeli 
settlements triggering Israel to launch on 14 November 2012 a wide military operation in 
Gaza known as “Operation Pillar of Cloud.” The operation resulted in the death of over a 
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hundred Palestinians and the injury of another eight hundred.
738
 The Egyptian regime 
rushed to contain the escalation. Mursi recalled the Egyptian ambassador to Israel, and 
called for an action from both the UN Security Council and the Arab League to pressure 
Israel to halt its aggression.
739
 Mursi also dispatched the Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham 
Qandil to Gaza to stress both Egypt’s solidarity with Gazans and its desire to restore its 
regional leadership.
740
 Mursi’s diplomatic actions seemed speedy when compared to 
those of Mubarak. During “Operation Cast Lead” of 2008-2009, Egyptian diplomacy was 
criticized for being too slow to respond to the human crisis in Gaza. This attitude 
stemmed largely from Mubarak’s mounting dissatisfaction with Hamas and his desire to 
weaken their presence on Egypt’s eastern border. Also, Mubarak’s diplomacy had to 
follow the lead of its US counterpart which explicitly adopts an anti-Hamas stance.
741
 
Mursi’s initiative succeeded in finalizing an Israeli-Palestinian cease fire on 21 
November 2012. The agreement stipulated an immediate cease fire on both sides (Israel 
and Hamas) and opening crossing gates to facilitate the passage of people and goods. The 
agreement placed Egypt as a witness to observe the implementation of the cease fire by 
both parties.
742
     
The Egyptian government also pushes toward finalizing the long-awaited Hamas-
Fatah reconciliation. By early 2013 Egyptian officials invited representatives of both 
                                                          
738. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pillar_of_Defence also see “Gaza Braces for Invasion as Death Toll 
Mounts,” The Observer on 18 November 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/18/israel-gaza-
braces-for-invasion  
739. http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/Egypt-recalls-Israel-ambassador-after-Gaza-raid/-
/1066/1620468/-/duoj9kz/-/index.html  
740. Kevin Connolly, “Conflict Test for post-Mubarak Egypt,” on 15 November 2012 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20343183  
741. Ibid. also refer to chapter (4), 28. Notes No. 109-110 
742. http://www.dostor.org  on 21 November 2012 [Arabic Source] also see “Israel and Hamas Agree to a 
Cease-Fire, After a U.S.-Egypt Push,” The New York Times on 21 November 2012 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-conflict.html?hp&_r=0  
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organizations to settle their differences and draft a tentative timeline to finalize the 
reconciliation, set a date for new legislative elections, and form a unity government.
743
 
However, talks kept dragging and a concrete achievement remains elusive.
744
 Further, 
Egypt’s mounting political turmoil with Mursi struggling with social unrest and 
unprecedented economic decline enforce the state to turn inward. Egypt’s domestic 
dilemmas pose a serious challenge to its ambitions in restoring its Arab leadership. It 
remains to be seen when and how will Egypt overcome its turmoil and head toward 
achieving the prominence envisioned by the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square.      
Despite Egypt’s diplomatic initiatives, the core of Mursi’s political approach did 
not significantly differ from that of his predecessor.  In other words, the government’s 
stance focuses on the Palestine cause but not the Palestinians. Ever since the demise of 
Nasserism, Palestinians in Egypt faced systematic marginalization resulting in them 
being an invisible community. Much has been said about solidarity and commitment to 
the Palestine issue and Palestinians in the occupied territories. By contrast, neither the 
successive Egyptian governments, nor the media attempted to adopt any initiatives to 
improve the social and legal conditions of Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt. The 
only progression came in the form of issuing Law 154 of 2004 related to granting 
Egyptian citizenship to children born to Egyptian women and foreign fathers. During the 
revolution, Palestinian refugees mostly refrained from participating fearing that they 
                                                          
743. “Egypt Pushes toward Achieving a Palestinian Reconciliation,” on 10 January 2013 
http://arabic.peopledaily.com.cn/31662/8086769.html#  also see “Fatah Appreciates Egypt’s Role in 
Backing the Reconciliation,” on 18 January 2013 http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=913085  
[Arabic Sources] 
744. “Egyptian Correspondences with Hamas to Save the Palestinian Reconciliation,” on 25 February 2013  
http://www2.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=958488& [Arabic Source] 
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would be targeted by security forces.
745
 The success of the revolution and the initial wave 
of popular solidarity with the Palestine cause revived hopes that the years of 
marginalization are about to end. Starting from May 2011 Palestinians born to Egyptian 
mothers could finally apply for their Egyptian citizenship. However, this was the only 
tangible improvement achieved while all the regulations defining Palestinians as 
foreigners remained intact. With Egypt’s mounting internal crisis, it becomes rather 
difficult to predict when or how would the government address its responsibilities toward 
its refugee communities.  
  
                                                          
745. Bisan Udwan, “Egypt’s Palestinians and the Uprising,” http://english.al-
akhbar.com/content/egypt%E2%80%99s-palestinians-and-uprising on 13 October 2011, also see Sarah el-
Rashidi, “Refugees Remain Invisible in post-Revolutionary Egypt,” on 6 April 2012, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/38224.aspx  
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